

RS-UMA-89-011  
MAY 1989



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

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***Military Affairs***

# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-89-011

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15 May 1989

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**Chief of Party Organizational Work on Recent Reports, Elections Campaign**

*18010514 Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL in Russian No 4, Feb 89 pp 3-10*

[Interview with Lt Gen Vadim Dmitriyevich Lukinykh, chief of organizational party work in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, by unidentified KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL correspondent: "From Discussion to Action"; first paragraph is KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL introduction]

[Text] In a conversation with our correspondent, Lt Gen V. Lukinykh, chief of organizational party work in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, reflects on the results and main lessons from the reports and elections in party organizations.

[Correspondent] Vadim Dmitriyevich, reports and elections of party organizations took place three times during perestroika in the armed forces. It is said that everything is known in comparison. What, in your view, special features and new characteristics distinguish the recently concluded reports and elections campaign from previous campaigns? Do you think that they were successful in transferring the spiritual and moral charge of the 19th All-Union Party Conference to army and navy party collectives?

[Lukinykh] Precisely the impact of the ideas and spirit itself of the 19th CPSU Conference on the minds and consciousness of people predetermined the main feature of the reports and elections in party organizations of the army and navy. They became part of the vivifying process of the more profound comprehension of the political aims and innovative decisions of the conference and ways for their more active embodiment in the practice of party work. A noticeable change has taken place in party life away from social apathy, public inertness and conservatism in thinking toward the development of the personal interest, action and high-mindedness of communists. Thanks to this, the current reports and elections campaign differed significantly from all preceding campaigns in terms of the democratic and businesslike nature of the atmosphere, its content, the sharpness and profundity with which current problems were raised, and the active participation of communists in the discussion and elaboration of decisions and formation of elective party organizations. In summarizing its results, the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate noted a whole series of positive changes, approaches and undertakings that helped to raise the initiative and responsibility of communists, increase the dynamism of the renewal of party political work, and strengthen the influence of party organizations on the qualitative parameters of the training of naval troops and forces and on the strengthening of military discipline.

Army and navy communists became more convinced adherents and advocates of perestroika. This is certainly the main political result of the reports and elections. Openness and frankness in the exchange of opinions and

in the assessment of the work of party leaders prevailed almost everywhere in meetings and conferences. In most instances, in contrast to previous years, and without a trace of affectation, they realistically and strictly analyzed the work of political bodies and party committees and bureaus in connection with the realization of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th CPSU Conference and the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee on defense matters. The following facts speak eloquently of the more demanding nature and high-mindedness of communists and of their dissatisfaction with the speed and results of the restructuring of the work style and methods of elective party bodies. The work of 17 party committees, 161 party bureaus and 522 party organizations was found unsatisfactory. The number of secretaries of primary and shop party organizations rejected in the course of secret voting was several times greater than in the reports and elections that took place on the eve of the 27th CPSU Congress. Communists refused to put their trust in those who were incapable of organizing party work in a new way and who lack boldness and firmness in defending the interests of perestroika, sensitivity toward people, and the ability to listen to the opinions and suggestions of their comrades.

The incipient overcoming of indifference and apathy is perhaps the most significant characteristic of the improvement of the moral climate in primary party organizations. For it was just 3 years ago that criticism was basically from the top down and many communists were reluctant to tell each other, and especially leaders, the truth from face to face. It is no secret that many party members absolutely did not care who heads the party organization, how things stand there, and what is the nature of its interrelationships with the political body. There is now more and more criticism of leaders and one another and it is becoming more objective and convincing. And communists are now striving to promote people to the party organs who are creative, innovative in their thinking, bold and capable of working effectively. The sharpest polemics flared up precisely in the promotion and discussion of candidacies in party committees and bureaus and of delegates at the party conference.

[Correspondent] What brought about such a sudden psychological change?

[Lukinykh] It was above all the democratization of life within the party. In accordance with the new CPSU Central Committee Instruction on the holding of elections of leading party organs, communists were given not the declared but the actual possibility of independently determining and deciding who should head a party organization or represent it at a party conference. For the first time, almost every other secretary in primary and one out of three in shop party organizations was elected on a competitive basis with two or more candidates. True, it was not done this way everywhere. This practice was applied considerably more narrowly in the party organizations of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and in the Transcaucasus and Odessa military districts.



[Correspondent] In connection with this ambivalent attitude toward alternative elections, we have heard the opinion that the preliminary polls and questioning of communists and, in some places, non-party military personnel can themselves reveal the most worthy. And therefore there is no reason to include more candidacies in the lists for secret balloting and to cause moral injury to those who are not elected to the party committee or bureau or as secretary of a party organization. Can it be that there is some truth in this?

[Lukinykh] Yes, considerable truth. This is also new in our internal party life—the open and public study of the points of view and proposals of communists and of the opinion of the party or military collective about who among the members of the CPSU is most authoritative and capable of becoming the recognized leader there. It is up to communists whether or not to put forward alternative candidacies when it is completely clear whom the absolute majority prefers to see at the head of the party organization. This is especially so in the few organizations where they all know each other well and everyone knows who is the most capable of leading party work.

It is not a matter of observing form but of the freedom of communists to express their will. And it was ensured significantly more fully in the current elections than before. In any case, where the political bodies and political workers of units and ships and all party members explained in depth and interpreted the position of the new CPSU Central Committee Instruction. And where they did not study the opinion of communists and did not perform explanatory work but relied only on their own "authoritative" word and desires, they reaped the corresponding fruit. Thus, it was a surprise for the political sections of the air forces of the Northern Fleet and Military Engineering Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev that their former secretaries in the helicopter regiment and the regiment for the educational process, who were in poor standing in the reporting period, were not elected to the new party committees.

It is my opinion that competitive elections require a new attitude toward their results. They elect the secretary of the party organization and members of the party committee and party bureau from among the best. And if someone did not get the necessary number of votes, one must see this as a natural democratic process and not as an expression of public distrust or personal tragedy. It is another matter when the entire party organization refuses to put its trust in a communist leader. There is something to think about here and there is reason to take a closer look at oneself and one's interrelationships with people.

[Correspondent] As far as I know, the extension of democratization in internal party life involved not only elections.

[Lukinykh] For the first time, many report and election party meetings were open. In the party organizations of Moscow Military District, for example, there were non-party military personnel present at 40 percent of the meetings.

Communists approved of a new phenomenon in the internal party practice of the army and navy that arose through perestroika—reports of political bodies at party conferences and the evaluation of their work by the conferences. This encouraged the delegates to enter into a general and honest conversation about the style of the work of political sections and political directorates in guiding the restructuring of party political work. By the way, it was not just delegates who had this opportunity but also most communists. The preliminary familiarization of communists with the positions of reports, which until recently was done only on a trial or episodic basis, became almost widespread this time. The summaries were sent to primary party organizations in advance, published in district, group and navy newspapers, and discussed with the party aktiv. There were meetings of the leading personnel with delegates on the eve of the meetings in Far East, Belorussian, Moscow, Carpathian and other military districts.

The military councils and workers of staffs and services informed communists on the course of the realization of proposals and critical comments expressed at report and election meetings in units. Such mass discussion and contact with people made it possible, in the first place, to make the reports of political bodies the fruit of collective thought and, secondly, to resolve many urgent questions without delay and to concentrate the attention of communists on the most acute problems.

Also widespread was the collective council of delegates from the party organizations of the unit, ship or combined unit about who among them should best speak at the party conference and what questions should be raised.

New approaches were also seen in the formulation of resolutions. Included are their release from general call-up and saturation with specific measures that clearly define what needs to be done when and by whom and how to verify the quality of performance. Included is the preliminary familiarization of party members with draft resolutions and the involvement of a greater number of communists and delegates in their final elaboration. In a number of places, for example at the party conferences of the Moscow Air Defense District, Transcaucasus District and the Pacific Fleet, they adopted, in addition to resolutions on the reports of political directorates and party commissions, unique programs to deepen the restructuring of the work of political bodies and primary party organizations and to increase the role of party organizations as the political core of military and labor collectives. They also specified the system for the periodic informing of communists on the course of their realization.

Is this not a tribute to paper-shuffling? I do not think so. For there are all kinds of paper. A good specific plan that takes into account realistic possibilities and provides for the reasonable disposition of forces and reliance on the

creative initiative of people is a good basis for efficient and fruitful work. But it is obvious that the value of any innovations will be determined only by incremental work.

[Correspondent] In this connection, I would like to know your opinion about a certain question. At the beginning of the conversation, you told of significant breakthroughs in party work. But a breakthrough is not an offensive but more accurately is a probing action or the capture of a bridgehead. And we are already concluding the fourth year of perestroika. Why is democratization not working everywhere and bringing a perceptible yield? What is slowing the development of the action and independence of primary party organizations and hindering the increase in authority of elective bodies? Readers are asking about this in their letters to the editor's office.

[Lukinykh] Such questions were raised and discussed at most of the report and election meetings and especially intensely at the party conferences. We are seeing not only serious concern of communists about the slide of perestroika in a number of extremely important sectors and directions but also the striving to get down to the original causes of such an alarming situation and the sincere desire to correct matters. There are many reasons but in the final analysis all of them will depend upon the specific person, his consciousness and attitude toward party obligations and the degree of his responsibility.

Among communists, unfortunately, there are still many people, including those holding high posts, who use the terminology of perestroika to mask their own inability to think creatively and unwillingness to work more. But the authority of the primary party organization as the political vanguard of the military collective and the force of its influence on military personnel are directly related and depend entirely upon the authority of the party committee or bureau and the exemplariness and self-denial of each member and candidate member of the CPSU in service, studies and discipline.

There has probably not been a single party conversation at any level, beginning with the party group and ending with the session of the bureau of the Main Political Directorate, in the course of which the problem of the personal exemplariness of the communist was not accentuated. Without exaggeration, the problem is the most burning and most important one. But it is being resolved extremely slowly. Considerable evidence of this was presented at meetings and conferences. The barrier of mediocrity in personal training turned out to be insurmountable for more than one-third of party members in Turkestan Military District. In the combined unit where A. Yakunin is political officer, there are regimental and battalion party organizations where only 7 or 8 percent of the members and candidate members of the CPSU are outstanding. In many party organizations of units and ships, there is no decline in the number of communists who violate military discipline.

More examples of this kind could be presented. And people are completely reasonable in asking: What kind of vanguard is this that is lagging behind in its work and actions? The appeals for fundamental restructuring in the mouth of such a communist are nothing short of demagogic irreverence. And who takes them seriously anyway? One and the same idea was quite properly presented by those reporting and speaking at many meetings and conference: the main mechanism of the slowdown is we ourselves; we often wasted no time in removing the requirement that perestroika start with ourselves. This applies to everyone without exception, rank and file communists as well as leaders. Doubtless primarily to the latter. This is not the first time that communists at report and election meetings have revealed such shortcomings as the diversion of some personnel from combat training for diverse economic work, the growing rather than diminishing flow of paper from staffs and directorates, and the large invasion of commissions that hinder work in the units. But this situation is not changing for the better. Why? As a rule, the corresponding officials of the district level and higher are also party members and are not taking measures to eradicate the negative occurrences.

[Correspondent] But if some members of the CPSU took so long to sense the need or lacked the willpower to change and to adapt to a new and more responsible and conscientious attitude toward their work, then it follows that the party organizations and political bodies must help such comrades. The entire question is how. For the information presented in the reports at the conferences by the secretaries of party commissions or political bodies of a number of military districts, fleets and combined units indicates that the number of communists brought to party account is not declining but is even increasing in some places such as the military construction units, for example. Consequently, much is already expected of them, including "from below," as confirmed by the significantly higher number of secretaries of party organizations who have been deprived of trust because of unsatisfactory work, as mentioned above. What is the answer?

[Lukinykh] The answer is in a new understanding and filling with new content both of the responsibility of every communist for the situation in the sector entrusted to him and for his personal contribution to perestroika and of party demands. The only thing that really works is responsibility based not on fear of punishment and administrative coercion but on party conscience, political awareness and ideological maturity. Two extremes, however, hinder the formation of a profoundly realized responsibility: extreme preoccupation with the imposition of party punishment and connivance, the lack of the proper demands on the communist. At the conferences, they presented cases in which in individual party organizations one-fourth or even one-third of the members of the CPSU were brought to account but their attitude toward their work and therefore their vanguard role has not changed for the better.



It appears that in the interests of perestroika we need to relearn the culture of party strictness as well as the culture of criticism, glasnost and democracy. And also learn comradely high-mindedness, directness, honesty, the sensible utilization of the rights granted by the CPSU Rules, and the exclusion of maximalism from above as well as from below. Without in any way encroaching on the free expression of the will of communists in the election of party organs, I nevertheless want to say that at times there was not enough openness here. For there were no grievances against many of the rejected secretaries of party committees and bureaus expressed in the speeches of communists or in the discussion of candidacies. They were unanimously included in the list for secret balloting and were just as amicably "rejected." Such an approach does not jibe very well with party comradeship and true party high-mindedness.

The new understanding and content of strictness is, as it appears, above all the establishment in each party organization of an atmosphere of mutual strictness and constant comradely demands on each member and candidate member of the CPSU for ideological and moral growth, their observance of the norms of party morality and ethics, and the fulfillment of statutory obligations. This is the affirmation of mutual respect, culture, humane relations and the restoration of the original Bolshevik sense to the concepts of party duty, honor and dignity, the sharpened perception of which is the most reliable guarantor of the increased exemplariness of communists. As the reports and elections showed, the renewal of the work in ideological and theoretical hardening and the political and moral education of party members is still the weakest link in the overall process of restructuring the work of primary party organizations and political bodies. For this reason, they are slow in switching over to political methods of work and in mastering the art of influencing people ideologically.

Unfortunately, the state of conceptual-educational and all ideological work of political bodies, party committees and bureaus, and party organizations was analyzed superficially at many meetings and conferences and without the necessary depth and high-mindedness. Whereas previously such an omission also did not honor anyone, now, under the conditions of the implementation of the first stage in political reform and the ongoing preparation for the elections of people's deputies of the USSR, it is simply inexplicable and unforgivable. It is necessary to make up for what has been neglected immediately and in the most decisive way. It is impossible with old habits and views to be successful in assimilating the political methods of work and leadership in political bodies and party organizations.

At a recent meeting of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, M.S. Gorbachev stressed that the party cannot realize its potential as a political vanguard without a change in the role and position of the primary party organization and communists. He named the task of activating and strengthening all processes of party life in primary organizations as the

immediate and main task. They must now feel different and live a different life—ideologically saturated and imbued with the high political activeness and responsibility of communists and an orientation toward specific work aimed at the individual in all of its content.

Who should reorganize it precisely in this channel? Of course it must primarily be the party committees and bureaus of the units and ships, staffs and directorates. We talk a lot about the necessity of restoring their authority and this is certainly right, for the authority of the party organization begins with the authority of the party committee and bureau. Only it cannot be introduced from the outside but is earned through their own authoritative actions. And through a bold, innovative and firm position in the restructuring and implementation of party personnel policy and in the resolution of all questions involving the improvement of the quality of combat training and the strengthening of discipline and the social health of people.

Look at the composition of our elective party organs. As a rule, these are competent people in the military-technical and political sense, people who are capable of in-depth understanding of any situation arising in the military collective and any problem in the educational process and of finding a way out of a difficult situation as well as optimum ways to resolve problems. But are all party committees in fact collective organs of leadership? No, quite frequently report and election meetings revealed a chronic "illness": it is basically the secretary and one or two members of the committee or bureau who do the work. After the assignment of duties, the rest forget about them; they sometimes remember the fact that they are members of an elective party organ only during its meetings. And it was for this reason that the party committees headed by Lt Col N. Yefimovich, Maj A. Gribankov, Capt 3rd Rank A. Inchin and the secretaries of other committees and party bureaus received unsatisfactory evaluations.

The fruitless work of other elective bodies also characterizes the style of the leadership of the corresponding political sections. The commission of the Main Political Directorate recently studied and analyzed the results of the work of the political directorate of Belorussian Military District in the training of primary political bodies in political methods of leadership. A certain amount of experience has been gained in this connection here and they are searching for new and more effective forms of work. Overall, however, it must be said that among some political bodies there has not been any decisive turning to the functions and methods of political leadership. Some of them have a difficult time giving up their arbitrary administrative style.

[Correspondent] Vadim Dmitriyevich, allow us to touch on a certain aspect of the matter. Did the reporting nature of the conferences play a role as a factor in strengthening the feedback in the link "primary organization—political section"? According to the comments

of communists in the forces, some political bodies were not especially enthusiastic about this innovation. At the conference in Moscow Air Defense District, for example, it was proposed that in the future they should evaluate only the work of the primary political bodies and talk about the work of the political directorate at the district level in the declaratory part of the resolution. Judging by reports from the party conferences published in the central military press and in district, group and fleet newspapers, the criticism of the political directorates was infrequent and timid. At the conference of Kiev Military District, for example, only one delegate dedicated his speech to a critical analysis of the work of the sections of the political directorate. How can one explain such facts—through the strangeness of the situation, the lack of party courage or other reasons?

[Lukinykh] I think that it is better to avoid generalizations about particular facts. There is no question that, just as all new things, the accountability of political bodies to the masses of communists is not an easy matter to introduce. And there were cases of a lack of understanding of the whole political importance of this practice. Thus, in the large formation in which Comrade V. Zakrevskiy serves, not all communists were informed of the possibility of evaluating the work of the political body and, naturally, the delegates speaking at the conference referred to the work of the political section in a basically complimentary spirit. In a number of places, the reports were in the traditional form and the reporting amounted to recognizing the fault of the political body in various shortcomings in party political work and there was really little criticism of the political directorates.

Overall, however, the new order forced the political bodies to take a closer look around. The reports were characterized by self-criticism. The communists became more demanding. In particular, the work of the political sections of the combined units where lieutenant colonels G. Ryazanov and L. Sidorenko worked was found to be unsatisfactory. Why? For their bureaucratic paper-and-telephone style, their adherence to administrative pressure in leading party organizations, and their formalism in ideological work. Twelve secretaries of party commissions under political bodies were rejected in secret balloting. The same number of chiefs of political sections were not elected by the delegates to party conferences because of passiveness in perestroika and shortcomings in their duties and personal conduct.

[Correspondent] What is the nature of the most frequent critical comments against political bodies? Or, more accurately, what aspects of their work were referred to most often?

[Lukinykh] Literally all aspects having to do with the style of work and leadership. In first place is the demand that they more quickly master political methods of leadership and that the party organizations be taught political methods of work. In the sections and departments for the organization of party work and in their

instruction and inspection staff, the communists want to see "brain centers" that accumulate advanced experience in perestroika and get it to the entire party aktiv. In the opinion of those speaking, they are still doing a poor job of this. And more help is expected from them locally in the implementation of the ideas put forward by the political bodies as well as in the introduction of new forms of party work. In this connection, demands were made on the workers of the political directorates of the Pacific Fleet and Volga Military District. We also fully accept these critical comments with respect to our administration of organizational party work.

The sections for propaganda and agitation were criticized for not acting to generate fresh ideas and to encourage the renewal of political instruction and ideological work. They were asked and advised to act more quickly to renounce the striving for large numbers of measures and the bureaucratic invention of forms and to deal in a practical manner with the renewal of the content and methods of political instruction, mass political work and their reorientation toward dialogue with people.

The most pointed questions raised had to do with the inadequate attention and slow reaction of political bodies to the critical comments and proposals of communists. It is as though no heed is being paid to the repeated criticism of the same shortcomings in the organization of the service of troops and the planning of combat training or to the proposals for their elimination, the establishment of quarantines for the social protection of military personnel, and the improvement of their provision with material supplies and domestic services. Some of them get bogged down at the district, group or fleet level and some of them in the directorates and offices of the central staff. In this connection, there was justified reproach of the party organizations and political bodies of staffs and directorates for their weak influence on the style of the work of communists and for showing little concern about the delay in elaborating standard documents and about bureaucratic red tape in approving them.

Communists made tens of thousands of critical comments and introduced thousands and thousands of proposals at the report and election party meetings and conferences. The political bodies, party committees and bureaus know very well what they have to do. Without delay, but without haste, they must take a close look at all constructive comments and suggestions and implement what they can in the unit, ship or combined unit without putting it off. The criticism and proposals on which the higher levels are empowered to make decisions and take measures should not only be brought to the attention of the appropriate leaders but one should also persistently endeavor to get factual answers and to inform the party organizations in a timely manner.

Many political bodies immediately undertook their vital and very important task of instructing and training the newly elected party aktiv. It includes more than one-third of army and navy communists. Almost half of the



secretaries of party organizations and members of party committees and bureaus are new. It is understandable that in working with them one must not limit himself to the assemblies and seminars held immediately after the conclusion of report and election party meetings. The bureau of the Main Political Directorate stressed the necessity of eliminating unsystematic campaigns and of improving the system and renewing the content of the training of the party aktiv. Today it is not enough merely to arm it with knowledge about the priority directions and basic forms of party work. Today it is necessary to provide instruction in the methodology and practice of perestroika and to give objective help to the local party committee and party bureau in mastering the political methods for influencing the moral atmosphere in the military collective and the formation of a new attitude in people toward the performance of their military duty.

To a considerable extent, the strengthening and development of the democratic principles and valuable initiatives engendered in the course of reports and elections as well as the uncovering of shortcomings and the demolishing of the mechanism of obstruction will depend upon the very rapid renewal of the work style of political bodies, especially primary bodies. Life itself indisputably shows that one can raise the authority and activeness of primary party organizations as the acknowledged political vanguard of the military collective only under the condition that the political section of the combined unit or unit begins to work effectively and adapts the style of its own ideological and organizational work to the demands of the time. Hence the paramount task of all higher political bodies to help each primary political section take its appropriate place as the immediate organizer of the restructuring of party political work in the units and on ships and of orienting it toward the individual.

The January Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee demanded that the center of gravity be shifted abruptly to practical work in realizing the policy, strategy and tactics of perestroika and in implementing decisions. In accordance with their duty and consciousness as the political vanguard, communists in the army and navy must provide an example of efficiency and purposefulness in the renewal of party work and the improvement of the quality of combat proficiency, organization and discipline.

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#### **Military-Judicial Roundtable on Role of Law in State**

18010429 Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL* in Russian No 3, Feb 89 pp 18-38

[Roundtable discussion led by Col N. N. Belyakov: "Armed Forces in the Soviet Legal State"]

[Text] The editorial board of the journal *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* conducted a roundtable discussion on pressing problems associated with practical

implementation, in the army and navy, of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference resolution "On Legal Reform" in a time of development of a truly legal socialist state.

Its participants included: Colonel of Justice I. M. Vashkevich, senior legal consultant, Affairs Department, USSR Ministry of Defense; Lieutenant Colonel V. D. Glushko, regiment commander; Colonel of Justice V. A. Dzyuba, deputy chief, Affairs Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense; Major General of Justice L. M. Zaika, first deputy chief military procurator; Colonel of Justice A. M. Zorin, chief, military legal faculty, Military Institute, USSR Ministry of Defense; Doctor of Legal Sciences A. S. Koblikov, professor, Military Institute, USSR Ministry of Defense; Candidate of Historical Sciences V. G. Krivorotenko, deputy director, division of sports and public defense work, Komsomol Central Committee; Colonel of Justice G. I. Kucher, candidate of legal sciences, chief, methodological department of military tribunals; Doctor of Legal Sciences V. P. Maslov, leading scientific associate, Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences; Lieutenant Colonel B. V. Molostov, candidate of philosophical sciences; Colonel of Justice V. I. Prishchep, department chief, Main Military Procuracy; Captain 3d Rank V. I. Rebrov, political worker; Colonel of Justice V. P. Seregin, candidate of legal sciences, docent, chief, department of military law, Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin; Doctor of Legal Sciences K. F. Skvortsov, deputy director, All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Problems of Strengthening Legality and Legal Order, USSR Procuracy; Doctor of Legal Sciences Ye. A. Skripilev, professor, leading scientific associate, Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences; Major General of Justice A. T. Ukolov, deputy chief, Military Tribunals Directorate; Lieutenant Colonel Ye. S. Shats, student, Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze.

The roundtable discussion was led by Colonel N. N. Belyakov, candidate of philosophical sciences, assistant editor-in-chief, *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*.

[Belyakov] The restructuring occurring in our country would be unimaginable without its comprehensive legal support. Creating a truly legal socialist state is one of the urgent tasks from this point of view. What are the basic principles and advantages of such a state?

[A. Zorin] First of all a state may be said to be legal if it functions on the basis of law, if it is constrained by the law, and if it ensures mutual responsibility between the state itself and the citizens and their organizations.

I share the point of view stated by Academician V. Kudryavtsev and Professor Ye. Lukasheva in the article "The Socialist Legal State" (*KOMMUNIST*, No 11, 1988). They distinguish the following basic traits of a legal state: a) dominion of the law in all spheres of social life; b) constraint of the state itself and its organs by the law; c) inviolability of the freedom of the individual, and

of his rights and interests, their protection and guarantee, and mutual responsibility between the state and the individual; d) effective control and surveillance over implementation of laws.

[V. Seregin] It was emphasized in the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference that "formation of a legal state must be completed." But then, the conference resolution "On Legal Reform" states: "Major measures of legal support to restructuring have been implemented. However, they should be interpreted only as the beginning of a great effort associated with forming a socialist legal state." These discrepancies are fundamental. What I mean is that we have yet to make the law supreme—that is, to make it an inviolable rule that the state must strictly follow the law. It is no secret, after all, that until recent times some state and administrative officials in high places lived by "their own" laws. Taking cover behind "higher interests," some officials often ignored the law, which is totally impermissible in civilized society.

[A. Koblikov] I think that in this connection we need to clarify one other fundamental point. Specifically, the supremacy of what law are we striving to ensure? Let's finally admit that we should be discussing only those laws today which express the real will of the people, their sovereignty and their impressions of justice, of law and of the moral values they profess. Only under this condition can we discuss a legal state. Otherwise many laws could be adopted, but if they are not enacted, they would become, mildly speaking, stillborn.

[K. Skvortsov] That's absolutely correct. Clear and unambiguous establishment of social relations in law is necessary in a truly legal state. Especially now, in the conditions of expanding glasnost and democratization. I vote with both hands for pluralism of opinions, though I repeat, within the bounds of law. For the moment, unfortunately, we have many laws that may be interpreted both in one way and in another. Take for example the peoples movement in Lithuania for restructuring. I asked some comrades from the republic this question: "In what direction are you intending to restructure things? You've got extremists, nationalists and 'Westerners' shouting out their righteousness, while utilizing our legal norms and laws, and extremely actively at that." As you would understand, the responses were contradictory and debatable. Consequently we need to get the law to regulate legal relations unambiguously, and to preclude any interpretations other than those indicated by the letter of the law, as quickly as possible.

[A. Koblikov] Otherwise, what sort of triumph of democracy would this be? A legal state would be unimaginable without the triumph of laws. What, then, is the basis of the idea behind such a state when, for example, the Estonian Supreme Soviet went as far as to permit an amendment to the union republic constitution which was clearly at odds with the USSR Constitution?

[Belyakov] But everyone knows, after all, that the inconsistency between constitutional and real exercise of state power has been the main flaw of our system in the course of the last six decades. For practical purposes the soviets were inactive, since they had no power, which was concentrated without limit in the hands of individuals or groups. On several occasions this generated lawlessness, corruption and unjustified purges. Why did we not build a legal state immediately after 1917? Who kept us from doing so?

[A. Koblikov] Stating the objective of creating a socialist legal state in the USSR is one of the fundamental ideas of restructuring. This is essentially a revolution in our relationship both to the political system and to the principles of its function. Let me note that such a state could be built only in a particular stage. While we did take on this highly important task very late, we must nonetheless understand that in the conditions of revolution, civil war and the first half of the 1920s, it was impossible to propose and implement this idea. The dictatorship of the proletariat was established at that time. And in 1920 V. I. Lenin emphasized: "Dictatorship means...unlimited power relying upon force, and not upon the law. During a civil war, whatever power is victorious can only be dictatorial." Many of our prominent publicists, philosophers and historians who are boldly revealing the "omissions" are forgetting this for some reason. At the same time Stalin and his associates, and many party, soviet and state workers of lesser rank, doubtlessly bear enormous blame for the revelry of lawlessness.

[Ye. Skripilev] And among those who played an especially malevolent role in the "development," or more accurately in the ruin of Soviet law, A. Ya. Vyshinskiy, who received four orders of Lenin from Stalin for his "outstanding services," is the leader. Our legal science had its own "Lysenkoism," its own Academician Lysenko—Vyshinskiy.

*Editor's note: Vyshinskiy, Andrey Yanuaryevich (1883-1954). USSR general procurator in 1935-1939. Academician. Author of over 200 works on state and law, which distorted Soviet justice and for practical purposes led to serious violations of socialist legality and unjustified purges of millions of people. Best known works include "Kurs ugolovnogo prava" [A Course in Criminal Law], "Sudoustroystvo v SSSR" [The Judicial System in the USSR], "Teoriya sudebnykh dokazatelstv v sovetskom prave" [The Theory of Legal Evidence in Soviet Law], "Voprosy teorii gosudarstva i prava" [Problems of the Theory of State and Law].*

V. Ulrikh, chairman of the military board of the USSR Supreme Court, tried to keep up with him as well. No matter what laws of the 1930s you look at, these people had their mark on them. They so distorted Soviet legislation that there was nowhere else to go.

They did what they wanted to. They carried out their reprisals against the cream of the crop of Soviet people. Here is an excerpt from an official document published 12 June 1937 in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reporting on a special court hearing conducted 11 June 1937 under the chairmanship of V. Ulrikh: "A Special Court Hearing of the USSR Supreme Court found all defendants—M. N. Tukhachevskiy, I. E. Yakir, I. P. Uborevich, A. I. Kork, R. P. Eydeman, B. M. Feldman, V. M. Primakov and V. K. Putna guilty of violating military duty (the oath), betraying the Workers and Peasants Army and betraying the motherland, and passed the following sentence: Stripping all defendants of their ranks, and defendants Tukhachevskiy of his rank of marshal of the Soviet Union, and sentencing all to the highest degree of criminal punishment—death by firing squad."

A discussion was held in 1940 with the purpose of clarifying what military law is, and whether or not it exists in general. We were made to believe by the ideas proposed that military law exists. It consists of military administrative, criminal and judicial law. But Vyshinskiy slammed down all of this theory, and concurrently the practice of military legislation. He disarmed military lawyers for decades. He began frightening them with the notion that developing such law would pit the army against the people. What nonsense this demagoguery is.

*Editor's note: The victims of the purges of 1937-1941 in the armed forces included: out of five marshals—three; out of five army commanders 1st rank—three; out of army commanders 2d rank—all; out of 57 corps commanders—50; out of 186 division commanders—154; out of 16 army commissars 1st and 2d rank—all; out of 28 corps commissars—25; out of 64 battalion commissars—58; out of 456 colonels—401. In all, 44,000 commanders and political workers were purged in the army.*

[V. Krivorotenko] We in the Komsomol Central Committee feel that as a social organization, the Komsomol underwent distortion from the late 1920s, and especially in the 1930s. Stalin and his associates spared no effort to completely deprive our youth union of its organizational and political independence. Party organs have just begun analyzing the processes occurring in our union, and relating to the Komsomol as a real helper of the CPSU, a real political youth organization. In this connection we are restructuring many aspects of our activity. Among other things, we are beginning to delve with greater interest into the work of Komsomol organizations aimed at preparing young people for service in the army and navy, and for service as Komsomol soldiers as well.

[A. Zorin] The 20th and 22d party congresses exposed the tyranny and lawlessness of the times of the cult of personality, and adopted a number of specific measures to restore Leninist principles of socialist legality.

[V. Dzyuba] At the same time these were half-way and inconsistent measures. The reason for this was that they were carried out under the conditions of the former

political structures, of excessive intrusion of the state into social relations, and of a dogmatic approach to solving the complex problems of the people's life. Violations of socialist legality, and especially of the principle that legal norms are binding upon all, irrespective of their position (equality before the law), became more frequent, the fight against crime became less effective, and mismanagement, bribery and corruption began to flourish.

*Editor's note: Criminal clans in Uzbekistan actually embezzled 5 billion rubles from the state. Continuing to adopt higher pledges for "harvesting" cotton from year to year, "Rashidovites" promised in 1968 to sharply increase its production; in this case they planned to "procure" an even half of it by means of false reporting and intrigue. During examination of the case of the main trade administration in Moscow, the inquiry spread to 2,000 workers of the capital's food trade system whose complicity in the multimillion embezzlement or extortion did not elicit any doubt. The crimes of wheeler-dealers from Kirghizia, the "Pirozhkov" case in Sverdlovsk, the intrigues of the Okean company and the Svet, Kaskad and Tadzhikistan stores, the Krasnodar case, the Rostov and Moldavian cases, corruption in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and many other improper activities received broad publicity.*

[A. Ukolov] The army did not escape these negative phenomena to a certain degree either, and this had an effect on the level of legality and legal order in the troops. Disregard of the laws, manuals and orders, and legal nihilism intensified in the army and navy. This in turn generated negative phenomena such as irresponsibility, falsification of accounts, abuse of official position, protectionism and improper mutual relations between servicemen. It was noted at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo on 13 October 1988 that many of these problems are still urgent today.

[A. Zorin] And a legal state is precisely not only a firm and insurmountable barrier to recurrences of the past, to dismantling of democracy and to violations of socialist legality, but also a guarantee of legal protection of the individual.

[Belyakov] And so, the discussion turns to legal protection of the individual. We know that every citizen of our country possesses a certain range of responsibilities before the society, and that he bears responsibility before the law and the state for fulfilling or not fulfilling them. But should the state not also bear legal responsibility before the citizens, particularly for protecting their rights and freedoms?

[K. Skvortsov] Let me make this clear right away. Yes, we are obligated to ultimately achieve real support of rights and lawful interests by the state, though not of citizens in general but of every citizen individually. Otherwise in our country many executives in the period of the cult, in the years of voluntarism and in the times of stagnation became accustomed to looking at the



people in general, to speaking about and concerning themselves with the laws of Soviet people in general. All of this rings eloquent, but when the matter reduces to any particular citizen, including a serviceman, often the individual collides with insurmountable obstacles, and sometimes even scandalous unlawfulness.

*Editor's note: During L. I. Brezhnev's term as Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, this organ permitted the use of capital punishment against a person under 18 years old, contrary to the law.*

[V. Prishchep] The individual should of course become the center of attention of a legal state. Specifically, it is in his behalf that legal reform is being enacted. The Soviet individual must have material and legal guarantees not only of universally recognized individual rights and freedoms (the right to work and leisure, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and so on). He must be certain in the fact that the mechanism of political power and economic and spiritual life would ensure that his opinion would be accounted for in the affairs of the collective and the society. In a case where his rights and freedoms are restricted or transgressed by anyone, state and social institutions will restore them at the first appeal. A regime of favorable, socially useful self-assertion of the personality—this is the essence of the individual's position in a socialist legal state. Derivatives of this include creativity, patriotism, a high sense of personal worth and so on.

[Belyakov] And yet, to what extent will the planned legal reform affect the army and navy? What directions of its influence upon the personnel can we now discuss?

[L. Zaika] The legal reform has already begun, and it immediately affected the armed forces. Servicemen are actively participating in the discussion of draft laws on amending the USSR Constitution and on the electoral system. They are an integral part of the people, who are developing popular sovereignty under the guidance of the party. Were we to factor out from the concept of legal reform its main components—improving legislation, strengthening the mechanisms of legal protection of the individual, universal legal education—then obviously all of them would be found to pertain directly to people fulfilling their constitutional military duty as citizens of the USSR as well. As with all of our society, the armed forces are a participant and creator of the reform, and at the same time a user of its results.

[G. Kucher] Drafts of many legal documents affecting fundamental issues in the life of the army and navy have already been written or are presently being written. Among them we can name, for example, drafts of the Law on Defense, the new all-services regulations, and the Law on Criminal Liability for Military Crimes. We are preparing a draft Statute on Military Tribunals and other documents—the list could be continued—with regard for the new approaches and ideas embodied within the draft all-union Law on the Status of Judges.

[V. Dzyuba] Let me add something to this. For the first time in the history of Soviet military construction we have introduced the Manual on Legal Work in the Soviet Army and Navy and the Officer's Legal Minimum—documents called upon to ensure that the activities of officials remain within the strict bounds of legality. Revision of military legal documents that fail to meet today's requirements is continuing. Over 500 such documents are to be renewed and their number is to be significantly reduced in the very near future. Military criminal legislation is being improved. The draft Statute on the Officer Meeting—one of the new forms of participation of the army and navy public in the affairs of military collectives—is being written.

[A. Koblikov] Further democratization of our society and implementation of legal reform will also increase the role of the soviets in defense build-up. In connection with adoption of the 1 December 1988 USSR Law "On Amendments and Supplements to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR," our country's Supreme Soviet has now been granted the right to form the USSR Defense Council and approve its make-up, appoint and replace the supreme military command of the armed forces, and establish ranks. It has now been given the right to determine the basic measures in the area of defense and ensuring state security; announcing general and partial mobilization; announcing a state of war in the event of a military invasion of the USSR or in the event of the need for carrying out international treaty obligations concerned with mutual defense against aggression.

Without a doubt what happened in our country with introduction of the limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan can no longer happen again: Such an important and responsible decision was made at the level of a few party and state officials in high places.

The Law on Defense—one of the basic constitutional laws which we lack for the moment—is to be adopted by the Congress of the Soviets.

And finally, a remark connected with the new all-services regulations being written. I am deeply convinced that these highly important documents, which actually regulate all of the life and activities of servicemen, must be adopted by a legislative organ—by the peoples deputies of the supreme organ of power. It is namely up to them to decide what rights, responsibilities and privileges are to be granted to defenders of the motherland. But no end of things have happened with regulations: Some have been adopted by the government, others have been introduced by an order of the minister of defense, and still others were enacted by ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Will we finally come to understand that, for example, the Internal Service Regulations are not a fence beyond which our Soviet government, as represented by peoples deputies, should not gaze.



[V. Rebrov] We military people cannot gaze beyond this "fence" either, by the way. All we heard was that some new regulations were to be published. In the academy I asked officers recently from the troops who of them had read, at least selectively, drafts of the regulations, or had seen them. Not only students but even most of the instructors, if not all, had never held them in their hands, read them or seen them. What are these, secret documents? Of course not—in a little while stacks of them could be found in any Voenkniga bookstore. The bulk of the servicemen are alienated from discussion of their own fundamental law of life. And yet we did have experience in such discussion in the past.

*Editor's note: For several months of 1958 the editor's office of the journal VOYENNY VESTNIK carried a discussion of the statutes contained in the draft Internal Service Regulations and Drill Regulations (see No 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). During it, over 50 generals and officers made statements in the journal, and over 500 various proposals, corrections and refinements were published, helping the regulation-writing commissions to significantly improve the content and to edit these documents, so highly important to the armed forces, during their final writing.*

[A. Koblikov] I know of no organ of the military press that has been included in the discussion of the drafts of the all-services regulations and these highly important laws of life in the armed forces. As I have understood, the discussion is proceeding totally in camera, somewhere at the highest level. Is it not a paradox that this is happening under the conditions of restructuring and democratization of army and navy service?

[L. Zaika] Officers are rightfully perturbed by the fact that nothing is known in the troops about the drafts of the new regulations.

[Belyakov] Perhaps we could utilize the "podium" of our roundtable and suggest at least some of our proposals for the draft regulations?

[V. Krivorotenko] I have a proposal. If we are saying (and this is true in fact) that restructuring and democratization represent decisive dismantling of established stereotypes, including in the army, then why not pose the question, and I do so now, of permitting election of junior commanders (petty officers, NCOs) in the army and navy, and granting these rights to Komsomol organizations, through the power of the regulations? The overwhelming majority of collectives of servicemen in their first term of service are young collectives. Why not try this?

[V. Rebrov] When it comes to the question of electing junior commanders, let's begin with the interests of the individual, as Marxism-Leninism teaches us. What do I mean by this? In contrast to the conditions of civilian life, the economic basis upon which the electoral system is organized there has been removed from our environment. If this is so, then there can even be no discussion of any kind of elections of petty officers and NCOs, in

my opinion. We already tried electing commanders in the civil war. And who did we end up promoting? Often he who spoke eloquently from the podium, who granted more favors, who beat his chest and shouted that he was his own man, and even he who played the harmonica best. And in general, is a first-term soldier or seaman interested in electing a strict, principled junior commander who would not deviate one iota from the requirements of the regulations, or grant him any favors? Not always, I think.

[Ye. Shats] Let me cite a practical incident.

When I was a company commander my Komsomol members wished to conduct a Komsomol meeting of the subunit unbeknownst to me, and determine which NCO had the work qualities which would allow him to become company master sergeant. I managed to attend the meeting anyway. There was much debate, and many votes were taken. Finally the Komsomol members came to a shared opinion, and named a candidate for me. I decided to go along with the experiment, and I supported their nominee before the senior chief. And as things turned out, I subsequently never had any problems with this master sergeant—the discipline and responsibility of the Komsomol members climbed, and my authority only increased as a result. The result may not always be the same, but there appears to be an element of reasonableness in this. After all, for the most part our soldiers are rather decent people.

[V. Rebrov] This roundtable discussion is the first time I heard that the drafts of the new regulations once again foresee work details. Moreover granting the right of this form of punishment once again to junior commanders, including squad commanders, is proposed. This is reasonable in general. We're not at a health resort or tourist camp, after all. There are all kinds of work in the army, including the dirtiest, and there's nothing you can do about it.

[Ye. Shats] While I'm not in favor of repealing the work detail, I still believe that people should not be punished with labor as such. And especially in the army. Why should we try to punish a soldier or seaman by making him do what a good manager, or any laborer, would do himself? This, if we look deeply, is far from the best line of education.

[V. Rebrov] It is written in the regulations that a commander must take all steps to ensure that servicemen fulfill orders and their responsibilities. But let me ask, what measures? Political, moral, psychological, or perhaps physical? It is more or less clear in a combat situation, but what about in day-to-day life? It would be nice to resolve all of this with legal rules as well.

[Belyakov] All of this persuades us yet another time that we need to create dependable legal guarantees for the protection of the individual serviceman as soon as

possible. His rights must be clearly regulated at a legislative level. Let's look once again at the regulations. Ours are filled only with responsibilities. The rights of officers and warrant officers, not to mention of first-term servicemen, are limited. And yet, the all-services regulations of a legal state should determine the legal status of the serviceman in such a way that he would be a truly free individual in a free state, while at the same time fulfilling the highly responsible and honorable mission of dependably protecting it in exemplary fashion.

[Ye. Shats] Our legislation, including military, needs improvement. I, and many of my comrades as well, were persuaded of this by a certain incident in Afghanistan. A regiment commander ordered the chief of the medical service to go to the supply depot for medical supplies for the next operation, which was to begin the next day. The officer took some vehicles to the garrison and loaded up. Before he could return, twilight came upon him. The patrol posts would not allow him on the road—a dushman attack was possible. But he had to carry out his orders somehow, for there was to be combat tomorrow. Our medic detoured the post, and the column headed for the unit. As luck would have it, it stumbled upon an ambush. There were losses of both men and equipment. The result: The officer was handed over for court martial. Even though we all knew him to be a faultless, courageous and highly honest person.

[A. Ukolov] The criminal case will be studied meticulously. If the decision is wrong, the mistake will be corrected.

[Ye. Shats] But there's more. In that same time period Private Lobanov, a serviceman in our unit, betrayed the motherland (war is war). The rebels actively exploited him against us. The traitor was finally exposed and taken before the military tribunal. And as it turns out, our medic was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment in a strict-regimen colony, while penitent Private Lobanov—we are humane, after all—was sentenced to only 4 years of general regimen. We, the officers of the regiment, wrote every possible place with an appeal to reexamine the case. All we got in response were form letters or an impenetrable wall of silence. How do we reconcile all of this with the law?

[K. Skvortsov] Getting ready for the roundtable, I looked through the draft "Principles of USSR Criminal Legislation." The draft contains a new article declaring the following: "If an act is seen to be one falling within criminal law but is carried out in execution of an order or instructions, and if the person was unaware of the criminal nature of this order or these instructions, such an act is not a crime..."

[V. Prishchep] It was precisely the military procuracy that petitioned to include this article in the new legislation.

[L. Zaika] There are still many imperfections in the legislation. For example experience persuades us that as life in the armed forces undergoes democratization, a law or some other normative act which would foresee reinstatement of illegally dismissed officers, shore-based and sea-going warrant officers and extended-service servicemen should also be adopted. As an example in recent times we had to protest recommendations by a number of commanders and chiefs for illegal discharge of officers into the reserve. But I repeat, because we do not yet have the corresponding law, in some cases it has been found extremely difficult to correct the situation.

[V. Glushko] In my opinion there would be nothing wrong in clearly determining, by legislation, exactly what the army should be doing. Consider what is going on otherwise. Our main mission is to persistently teach military affairs, and raise combat readiness. But instead, at times we spend several months harvesting the crops, or building roads, or helping our own patrons, enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhoses, or toiling at the unit's kitchen farm, and most of the time we are perpetually building—building everything ourselves, with our own resources. Or more accurately, who knows how. Some officers are getting just as good as builders with hardware and brands of cement. They are able to get roofing slate, paint, lumber and nails when there is none to be found anywhere in the area. This causes discipline to deteriorate.

[Belyakov] Television, radio and the press have recently been illuminating the problem of improper mutual relationships in the army on almost a daily basis. Why have such relationships appeared in the units and subunits? Have the number of conflicts and crimes committed on this soil increased or decreased? What are military lawyers doing jointly with commanders and political workers to completely eradicate the causes generating such a shameful phenomenon?

[Ye. Skripilev] Improper mutual relationships are doing enormous harm to the army's authority. Many citizens whose children and grandchildren are called up for active military service are very concerned by what awaits them there. Especially in moral respects. All the more so because in the recent times of stagnation most military chiefs assured us that there was total order in the army and navy, and that there were no improper relationships among personnel. And this was in a time when we should have been sounding the alarm, and speaking honestly and directly about the growing negative trends. Wouldn't the people have understood? They would have, and how! The army, after all, is not isolated from the society. It is a fragment, a part of it. And if the society has been ill for a long time and is now recovering slowly, it would not be difficult to surmise why the armed forces sometimes receive low quality replacements.

Young men are not called up straight out of the incubator; they differ in their characters, which are already fully formed at that, and some even possess clearly pronounced criminal tendencies. And it would be naive and laughable to think that officers would reeducate the novices on the spot.

*Editor's note: Among the conscripts of 1988, 15 percent have one parent, 2 percent are orphans, and 50 percent committed moral or physical violence against persons of younger age in vocational-technical schools, secondary schools and VUZes.*

Thirty-seven percent of soldiers interviewed in a certain military unit responded that they first encountered "dedovshchina" in vocational-technical schools and tekhnikum. "We lived in constant fear," writes Sergeant A. Boshkov, a graduate of the Rostselmash Plant's Vocational-Technical School No 1. "We were afraid to leave our rooms at the dormitory. But even they weren't always a sanctuary. Sometimes a door would be smashed through, senior classmen, drunk or high from smoking some sort of garbage, would break into the room and force us to carry out all of their whims."

[G. Kucher] If we look at history, we would have to say that back in the 1950s-1960s manifestations of so-called "barracks hooliganism" were relatively rare, and they were reduced chiefly to the rituals of "initiation into the soldiery" with the so-called "soldier's oath." Although all of this was outright ridiculing of the soldier's personality, as a rule it did not incur severe consequences.

Later on, however, such transgressions not only increased continually in quantity, but also gradually acquired a qualitatively new content, transforming into sophisticated harassment of young soldiers using physical violence; moreover, such harassment has now begun to assume ethnic overtones in some places as well.

The dynamics of convictions for relationships at variance with the regulations in the last 10 years are characterized by the following data. The number of convictions increased continuously since 1978, and in 1985, when they peaked, there were 3.2 times more than in 1978.

[V. Seregin] The society is changing. For example in the 1950s the country's divorce rate was 3 percent, while now it is 30 percent. Each year 1.2 million children are left without their parents. And consider what all of this translates into! The young people coming to the army are from broken families, they are often introverted, they lack self-confidence, their physical condition is poor, as I would say, is their psychological fitness, and they have been in trouble with the law from an early age.

[A. Ukolov] These same preconditions also frequently bring on improper relationships among servicemen. This problem is one of the entire society (in which morality underwent severe distortion in the period of stagnation), and not purely an army one, as some believe.

[I. Vashkevich] I agree that the causes of improper relationships are not in the army. But we have our own woes as well. We must admit that we were not prepared to neutralize relationships of this kind, when they suddenly began manifesting themselves in the army and navy environment. And after that we continued to assure

ourselves for a long time that these were isolated incidents, and that we would manage somehow. But the truth is that we must manage not just somehow, but seriously, with some idea of what is going on.

[L. Zaika] Let's begin our reckoning from 1985, when the CPSU Central Committee focused attention on the fact that commanders, political organs and law enforcement organs were not doing everything they could to curtail the spread of improper mutual relationships, evasion of military service and other violations. When we do that, here is the way things stack up. As of today, these violations have decreased by 65 percent. The number of criminally punishable violations continues to decline. The statistics provide the grounds for suggesting that this is a stable trend. For example in comparison with the same period in the previous year, in 9 months of 1988 the number of crimes decreased by almost a fourth.

But crimes committed on this soil are still widespread. They make up over a fifth (21 percent) of the overall structure of crime. The factors causing and promoting such crime are diverse. It will take consistent, daily work to eradicate this crime phenomenon.

[A. Ukolov] Restructuring, which has affected all aspects of life in the army and navy, is also having a favorable effect on the dynamics of convictions for relationships at variance with the regulations, the curve of which has begun falling rather steeply. Thus in 1987 it decreased by almost a third in comparison with 1985, while in 9 months of 1988 it decreased by another 31.1 percent. I believe this to be the result of meticulous, persistent work by commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations and the army and navy community. And we military lawyers have also doubtlessly made our mark as well. Nonetheless the state of affairs in regard to this issue can in no way satisfy us.

First of all the number of persons convicted for improper relationships is still rather significant, and their proportion within the overall structure of convictions of servicemen is the highest. Second, all of this is having a negative effect on the atmosphere in military collectives, it is keeping people from working normally, it is undermining their faith in justice, and it is reducing the activity of young soldiers.

Third, improper mutual relationships do in fact harm the prestige of the army and navy in the eyes of the people, injure the authority of the commanders and political workers, and generate many justified complaints from the parents of soldiers.

*From a letter: Private Solomatin, who was convicted for premeditated murder of several of his fellow soldiers, wrote the following to his parents: "Mama, Papa! I've gotten into such bad trouble that my whole life has been*



*upset. Pain and suffering kept building up inside me all of this last half year. They made fun of me, beat me up and violated me. I don't remember picking up the gun, or shooting it at them."*

[L. Zaika] We are currently waging a most decisive struggle against violators of proper mutual relationships. Let me note that orders of the minister of defense obligating us to assess the level of discipline not by the quantity of violations committed but by the status of discipline have been published, and not without the participation of the Main Military Procuracy and the Directorate of Military Tribunals. But unfortunately the psychology of the stagnant times, when military discipline in the units was assessed on the basis of the number of documented incidents, is still far from being eradicated. I recently visited the Black Sea Fleet and a number of districts, and everywhere I went, officials I spoke with asked me, just like before: "And how many crimes have you recorded?" And yet the emphasis should be on something else—on getting together and thinking about ways to organize the work so that improper relationships in their early stages would not be concealed. And consequently so that they would not build up later on into a conflict that according to the law could then be resolved only by the procuracy and the tribunal. That is, I would like to appeal to the honor and the worth of the officers themselves, to remind them of their highest responsibility.

*Editor's note: Thirty-two percent of soldiers interviewed in the unit declared that the officers and warrant officers were not themselves setting the example in compliance with the requirements of the laws, regulations and moral rules of associating with subordinates, and that they were allowing coarseness, bad language and humiliation of the individual. Up to 50 percent of the respondents note that officers fail to properly address cases of harassment of young soldiers. Twenty-four percent indicated that these phenomena are not controlled by officers, and the culprits remain unpunished.*

[I. Vashkevich] Despite all of the orders, those who conceal relationships at variance with the regulations often go unpunished. I recently had some business in the Transbaykal Military District. What did I see there? The procurator showed me a whole bunch of paperwork on crimes resulting from improper relationships, concealed by the regiment commander. The only action taken was to make this commander chief of the personnel organ. We did of course encounter scrupulous comrades as well. Think about what they have to say: "Even if they fire me, or expel me from the party, I'm going to see that things go in accordance with the law." That is, in order for things to go according to the law, it takes almost heroic effort under our conditions.

[V. Rebrov] I don't see what's so astonishing here: People in our country are always uttering words from lofty podiums in support of the honest, principled champions of decisive reinforcement of discipline and legal order, while the reality remains the same: If crimes have

been documented among your subordinates, you are a poor commander. That is, don't even think about career advancement, or promotions, or the academy. And so officers in many units strike a deal with their conscience—to "strengthen" discipline, as before, by all methods, including silence, open concealment of violations, and even the support of NCOs, who create "legal" order through clearly illegal means.

[L. Zaika] Let's not carry things too far. I have been persuaded of the reverse. In some units of the Strategic Rocket Forces there have already been cases of rewarding commanders and political workers who revealed and curtailed violations of the rules of proper mutual relationships in their early stages. And the result is there for all to see: Although the number of disciplinary violations has risen, criminally punishable violations have decreased.

[Ye. Shats] If only things were like this everywhere. If only the motivation existed.

[G. Kucher] This is precisely what the CPSU Central Committee Politburo turned our attention to in its 13 October 1988 meeting, when it pointed out the need for implementing additional measures to strengthen military discipline in the army and navy, and ensure strict legal order in every unit and subunit. We must implement these measures integrally, successively, persistently, with wide reliance upon the public, and by necessity, openly.

[A. Noblikov] And of course, while doing so we should not forget about improving work with preconscrip youth, preparing them better for the army, and orienting them on honorable service and strict compliance with the laws.

[V. Krivorotenko] Well, how are we preparing young people for service in the army? Military-patriotic work is overseen by plenty of chiefs. But as they say, too many cooks spoil the broth. Numerous legal acts have determined that everyone is responsible for it—the Main Political Directorate, the Komsomol Central Committee, the USSR DOSAAF, the Political Directorate of the Ground Troops, military commissariats, veterans' organizations, and even the Znaniye Society. Everyone is responsible for it, but at the same time no one is specifically responsible for it. It is not even entirely clear who has what rights and powers in this area. The corresponding documents do not say anything precise about this, or they say nothing at all. I am persuaded from my own experience that the same officials are attending meeting after meeting convened to improve military-political work and preparation of young people for service in the army. All they do is assign tasks to each other, and with what result?

[V. Rebrov] Everyone needs to work harder, including the Komsomol Central Committee and the local Komsomol committees, and even our comrades in the army.



[V. Krivorotenko] I would like to make this point: The system for preparing young people for service in the armed forces is run today only from top down. And good, useful initiatives of Komsomol members locally are not only unwelcome, but are also suppressed in a number of cases. The Komsomol Central Committee conducted the All-Union Rally of Young Reserve Soldiers in Ashkhabad in 1987. There was one issue that was particularly urgent: Yesterday's soldier-internationalists, paratroopers and frontier guards are establishing military-patriotic clubs. Boys are joining them eagerly, but the materials and equipment available to the clubs are simply squalid. After the rally we asked the Ministry of Defense for a little equipment. It took a whole year for a favorable decision to be made on this issue. The youth initiative, which is not yet supported by law, was pushed through with difficulty. We hope very much that it will finally be included in the Law on Youth.

[B. Molostov] Considering that lip service, the tendency to substitute meticulous educational work with the young by broadside measures and pretension continue to manifest themselves in this area, these issues are acquiring special significance today. Obviously specific zones of responsibility of competent organizations for preparing the preconscrip and conscript contingents must be assigned on a legal basis in the Law on Defense, and greater demands must be placed on these organizations.

[V. Krivorotenko] There are over 200 associations of former servicemen that do real work for the army in the USA. After the Ashkhabad and Novorossiysk rallies, the young men proposed creating an association of military-patriotic clubs and unions. We supported them. It was then that the Komsomol Central Committee was met by something of an avalanche of criticism from the leadership of the DOSAAF: What do you mean a defense society? That's what we are, and not some semi-independent organizations out there. They immediately began viewing the nonexistent association as a kind of counterweight to their esteemed defense society, as an undesirable competitor of sorts. And who said, and by what law is it determined, that reserve soldiers can't create their own association!? All the more so because the Komsomol Central Committee is proposing the establishment not of a union of metallists, or rockers, or hippies, or sports fanatics, but people interested in reinforcing the country's defense capabilities, people who spare neither time nor effort for this goal!

And what are we doing today? The soldier-internationalists are working separately. The paratroopers and border guards are working separately. And the seamen sometimes turn their noses up at all other branches of troops.

It is now coming to the point where paratroopers and border guards who celebrate the holidays of their troops noisily and joyfully must be subdued with police help.

[B. Molostov] Yes, we have not yet learned how to work with young people in a way necessary under the conditions of restructuring. On the whole we let many opportunities slip by. For example, public education workers recently conducted an all-union congress. Only two of the delegates were selected from the tens of thousands of military instructors from the secondary schools, vocational-technical schools and tekhnikums. The problems of military-patriotic indoctrination of young people and of initial military training were not discussed in any of the 15 sections of the congress. These problems are not even alluded to in the dozen or so congress documents, including the most important of them—the conceptions on general secondary education.

[L. Zaika] There is something else I would like to say: The mass media are writing a great deal about "dedovshchina" in the army today. Moreover, the people who are eagerly taking on the job of "deeply" illuminating this topic know about it only by rumor. For example I was interviewed by a "great expert" on the army, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET'S correspondent M. Pasternak. The interview was for the journal CHELOVEK I ZAKON, by the way. You should have heard the sort of naive questions he asked me. I was later compelled to ask him: "Comrade Pasternak, did you ever serve in the army?" No, he said. I asked him how he could dare to analyze problems about which he knows so little. He replied with absolute confidence: "I make do."

[Ye. Skripilev] Pasternak feels that he did serve in the army—he attended reserve training for 2 months.

[L. Zaika] Now that's quite a substantial career. So it is that we are farming out illumination of the "sore points" of the army and navy to incompetent people. And in the meantime, where are our military journalists, including from the editor's offices of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL and SOVETSKIY VOIN? Is this not their business? When it comes to this "dedovshchina" problem, after all, not only are they able but also they are obligated to write more objectively, and delve into the problem from all of its aspects.

[A. Ukolov] Yes, when it comes to generalities, not enough is yet being written about "dedovshchina" in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, but when it comes to specific facts, total silence is the usual rule. If they are any indication, the district and fleet press is basically trying to avoid washing its dirty linen in public.

[Belyakov] All kinds of deviations from the requirements of the manuals and other laws are in fact occurring, and unfortunately, sometimes they incur serious consequences. The work, and most importantly, the people, suffer. We have talked in detail about the problem of improper mutual relationships among personnel in their first term of service. But doesn't the officer corps also have its own problems from the standpoint of the

law? Who, after all, should be standing up for the rights of the serviceman? Are the real possibilities of lawyers in this area expanding in connection with the legal reform?

[A. Koblikov] The 19th All-Union Party Conference and the last meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet laid emphasis on the need for enlarging the role of justice in the society's life, and for activating surveillance by the procuracy. The procurator is now becoming the primary legal defender of the serviceman, and of his rights, interests and merits. And of course, a defender of the interests of the state. But we need to create a situation where procurators, examining magistrates and judges are independent of pressure from party and soviet organs, and from the command, and adhere only to the law. When a procurator or a member of a military tribunal depends on the command, as he does today, for promotions, housing and health resort services, I think that we cannot talk seriously about the real independence of justice.

[L. Zaika] The Main Military Procuracy has been working since April 1985 to develop a special conception of more effective surveillance over fulfillment of the law in the army and navy: in the administrative, economic and social activities of officials, in our practical work and in personnel training.

[V. Glushko] Comrades, it would be very nice if lawyers could provide officers with some kind of real rights. And real responsibilities as well. As with commanders of all ranks, I, a regiment commander, am obligated to answer for practically everything according to the regulations. If my subordinates do poorly at the firing range in an exercise, I get the blame. If my men flip a tank over, who is responsible? I am. If a soldier goes absent without leave or fails to return from leave to the city, once again I have to answer for it. If someone is beaten up in the unit, I am made fully responsible. What I would like to find out from you lawyers is this: Is there any way I can know what they might fire me for tomorrow? No, I can't. After all, a one-man commander can be dismissed for practically anything—it all depends on how you consider a particular case. And the law says nothing definite about this.

[A. Zorin] The law must realistically support the rights of the individual in different spheres of life, and dependably guarantee them. However, the wide range of rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens, including servicemen, documented in the USSR Constitution, are not always actually implemented in life, inasmuch as a clear legal mechanism of such implementation has not been developed.

[V. Glushko] But what kind of social rights do we have (please understand that I'm not talking about myself alone)? I have young lieutenants, captains and majors subordinated to me today. They come to me, and they tell me they don't want to serve in the army any more. Fabulous, competent officers say such things. I serve with many of them in Afghanistan. I sit them down and talk about it with them, and I hear things that I myself have had to endure (in 26 years of service I have had to

move from one garrison to another together with my wife and two children 11 times): "No matter where I serve," my subordinates complain, "I have to run around like a madman, looking for a place to call home. When I find one, it costs me 70-120 rubles. I spend almost 24 hours a day in the unit. I never see my children. You can't get away for a summer leave, and travel and accommodation warrants are nowhere to be found. I can't go on like this any more." But even in the conditions of restructuring, someone has got to create legislation that would put some sense into our work day, think about housing and leave time for officers, warrant officers and their families, and above all that, get some work out of them. Who is going to do all that? We, after all, do not move from one place to another at our own will.

[Ye. Shats] Let's look the truth in the eye. The reluctance of young officers to serve has become a trend owing to our hardness and our neglect of people. A lieutenant just joining the unit already has it in his mind that he is not going to make a career of it. For example over a period of many years, I have become accustomed to the notion that I will never have a day off. So has my family. But how do you explain this to a young warrant officer, lieutenant, senior lieutenant and their families? It is not all that simple to get used to such a future.

*Editor's note: In many military units, especially in the air defense forces and in the strategic rocket forces, an officer's work time presently totals 340-360 hours a month, exceeding all reasonable limits. If we compare this with the work time budget of enterprises in the national economy, we would find that it is more than double, even if we include "black Saturdays" and overtime work.*

[V. Glushko] Consider also how people in local government organs speak and relate to officers or warrant officers. I remember participating in a harvest when I was a captain. In one certain situation I tried to defend the interests of my subordinates. The party oblast committee second secretary—a woman—was blunt: "Listen, Captain, don't be high and mighty with me. Or I'll fire you...." And in those times of stagnation, she actually could have done that!

[V. Rebrov] Whatever happens, we are told that we are obligated, that we must, that we receive money for this. But we all receive money for our work. Except in contrast to other categories of Soviet people, we officers have far more responsibilities and far fewer rights, and sometimes we have no social protection.

*Editor's note: Taking account of deductions and allowances, the monthly monetary income of a young officer and his family is about 120 rubles less, and that of a senior officer is 20 rubles less, than the mean statistical income of a Soviet family. Correspondingly when the figures are expressed per family member, the income is 20-30 rubles less. This is explained by the fact that around a fourth of the wives of officers simply do not have an opportunity to work.*

The number of officers lacking housing is 18-23 percent (depending on the region and the branch of troops)—that is, about one out every five is without a home.

[V. Glushko] A senior chief can insult an officer of lesser rank and position, belittle him and even scold him in offensive language as much as he pleases. All of this also happens in front of subordinates. And just let a warrant officer, lieutenant or captain try to show anger or to demand an apology from his chief. You laugh, and rightly so. You know what would happen to him next. As lawyers, can you recall a single case where in defense of his honor, a junior officer (I am not even talking about ranking NCOs, NCOs or soldiers) appealed to the procuracy after being scolded with offensive language by a battalion, regiment or division commander? I cannot recall anything of the sort.

Or let's consider the conditions under which servicemen work. It was by pure luck that I ended up in the Crimea after Afghanistan (there was apparently a mix-up of some kind in Personnel). I spent a little time there. They finally figured it out that I did not have any protectors in high places, and so they sent me further away. But nonetheless I did manage to see how some officers and warrant officers live. For all of their lives, they sit in headquarters and look out onto the sweet Black Sea. Why are they never sent anywhere? While others—the overwhelming majority—basically serve the motherland in the East, in the country's North, in the deserts, in remote garrisons, in alert duty units and so on.

[Belyakov] The regiment commander has posed many issues. Very acute ones and, I would think, just. It is also clear that in this case he is expressing the common opinion of a sizable number of officers in the troops. But before asking for answers to these questions, I would like to add one more, no less urgent one. The editor's offices of this journal, and of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and the central newspapers as well, are receiving anxious letters from soldier-internationalists and reserve officers. By law, for example, many of them enjoy privileges in the acquisition of housing space, and other benefits. But in reality the local soviets of peoples deputies, and the unit commanders as well, often simply ignore these requirements of the law. What is being done to correct this abnormal situation?

[V. Seregin] In our country, if we are building a legal state, not only should there be responsibility of citizens to it, but also there must be responsibility of the state itself to the citizens. What do I mean by this? It is written in a USSR Council of Ministers decree, after all, that an officer who is discharged into the reserve or who is retired because of health reasons, age or a reduction of forces, must be provided housing by the executive committees of local soviets of peoples deputies on priority, but not later than 3 months after arriving at the place of residence selected with regard for the existing visa procedures. But the soviets are not doing this everywhere. And a citizen has nowhere to turn for advice. Why?

Because this issue is regulated in our country not by a law but by a decree. Everything is turned upside-down. Just think about it: The decree is adopted by executive government organs, but it is the soviets representing the state that are responsible for its fulfillment. And in general, if a serviceman does something wrong, he would have to answer to the state as both a soldier and a citizen. But the state's responsibility to him is reduced to naught. I feel that the legal position of the serviceman must be regulated not by a decree but by a law. Then the legal status of the defender of the motherland would increase.

*From a letter to the newspaper PRAVDA: "I gave 29 years to the service, and two of them in Afghanistan. In accordance with the procedures I gave up my three-room apartment at my last place of service. I received in its place a certificate which they assured me would guarantee me an apartment in Brest. I arrived with my family (five persons), and I was stunned by what I heard: 'First find someone who will register you, then you'll be put on a list, and you will receive an apartment in 6 years....' This is a lie at the state scale. Everything was done to get my apartment away from me at my place of work, and then for practical purposes they threw me out into the street. V. Malitskiy."*

[K. Skvortsov] We doubtlessly cannot reduce everything to just publishing laws, as had been done before. Publish a law, and you've filled a square indicating that measures have been implemented. But what is important is execution of the law, the real practical possibilities it affords. What has actually happened with the privileges for soldiers who served in Afghanistan? Was it right to adopt a legislative act without calculating every meter of housing space, the finances necessary for such privileges, and other resources? That is, without supporting such a necessary initiative economically. After all, the large group of soldier-internationalists has earned not our fictitious but our real concern for them. They must receive 100 percent of what they are entitled to.

[Ye. Skripilev] Exactly. Privileges were given to soldier-internationalists in words, but they were not supported in deeds. And if we are to speak honestly, they were not supported by the corresponding economic measures. We are obviously poor, and even Solomon couldn't drink his fill from an empty vessel.

[Ye. Shats] I know from my own experience the kind of care sometimes shown for "Afghans." When I was in Afghanistan I received a letter from my wife. Please excuse me for troubling you, she wrote. For a long time I was hesitant to write to you about this, but we have been evicted from our apartment. We have nowhere to live. You can imagine the state I was in. What had happened back at home? I learned that my family had been camping at the homes of neighbors and acquaintances for half a year because the commander of the unit in which I had served previously decided to resolve the housing issue at the post with one fell swoop. Naturally at the expense of "ballast"—the "Afghans" and those



who had recently been transferred to a new place of work. He resolutely evicted their families from their apartments, giving the freed housing space to new arrivals. And no one tried to stop him.

[V. Glushko] We have colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors working for us due for retirement. Where are they to go? Where are they awaited? In a few years I for example will retire into the reserves. My father and mother live in Tyumen. I myself was called up while living in Omsk. Does this mean that I must return to Omsk, and wait there several years for an apartment? As you all know quite well, visas to other places are limited. Just try to get into a large city in the European part of the country if you weren't called up from there. Even reserve and retired officers who went into the army from these places are unable to count on getting apartments quickly. There are so many problems. And why? Simply because the laws are not being fulfilled.

*Editor's note: Registering officers discharged into the reserves and retired officers who had resided permanently in Moscow or in nearby suburbs prior to being called up and placing their names on apartment lists are prohibited in the city of Moscow and in Moscow Oblast. Thus former soldiers lose their right to return after service to the place from which they were called up, to their relatives and friends (such a prohibition applies for the moment only to one category of persons—recidivists).*

Limitations on registering dismissed officers have been adopted in almost all capitals of the union and some autonomous republics, as well as in Leningrad, Odessa, Rostov-on-Don, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk and in resort zones.

[A. Ukolov] I am troubled by the fact that local government organs often use any excuse in an attempt to pass off the responsibility assigned to them in providing for "Afghans" as well as other categories of servicemen to the Ministry of Defense. Articles justifying such a position have begun appearing in the central press. But no one has the right not to fulfill specific decisions of the party and government. And this should doubtlessly be emphasized quite categorically in the Law on Defense.

[L. Zaika] Yes, attempts at transforming the whole people's concern for the defenders of the motherland into a narrow departmental one reflect the thinking of the period of stagnation. It was precisely then that the practice of pitting general state interests against departmental, local and even personal interests was introduced into the public consciousness and into the practical work of some employees of the administration.

Whenever we receive reports on violations of the rights of persons dismissed from the armed forces (if these violations are not associated with actions by military officials, military commissariats and other organs of military administration), we pass these reports on to those who are responsible for control and surveillance—

that is, to the appropriate territorial procurators and competent organs. In the appropriate cases we ask that the results be communicated to the military procuracy. We report major issues to the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR General Procurator.

In this connection it would be pertinent to recall the 13 July 1988 meeting of the governing board of the USSR Procuracy, which looked into the causes behind the failure to fulfill legislation on the privileges of soldier-internationalists locally. Among them were causes that could be resolved with varying degrees of difficulty. It was found that few were aware locally of these privileges, since they were established by a secret normative act. Moreover access to it by those who must comply with it is limited. The document was declassified at the suggestion of the governing board. As we know, the 9 August 1988 decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on additional privileges has already been published in its entirety in the open press.

[V. Prishchep] Steps have also been taken to strengthen the mechanism for monitoring the way privileges are actually being satisfied. Last week the USSR Procuracy, the USSR Ministry of Defense and the AUCCTU prepared proposals for creating rayon and city commissions in all oblasts to check on fulfillment of decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers granting privileges to participants of the war, to soldier-internationalists and to the families of deceased soldiers.

[L. Zaika] This document foresees creation of commissions under every executive committee of the soviets of peoples deputies (in all rayons and cities), staffed by the rayon or city party committee secretary, one of the executive committee assistant chairmen, a military commissar, officials from the local trade union organ and the Komsomol committee and, of course, deputies. This commission is to ensure real satisfaction of the privileges of the persons indicated above. It has also been given the direct responsibility of finding employment and housing space for servicemen discharged into the reserves and their families, and strictly ensuring that they are given everything prescribed by law. And because the soviets are finally to receive economic power in addition to administrative power in their territories, the drafting of this document is very timely. It is already being discussed in the CPSU Central Committee. We are awaiting the decrees. Moreover the latter will also clearly define who is to be responsible. And specifically responsible.

[Belyakov] We thus come to the conclusion that the armed forces should be included, in the legal socialist state presently being erected, as a completely healthy organism free of all of the enumerated and as yet unnamed shortcomings. The supremacy of the law, social justice and wide democracy must be firmly consolidated within it. But how do we satisfy the main principle of our defensive development in this case—the principle of one-man command? That is, the question is



this: Is there a problem in the relationship between democratization and reinforcement of one-man command, and how is it to be solved from the legal aspect?

[V. Maslov] A problem does exist. Unfortunately, it is premature to say that any serious, practical steps have been taken toward its solution. I feel that we should begin by improving the powers of the regiment commander. Is it an important problem? Doubtlessly. I have had occasion to deal with it. Once I visited the troops with a group of comrades for a "Vystrel" training course. We counted up—I'm not exaggerating—a thousand orders, directives and instructions which defined to one extent or another the responsibilities of a regiment commander, literally tying him hand and foot. This simply astounded us, and we stopped counting any further. What's the use?

[V. Glushko] We do not discuss orders—we fulfill them. But perhaps they should be systematized in some way. Comrade Lieutenant Colonel, I was once told, it seems you're unaware of such-and-such an order that you're supposed to be following. Shame on you. I shift nervously from one foot to the other. I search my mind. Yes, I did read something. No, I can't remember. But believe me, I've written outlines on all of them, and I've read and reread them all. But there are such enormous numbers of orders. Comrade Maslov had just asserted that his group counted over a thousand orders that a regiment commander must follow, while I and some other regiment commanders counted as many as around 4,000. It's simply more than the mind can grasp. But what is most interesting is that many of them are often generally at odds with each other. Apparently because orders are given by different chiefs and commanders, and always as a rule in the interests of their own services. In fulfilling them, I must simultaneously be here, and there, and somewhere else, simultaneously carrying out different and mutually exclusive tasks. The resulting picture is scary.

[I. Vashkevich] Regiment commander Colonel Glushko says that he can't be familiar with several thousand articles, orders, directives and instructions. But let's look at this from the other side. Is there any need in general for him to know all of their details? Is this his business? If a one-man commander proves himself to be an excellent tactician and weapon specialist, an expert on military equipment, and a fabulous organizer and educator of personnel, praise and honors be unto him. Things such as this should bring him honor, respect, promotion and, finally, awards. But when it comes to administrative and legal functions, these should be carried out by an assistant, a professional lawyer. That regiment commander does after all have deputies—for political affairs, for equipment and armament, for rear services, for communications, and there is even an assistant for physical training. Why shouldn't he also have a legal assistant? We have not advanced a single iota in this issue since the 1920s and early 1930s.

If we consider the ratio of lawyers who help one-man commanders to those who only maintain surveillance, monitor, and conduct inspections from above, the ratio would be 1:100. Is it not about time to satisfy the need of the troops for professional legal personnel, instead of having commanders fend for themselves? As an example in those formations of the Moscow Military District where military lawyers are working on an experimental basis, lawfulness has increased noticeably and there has been a decrease in the number of law violations and complaints that servicemen were not receiving what the law provides to them.

[V. Glushko] Let me have one lawyer in each regiment, or if that's impossible, at least in each division. So that for example I as a commander could consult with him as to whether or not an order I am preparing to issue is legal, or one I have received from above is legal. Otherwise higher chiefs sometimes publish orders prohibiting officers from leaving the military post in private vehicles on Saturdays and Sundays. Or they might give instructions prior to an inspection to check that all NCOs and soldiers have shaved off their mustaches and have had their hair cut poluboks [translation unknown]. I don't understand why mustaches bother such a chief. Or why a poluboks haircut is necessary. True, the soldiers should be well groomed. But just try to ignore such an order or directive.

[L. Zaika] An order prohibiting departure of private vehicles from military posts on Saturdays and Sundays is illegal. We have had several occasions to protest such orders, and some zealous commanders and chiefs just keep on issuing them.

*Editor's note: Sixty percent of illegal orders in the armed forces protested by military procurators entail violations of the requirements of all-services regulations. Such orders are repealed, and commanders are subjected to disciplinary punishment for publishing them.*

[I. Vashkevich] Well, try to calculate how much time officers in the units and subunits spend on various legal inquiries. Especially in regard to clarifying questions such as whether or not material loss inflicted upon the state by a certain soldier should be compensated, the amount of this compensation and so on. We tried—the figures are quite astounding. Why not introduce the position of official investigator into the units for such occasions? He could successfully carry out the functions of a legal service in a large military collective, and he would do his work knowledgeably.

[Belyakov] Can we assert today, 4 years after the statute "On Intensifying Material Liability of Servicemen for Damages Inflicted on the State" was enacted by a ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, that the commander has now acquired a new, effective means of fighting those who are careless with the people's wealth? Has this legislative act provided specific, tangible results?

[V. Seregin] This statute fit in very well with the legal reform, since a legal state means the triumph of lawfulness. It can only be beneficial.

[Ye. Skripilev] It would be idealistic to think that this statute has produced tangible results. N. G. Chernyshevskiy once said: "Was the repeal of the bread laws in England in 1840 good or bad? Judge for yourselves: Prior to their repeal, each person received approximately up to 1 kilogram of bread per day. After the repeal, each began receiving 2 kilograms per day!" Why do I bring up this historical example, which at first glance seems irrelevant to the topic of our discussion? The fact is that no one anywhere in our country—and I can assert this as a specialist—has ever seriously and deeply studied or analyzed how effective our laws are today. Where are the statistics, what does a particular law, ukase or order do for us? Who has ever actually seen such statistics? For the moment, criminal statistics, which we have begun declassifying are all that we have available to us.

[L. Zaika] I disagree. The results are tangible. In absolute and proportionate terms, compensation for damages by the guilty has increased. If we compare the data for the past year with 1983 (preceding adoption of the new Statute on Material Liability), the proportion of damages exacted from perpetrators has increased by over a time and a half. Military procurators now have a legal basis for greater accomplishments in this direction of procurator surveillance. Just in 10 months of 1988 a large sum of money was returned to the state by the perpetrators of the damage at the demand of procurators. At the same time the overall dimensions due to losses and shortages have decreased. But what is positive is that we have initiated criminal proceedings three times less frequently against this category of violators than in 1987.

[I. Vashkevich] Fines of 15,000 rubles were paid in 1986 in the Odessa Military District for rail car idleness. In 1987, after the statute was enacted, the quantity of fines decreased by a factor of 10. Today they are almost a thing of the past. Is this not a real, positive result of the action of this legislative act?

[L. Zaika] There is something else that is important which does not yield to direct calculation. The soil for the psychology of impunity for spoilage, losses and mismanagement has been eliminated. The attitude of first-term servicemen toward state property has become more responsible.

[V. Dzyuba] However, serious problems also arise in the practical implementation of this statute. Numerous cases of groundless subjection of servicemen to material liability, the limits of which have now been significantly widened, elicit concern. I support Professor Skripilev's idea that we need to study the effectiveness of legislative acts, and particularly the statute. As we know, military service involves higher risk, including during operation of armament and military equipment; it nurtures boldness in servicemen, and a preparedness to assume

responsibility for a decision. Under these conditions we must not allow the burden of possible material liability for reasonable risk prevent development of the initiative and responsibility we need in military affairs.

[V. Prishchep] Who is responsible for collecting money from yesterday's servicemen? Military finance offices, for some reason, and not the corresponding local organs. It is true, comrades, that in some military construction units the chiefs of finance services can no longer spend all of their time seeking out debtors.

[Belyakov] We already discussed the fact that many instructions, directives and legislative acts have been repealed or are being reexamined. In a word, they will lose the force of law. Readers ask the following kinds of questions in this connection: "Under the conditions of revolutionary restructuring, is it necessary to fulfill all of the norms of our legislation, of which some have clearly grown obsolete, from 'a' to 'z'? Is the principle that 'everything that is not prohibited by the law is permitted' acceptable in the armed forces?"

[V. Prishchep] Many issues concerned with military service are governed by military regulations. Within the areas to which they apply, everything that these regulations do not prohibit is permitted. But at the same time it would be pertinent to note that not all relationships are regulated by law. Public and group morality, customs and traditions, habits and so on operate as well. And if dishonesty or cowardice is not punishable by law in a specific situation, this does not mean that the collective or the society as a whole is tolerant of them. The purpose of the principle that "everything which is not prohibited by law is permitted" is to encourage initiative, and it applies chiefly to those relationships which are regulated by law.

[V. Seregin] In my opinion this principle pertains to the individual serviceman. But not to the one-man commander (except in regard to his housekeeping functions). Otherwise if a commander were to follow this principle, he might actually do anything with his subordinates that is not prohibited by law.

[K. Skvortsov] I feel that this is a political slogan, and to no extent a legal rule. Unfortunately in our country we are beginning to treat this slogan as a legal rule, and rather often at that. Think about it—a law cannot consist of prohibitions alone. If this were so, then we would have to throw all civil rights out of the USSR Constitution.

[V. Dzyuba] We cannot ignore legislative acts presently in force, and yet it is becoming almost a rule to think that instructions are something that has outlived its time, something that should not be followed in the conditions of restructuring. Moreover, it is said that if you ignore instructions, you are being a proper Bolshevik.

[K. Skvortsov] Legal nihilism must be eradicated faster. At the moment it exists in our country, and even triumphs. The press, by the way, has recently been

provoking more and more new manifestations of it, instead of fighting it. Consider for example the times when journalists, choking with glee, write stories about a progressive enterprise or association director, a kolkhoz chairman or a unit commander who has violated laws, prescriptions and instructions which in his opinion are obsolete. He naturally would do so in the interests of the work, of the whole collective. Comrades, the interests of a single plant, a single kolkhoz cannot have priority over the interests of the whole society. This is a common truth. As long as a law exists, it must be fulfilled. If a legal act has lost its significance, if it has become obsolete, the issue of amending or repealing it must be raised in accordance with the established procedures, and its change or repeal must be fought for, but this is another matter. Before such an issue is resolved by legislative means, no one is permitted to ignore or willfully violate a legal prescription. It is no accident that Lenin raised the issue of fighting against local interests, against "Kaluga" or "Kazan" law. There should be a single law, and as long as a legal act exists, it must be fulfilled. This is especially true when it comes to the country's defense.

[V. Dzyuba] Many normative statutes or acts—especially those at the regional or departmental level—are only an imaginary expression of the will of the society and state. Frequently they have the characteristics precisely of "Kaluga" law, they do not reflect general state interests. Let me explain this with an example.

Some representatives of the Latvian People's Front demanded a national army for Latvia in meetings and demonstrations. And the chairman himself of the Latvian People's Front, the 33-year old journalist Daynis Ivanas, publicizing one of the points of the front's program—"forming the armed forces from this day forward on the territorial principle," explains: "I feel that creation of such national formations would raise responsibility for service in the army, promote development of patriotic feelings, and serve as a real school of internationalism."

[A. Koblikov] But then who is going to serve in other regions of the country, for example in places with a harsher climate, or outside the country, as long as there is a need for doing so? And what sort of school of "internationalism" would Lithuanian young men experience when they are actually preparing to defend only their own republic? Could it be said that a sensible combination of republic and state interests is achieved here?

[V. Rebrov] It is entirely clear that the territorial militia system of organization of the armed forces is not acceptable to our state. I was once the deputy commander for political affairs aboard a nuclear-powered submarine. We were based in the North. Does that mean, then, that the crew should consequently be made up only of representatives of the local nationalities? This would be absurd. And what would happen in such a case with

providing personnel to all of the navy, the Strategic Rocket Forces and the border troops? We need to base ourselves on the particular conditions which have evolved as of this date.

[G. Kucher] And it makes no sense for us to portray the obsolete territorial militia system as Lenin's conception of the development of the armed forces, as some people are trying to do today.

[V. Krivorotenko] Whatever the case, let me say this. Whenever we say military policy, or military-patriotic indoctrination, we are accused immediately, both abroad and by many of the informal associations inside the country, of promoting militarization, citing our own Law on Prohibition of War Propaganda. We now assert that we follow not military policy, but defense policy. This means that the time has come to think both about our terminology and about the precise legal status of such indoctrination in the legal socialist state we are erecting.

[Belyakov] Organizing universal legal education as part of a unified, integrated state-wide program encompassing all strata of the population, and all personnel centrally and locally, is an inherent part of the legal reform. In what manner will this proceed in the armed forces?

[G. Kucher] We need to discuss the specific content, program and principles of organizing universal education. But when it comes to our proposals, the most important of them briefly boil down to the following.

First, universal legal education is conceived to be an inseparable component of combat and political training (and not just of ideological work, as it had been before). Consequently lessons on legal subjects will be conducted during hours of combat and political training, and commanders and staffs will be responsible together with political organs for properly organizing these lessons. And when it comes to overall direction of universal legal education, the proposal is to make not only the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy but chiefly the General Staff responsible for it.

Second, a legal minimum is to be established not only for officers but also for all other categories of servicemen, with mandatory examinations at the end of the training year.

The third suggestion is to raise the level of instruction of legal disciplines in military educational institutions (these disciplines would be included in the state examination in schools, and taking a graded test would be required in academies). Instructors in legal disciplines are to be prepared in the Military Institute's faculty of military law.

Fourth, we feel it totally necessary to implement some serious measures of comprehensive methodological and material support to this universal education—to write,



and publish in sufficient quantities, training manuals, programs, references, popular literature and so on. Without this, universal education will not fly.

[A. Ukolov] We are starting universal legal education. A mandatory legal minimum was recently introduced for officers. But who is going to teach this and learn this, and using what textbooks? Study of the law is unsatisfactory in military schools and academies because there are not enough instructors. And things are even worse in the troops. There is absolutely no one there to take this job on, and worst of all, there is no literature. The laws are "studied," but officers and warrant officers, not to mention soldiers, seamen, NCOs and petty officers, never see them with their own eyes. They never see them because there are no books, and they are nowhere to be found. Yurizdat publishes a miserly quantity, while Voenizdat does not publish such literature at all. And the law can be known only when it is seen, when one reads and thinks about it, and not through hearsay. I think that the availability of the basic legislative acts in the army and navy should be about the same as with regulations. Finally, we need lawyers who would be qualified to teach military law in the schools and academies. We naturally need to prepare them in a full-fledged military legal educational institution; lawyers in the armed forces have persistently pressed the issue of creating such institutions for a long time.

[K. Skvortsov] A legal state would be impossible to create without the entire public's broad awareness of the laws it enacts. They do affect its interests and rights, after all. Is it right for us today to put out a legal act and impose the following constraint: "Not to be published"? Just try to find a statute dealing, for example, with registration in Moscow, with passport procedures, with the procedures for obtaining housing space and so on. Don't try—it's an exceptionally difficult thing to do. And yet all legal acts should be widely publicized, not only in proceedings of the USSR Supreme Soviet or in collections of government decrees. None of this gets down to the citizens.

[V. Dzyuba] Yes, we have gotten used to scolding one-man commanders who violate the law and condone unlawful actions. But has anyone ever seriously determined what chances and opportunities a commander has for knowing and precisely executing the prescriptions of the law? In school he studies military law for around 30 hours, strange as it may seem the time devoted to this in the academy is half that amount, and in the troops, a few lessons are given a year in the commander training system, which an officer attends if he is not involved in a detail, on a business trip, on leave and so on. Could one possibly become an expert on the law after such "study"? This means that presence of a professional lawyer in the units and formations would be expedient and very necessary.

[G. Kucher] Recall, comrades, the memoirs of Lieutenant General A. A. Ignatyev, "Pyatdesyat let v stroyu" [Fifty Years in the Ranks]. I think that most of us have

read this extremely interesting book. It contains a chapter in which the author tells us what he had to do to be admitted to the czarist army's Academy of the General Staff. He took many examinations, including on military administration. Moreover as Ignatyev emphasizes, this subject was studied very seriously in the military schools; it was included in state examinations, and then in entrance examinations for the Academy. Such was the attitude toward law in those days. And you can be sure that the officers knew the law, and made an effort to fulfill it. I think that in these days in which we are rethinking our past, we must take the time to consider this experience.

[V. Seregin] I feel that it is absolutely necessary to immediately expand the course on the principles of Soviet military legislation in military schools and the course on military law in the academies to 100 hours, and require a final exam. A state exam on military law should be introduced into the command academies and into the Academy of the General Staff.

[Belyakov] As we know, the resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Congress also made personnel support to the legal reform an important task. What problems exist in this area?

[V. Maslov] Back in March 1919, when the Red Army was just beginning to get organized, the rather well known General Bonch-Bruyevich warned: "We need to put military legislation in order. Otherwise the disorder in legislation will translate into anarchy in life. Moreover we need to do this on a scientific basis." M. V. Frunze accepted this idea, and following the civil war he began the military reform by reforming military legislation, as an instrument of the army's restructuring. Some executives should give some thought to this today.

[A. Koblikov] Under Stalin, our law enforcement organs were viewed as punitive organs. Under Khrushchev they turned benevolent, involving themselves chiefly in rehabilitation. Under Brezhnev they found themselves in a subservient status—their priority was made extremely low. It went as far as to the point where we declared that we were graduating too many lawyers in our country, and that there was simply no place to put them. I recall how one of the Transcaucasian union republics placed an order during one of Brezhnev's five-year plans for just a single lawyer. And it was not until after the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum that we discovered we had a colossal shortage of lawyers. And what about the quality of those we had!? Consider how irresponsibly they were selected for study, and that two-thirds of them were trained through correspondence schools. A legal state needs lawyers of a new quality. This is another of today's urgent problems.

*Editor's note: Among the 7,598 people's judges selected in 1987, 2,398 (37.1 percent) did not have any experience in legal work at all, and 257 completed their training in legal institutions of higher education by correspondence in that*

*same year as a rule. In the RSFSR, 938 of the 2,427 people's judges make do in buildings that are totally unadapted for these purposes or are in disrepair.*

[Ye. Skripilev] There was a time when the Military Legal Academy of the Red Army existed. It was liquidated in 1956. A shortage of highly qualified lawyers appeared. This situation must be rectified.

[A. Ukolov] No one in our country is conducting systems analysis of negative phenomena in the armed forces, such as relations at variance with the regulations. I would be so bold as to assert that serious research, on a scientific basis, is being conducted by no one. We have neither the forces nor the resources at the moment for serious theoretical sociological research, for detailed, comprehensive analysis of the causes of criminal activities. We cannot get by without scientific personnel and a research center. And so, for the moment military legal science is, mildly speaking, in a frozen state.

[V. Seregin] From my point of view, we need to do the following to train legal personnel: a) restore the Military Legal Academy or, as a second stage of military legal education, restore the faculty of military law under the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin; b) periodically train instructors for the course "Principles of Soviet Military Legislation" for military schools in the military pedagogical faculty of the Military Political Academy; c) remove law instructors in military schools from military departments and transfer them to departments of social sciences, because law is a social science (when Lenin created the first party school, he felt that its students should study the law on par with disciplines such as materialistic philosophy and political economics); d) in order to render methodological assistance to law instructors and maintain control over their activities, enlarge the department of social sciences of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy by adding military lawyers to its staff; e) introduce a new discipline into the academies—"Procedures for Preventing Law Violations (Principles of Soviet Military Criminology)," to be taught in 20-30 hours.

[A. Zorin] Personnel support to restructuring, the resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference states, is not a theoretical but a practical issue. It is time we went from words to action. In the armed forces, where all of the life and activities of the personnel must be based on fulfillment of the letter of the law, we cannot do without our own full-fledged institution of higher education. Without this, it would be very difficult to get legal reform in the army moving.

[Belyakov] Concluding the roundtable discussion, I would like to pose one more question, a fundamental one in my opinion: Are the law enforcement organs, including in the armed forces, themselves prepared for an uncompromising struggle for strict compliance with Soviet laws, binding upon one and all? We would have to admit, after all, that

a certain proportion of the population and servicemen bear rather substantial skepticism toward this, developed back during the period of stagnation.

[L. Zaika] It is impossible to give an unambiguous answer. Personnel of the military procuracies have the desire and the professional and moral qualities for the fundamental restructuring of their activity, required by the party. All of this is so. But restructuring includes legislative and organizational measures, and difficult issues of personnel support. This is not a one-act process. What problems exist here?

The first. A qualitative shift in the entire effort to ensure strict fulfillment of the law in the army and navy would be unimaginable without significant restructuring of the work of investigative organs. Consequently we need a new level of procurator surveillance in this direction, and introduction of a more effective system of clear interaction of military procurators with the command, political organs, staffs, the public and so on.

Unfortunately the material and organizational support to such a decisive turn is lacking. For example the insufficient legal training of some commanders, the understaffing of the legal service and state arbitration organs, and other circumstances compel military procurators to themselves demand imposition of various sorts of fines for violation of planning and contract discipline. In 10 months of 1988, over 4.5 million rubles in such fines were transferred to the budget.

The second. It is associated with incorrect utilization of the military procuracy. For a long time attempts were made to saddle it with the responsibility for the status of crime, at the same time that its only purpose is to maintain surveillance over execution of laws supporting the fight against crime.

The third. This one has to do with legislative issues. Today, a protest from a procurator concerning an unlawful act only suspends its action until the protest is examined. A similar procedure is being planned into the future Committee for Constitutional Surveillance. It is not endowed with the right to recognize an act as being unconstitutional. It can only propose its repeal. How can we say that the law is supreme if a possibility for deflecting a justified protest from a procurator or a conclusion from the Committee for Constitutional Surveillance is allowed?

Today we are critically reviewing the organization and style of work, the content of the functions and the procedures employed in procurator surveillance. The experience is being analyzed. Personnel training and advance training are changing. We are oriented on development and improvement in accordance with today's requirements, in the direction of the CPSU's long-range goals.

*From the editor: The issues brought up for discussion and the explanations of them far from exhaust the problems associated with practical implementation of the resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference "On Legal Reform" in the armed forces in conjunction with construction of a legal socialist state. These problems are much wider and more diverse. The editor's office will return to them once again. In this connection we await proposals, critical remarks and articles from our respected readers.*

We concurrently express deep gratefulness to all who took an active part in this roundtable discussion.

This article was prepared for publication by Colonel V. Snezhko and Lieutenant Colonel V. Zabrodin.

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**DOSAAF Candidates Campaign in Ukraine**  
18010441 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian  
17 Feb 89 p 1

[Article by Yu. Grachev and G. Chernomorskiy: "By Way of Democracy, Glasnost, and Bold Reforms"]

[Text] The following defense society candidates for USSR people's deputies visited the Ukraine for several days: Colonel General N. Kotlovtssev, chairman, Central Committee USSR DOSAAF; Major General of Aviation P. Klimuk, USSR pilot-cosmonaut; A. Mikhaylov, head, Buchach Motor Vehicle School; L. Nemkova, world and European sport flying champion; V. Fesenko, chairman, Krivoy Rog DOSAAF gorkom; B. Kharchuk, chairman, Central Committee, UkSSR DOSAAF; and Colonel General N. Chekov, deputy USSR minister of defense for construction and troop billeting. They spent some time in a number of the republic's oblasts, visited industrial enterprises, and met with labor collectives.

The present election campaign differs from the preceding ones, in that it is proceeding in an atmosphere of glasnost and democracy. It has become a stage in practical implementation of the reforms in the political system arrived at by the 19th All-Union Party Conference. We are eyewitnesses to the revival of the Leninist traditions of formation and activity of higher organs of authority.

Reserve Lieutenant General B. Orlov presented N. Kotlovtssev to workers of the Production Association imeni Artem. The enterprise's primary DOSAAF organization holds first place in the republic. B. Kharchuk was also present at this meeting. They were extended a warm greeting by A. Kachura, the association's general director; V. Tsventukh, the party committee secretary; and production pacemakers.

The conversation began. It is a well-known fact that working people speak openly.

"Our successes are past history," began V. Kulagin, committee chairman of the society's shop organization. "We had better speak of our shortcomings. The authority of our defense organization is suffering. Why? Our material and technical base is weak, especially at the training facility. Induction-age youth do not have available an equipped tactical training ground or a guard training facility, and there is a shortage of gas masks. In a word, we do not have the equipment with which to train future soldiers."

The weak material and technical base of the primary organizations constitutes a major problem. It has also showed up in the Ukraine. This was also attested to by N. Chekov, who had visited the Crimean and Zaporozhye oblasts. Existing equipment and facilities there are becoming dilapidated, and replacements are slow in coming.

"There can be no serious talk of authority in an organization if the latter is plainly poor, if it does not possess a technical sports club, modeling rooms, or a target range," added N. Kotlovtssev. "That is why we are striving to eliminate the lag. We are exerting extra effort to provide the primary organizations with a modern material and technical base."

The situation is just as bad in the case of the republic's training organizations. Although some motor vehicle schools have taken up a new program, they lack the necessary equipment. Old models of motor vehicles are used to train the students. Later on the Army must train them for two to three months to complete their instruction.

During this time other candidates—L. Nemkova, A. Mikhaylov, V. Fesenko—were visiting the Design Bureau imeni O.K. Antonov. There they were becoming acquainted with aviation science's designs of the future. They carried away lasting impressions created by what they were told about a super-heavy craft—the Mriya—which translates as "dream."

The candidates' itinerary called for visiting the republic flying club on the following day. What they saw there was not as favorable. They were immediately struck by the age of the equipment, and there was a shortage of that, also. They learned in their conversations that many people who would like to fly must wait two to three years for their turn. There is nothing on which to train them. So that the boys' dream is grounded even before they can try their wings.

There was a time when the design bureau kept the defense organization in mind. O.K. Antonov himself built at least ten gliders for the Osoaviakhim [Society for Assistance to the Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction of the USSR]. Today that tradition is forgotten. Can it be that aviation builders will once again lend a helping hand? Let us hope that the DOSAAF acquires a Mriya of its own.



Thoughts of perestroika and reviving the Osoaviakhim traditions were on the minds of participants as they joined the meeting of the defense collective held at the republic House of DOSAAF. The meeting was called to order by N. Shidenko, deputy chairman, Central Committee, UkSSR DOSAAF. He turned over the microphone to A. Anokhin, first deputy chief of administration, Central Committee, USSR DOSAAF, who spoke of the visiting candidates for USSR deputy.

The participants held a constructive discussion dealing with ways to improve the activity of the republic's defense society organizations. We must realize that we are speaking of 25 oblast committees, not counting the Kiev gorkom, and 17 Houses of DOSAAF. This encompasses a multitude of training organizations; dozens of production enterprises, shops, maintenance and repair units; and hundreds of patriotic associations and special interest clubs.

There is no end to things to be done, and they must be handled by competent managers who are capable of effecting bold reforms geared to perestroika. The ranks of such cadres are limited, however. Consequently, the responsible positions are filled by ambition-driven and even unprincipled people. Their main purpose is to occupy a "seat of power."

By the same token, work involved with selecting and placing managerial personnel into committees amounted to nothing more than authoritarian compilation of lists of the "reserve." In this connection, due consideration was not always given to the opinions of labor collectives, local party and soviet organs. As a result, selections of alternate candidates were extremely short. This surfaced just before it becomes necessary to reelect 50 percent of obkom chairmen and an even larger number of their deputies for military technical training.

We have no choice but to admit that we are still in the process of learning democracy. However, in this school we cannot have failures or students remaining behind for a second year, since there is little time for that.

Let us return to the aktiv's meeting and the continuing discussions. After hearing B. Kharchuk, who stated that mass defense work gained momentum in the course of the election campaign, there was a speech by V. Larionov, chairman of the Zaliznichnyy DOSAAF raykom, city of Kiev. His evaluation of the activity of the defense society's organizations differed from the preceding one.

"DOSAAF committees are suffering a loss of authority," said V. Larionov. "For example, at enterprises and institutions of our rayon, meetings are called to criticize the DOSAAF organizations for inactivity and formalism, and young people are urged not to join the defense society."

USSR pilot-cosmonaut P. Klimuk in his speech claimed that the present situation is due to lack of effective military patriotic work. And he was right. This was followed up by the subsequent speakers: V. Marchenko, Cherkassy obkom chairman, and A. Tarasyuk, Shostka gorkom chairman.

Further development of social principles in the defense society was the topic of a speech by flight instructor L. Nemkova. Some officials of committees usually rely on official workers, rather than use the aktiv. Without the latter, without the mass character in defense work, it is impossible to win authority. Past experience dictates that it is necessary to explore all ways to expand and strengthen the ties to the trade union, Komsomol, military units, military commissariats, civil defense staffs, and educational organs.

"Enhancement of the authority of defense society organizations," emphasized N. Kotlovtssev, Central Committee chairman of the USSR DOSAAF, "consists of continuing democratization of DOSAAF activity. The very nature of the voluntary society presupposes organic observance of democratic principles. The stagnation years have unfortunately left their mark. We have not set up a democratic mechanism that would exclude the possibility of a return to the mandatory administrative command method. The creation of such a mechanism will be the object of concern of the USSR people's deputies from the defense society. We have a pressing need for complete restoration of the essence and meaning of Lenin's concept of the democratic centralism principle.

The meeting of the republic's defense aktiv drafted an appeal to the participants of the 4th Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee to cast their vote for people's deputy candidates N. Kotlovtssev, P. Klimuk, L. Nemkova, A. Mikhaylov, V. Fesenko, B. Kharchuk, and N. Chekov.

#### Thoughts of Lithuanian Officer on Military Service, National Units

18010621 Vilnius KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 23 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Z. Vichis: "The Army Will Once Again Become Our School of Life: The Anxious Thoughts of Officers"]

[Text] Z. Vichis: Before beginning my discussion of the Soviet Army as a school of courage and life, and of its daily routine and morale, let me say a little about myself. I was born in 1943. After graduating from secondary school I decided to become an officer. I graduated from the Kaliningrad Military Engineering School, and I served in the north and in the east. In 1973 I graduated from the Military Engineering Academy. I served in the Moscow and Transcaucasian military districts, and now I am stationed in Vilnius.

It is not just from heresay that I know that the army is not for the weak-willed, that it is an organism in which personal interests are subordinated to the affairs of the collective, that there are many difficulties in army life, and that dealing with them requires a tempered character. I myself experienced the "system of political and spiritual education of Soviet soldiers," and its inestimable significance in regard to nurturing "the feeling of deep internal conviction of soldiers" (citations from the "chronicles" of the times of stagnation).

It was not at all that long ago that people asserted that only order prevailed in the army. They believed that life in the Soviet Army is the same as what they saw when they visited military units on a day when the oath is taken, and that the work is like what is shown on the Sunday morning telefilm "I Serve the Soviet Union." Few realized in those days that on the eve of a visit to the military unit by honored guests or a high commission, yellowed grass was painted green and leaves were glued onto the branches or plucked from them (depending on the time of the year). And God forbid that someone should broach the subject that some young people on active duty in the peacetime army lost their mental health and purity of spirit, and sometimes even parted with their life.

Even today, people wearing shoulderboards are reluctant to speak about the shortcomings of army life. For example Major General V. Sein, first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Baltic Red Banner Military District, asserted on 25 November 1988 in a Lithuanian television broadcast of "Government Studio" that army service was being criticized excessively in Lithuania. The army accused civilians of preparing good-for-nothing young people for army service: Over a thousand young men of conscript age are mentally disturbed, over a thousand and a half have records, a third do not have one of their parents, and one out of seven is on record with the police. In a word, the army is not isolated from the society. It is the parents, the teachers, the school, the punks, the rockers, the metallists and, of course, the stagnant times that are to blame for the troubles of the army, but never the military themselves.

Heaping the misfortunes of the army upon civilian society is not a solution in my opinion. By doing so we belittle that to which we have devoted our life—our profession. And it is no wonder that many tend to think otherwise. In this time of the nation's rebirth, when urgent issues associated with service in the army are being posed, there are more and more people who say whatever they think about the army, whatever their life and milieu dictates that they say.

Why do we, the military, hide beneath the cover of "secret" or "top secret" rather than seeking, together with the public, ways of removing the spots from our uniforms, and demand that civilians mind their own business and let us do our work in peace? We'll take care of all of it ourselves, we say, we'll punish some, replace

others, and write some new regulations. How can an officer possibly not notice the deceit, the hypocrisy and the astounding disorder in the army, and the outrageous pretense?

The Soviet Army does have problems. We must all solve them together. The public's concern is necessary not only when it comes to discussing price reform. I say that the time has come for us, the Lithuanian officers, to speak openly as well. We must confess our sins, and evaluate ourselves. Others already evaluated us long ago.

Let's try to delve somewhat into the life of the typical officer, and perhaps some things might then become clear. Take for example my own career, which doesn't differ very much from the careers of other officers from Lithuania, or from their life and their destiny.

It is written in my officer's book that I was born in the village of Derkinchyay, in what is now Skuodasskiy Rayon. The postwar thoughts of the village's frightened inhabitants were impressed into my young consciousness forever: A feeling of mistrust in tomorrow reigned in the town. To save ourselves, they said, we need to live a kind of double life: censure the former government, sling mud at land-owners and glorify kolkhozes. Otherwise we could lose everything we have, and in some cases even life itself.

The year was 1962. As with many young lads from the Zhemaytiya who dealt courageously with the class enemy and who had given some thought to the gloriousness of today and tomorrow, I felt that I could not believe at all in the future of kolkhozes. How was I to live, how was I to get an education? Moreover I wanted to travel my life's path without outside help, which incidentally was not to be found anywhere anyway. The easiest path was to enter a military school on a full state scholarship. Moreover as it seems to me, every young boy holds the uniform in respect. It is the sacred obligation of a man to learn how to use a weapon, and to rise to the defense of the motherland when necessary. Therefore there was nothing surprising in the fact that we, students of Shachyay and Barstichyay schools, were outright infatuated with the officer's profession, feeling it to be the most romantic.

Following my graduation I received an appointment to the cosmodrome. It was while I served there that I came to understand what I was worth. The daily work assignments were such that I frequently had to exert myself almost to the limit. Frequently there were days when only 3 or 4 hours were left for sleep.

But despite the constant stress and the difficult daily labor, my life acquired special meaning. Probably because we, lieutenants in a military unit under the command of company commanders, veteran captains, served in the way real officers are obliged to serve. Everything in our life was simple and clear: The service, and respect for one's profession above all! Therefore we did not divide the soldiers into "good" and "bad"—we valued each one. We educated our subordinates on the

basis of the well known army principle of doing as I do. The entire training process and the way of life were directed at one goal—developing a citizen and a soldier.

There were of course the bad days as well. Truthfully speaking I don't even like to think about them today. But there were more good days. And this is the way it should be, if a person firmly believes in justice, if he knows that everything that has been achieved by generals and marshals is also accessible to him—after all, that was before the time of the now-established principle that generals' sons become generals. In those days we were not so enraptured by company, battalion, regiment and division commanders, for whom the main thing was to have it noted in their personal files that they had climbed all of the rungs of the service ladder, even though these rungs leading to high posts were purely symbolic (1-1.5 years—platoon commander, 1-2 years—company commander, 1-2 years—battalion chief of staff, and now, 4-5 years after receiving the rank of lieutenant, one was a newly-made battalion commander). And beyond that, there were practically no obstacles.

In summer 1966 I unexpectedly parted with the cosmodrome forever. I was given a foreign passport, and sent to serve in Mongolia. There I saw the real consequences of the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations.

It was not until 3 years later that I went on leave. On hearing Russian being spoken at the customs office and on seeing Soviet people, I felt I clearly understood what it means to have a motherland. I do not wish the reader to think that I think in slogans, but it was precisely at this moment that I conclusively realized that Russians are my compatriots, but my real motherland is Lithuania. It is impossible to put an equal sign between these two motherlands—the Soviet Union and Lithuania. It is primarily one's own nook, the land and language of one's ancestors, that brings out the emotions in each person.

Some philosophers reason like this: What sense is there in talking about love for one's native nook, and about concern for the destiny of one's nation, if this nook and this nation are limited to what can be seen from one's window or from one's backyard? But it would be sufficient for such a "philosopher" to find himself far away from his motherland to immediately begin feeling what home means to a person. He would no longer need any proof that there is no person more unfortunate than one who is indifferent as to where he works, lives and dies. This is why the arguments of those three Lithuanian generals in the Lithuanian television broadcast "Government Studio," who said that life is easy even if one cannot hear a single word of Lithuanian, seem unconvincing to me. And there was good reason why at the end of the interview, Major General A. Naudzhyunas said that after he retired from service he would definitely live in Lithuania. This is natural. No matter where destiny might take him, the favorite tiny nook of every officer born in Lithuania will also remain within his heart.

But who is going to be touched by your tears? After I graduated from military school, the Soviet Union formally became my motherland, whether I wanted it to or not, but my roots remained where I was born and raised. There was nothing of it nearby. Only the memories: the round loaves, the buckets of fresh milk, my father weaving baskets, my mother spinning wool....

When a person selects the officer's profession he chooses life on the road; he becomes part of a nomadic society that carries all of its property on its back. Orders to go to the other end of the Soviet Union or even farther could arrive any day. We move from one military unit to another, where people brought up under different traditions and torn from the culture of their people are assembled together.

Does this not mean the loss of ethnic qualities? Or could this be the advent of new ones? Serving far away from Lithuania, we lose our national self-respect. There is good reason that Russians laugh when two Lithuanians speaking with each other in their native language use Russian swear-words. I must confess, alas, that they do use Russian swear-words. In our milieu, refined language is not necessary in order to speak convincingly. A soldier's lexicon and swear-words are enough. And if you try to argue that a need for speaking in a cultured manner must be nurtured, someone would invariably recall that even in Tolstoy's "War and Peace," the language in which Kutuzov speaks to soldiers is not at all refined.

Someone once said that a soldier loses not because he is poorly armed, but for the reason that he forgets to arm himself with the most dependable weapon—culture.

With time, unquestioning fulfillment of every order and recognition of its absolute power train an officer to fulfill any order. If you want to rise up the rungs of the career ladder, hold your tongue and don't ever dare to dispute the opinion of a senior commander, no matter how absurd it might be. You are obliged to fulfill all orders with identical meticulousness and stubbornness, even if they contradict one another. This is what the regulations require. True, the regulations do allow one to complain that an order is wrong, after carrying it out. But he who has served in the army knows what it means to complain.

In the matter of nurturing patriotism, in my opinion national origins should be the starting point. There can be no internationalism otherwise. I am referring to assimilation in general. Others, not only Lithuanians, also undergo assimilation. We can find few officers in the Soviet Army from the smaller nations who would not aspire to serve in their own republic. Whatever he might be, a person without a motherland is nothing!

Look at my children: They had an opportunity to study in Vilnius, but they have scattered themselves over the country. My son was born in Mongolia, my daughter was born in central Russia, and their homelands are only places noted in their documents. How can they prove



that their motherland is Lithuania? Nothing ties them to Lithuania, with the exception of their Lithuanian father. The old ruined castles of Lithuania are but heaps of stone to them, while its shrines are simply ancient structures. The history of Lithuania and its symbols are now meaningless to them. It is difficult for them to experience the feelings that I do when I think about the motherland of my past. When I write about the life of Lithuanian officers, and my life specifically, I have no intention of making trouble. I only want to try to understand why things are the way they are. Perhaps the problem is that we have lost respect for the history and the past of our nation.

We have been told for a long time now that Ivan Susanin, Aleksandr Nevskiy and Dmitriy Donskoy were progressive personalities. In czarist times, when a monument was erected in Novgorod for Russia's thousand-year anniversary, a place was found there for Lithuanians as well. On the monument, in equal company with Aleksandr Nevskiy, Dmitriy Donskoy, Ivan Susanin, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Nakhimov and other famous Russian military leaders, one finds the great Lithuanian Prince Kyastutis. And among 26 government officials—in company with Yaroslav the Wise, Vladimir Monomakh, Peter the Great and other famous people who created the Russian state, one finds the great princes Gediminas, Algirdas and Vitautas. But in the offices of military glory, and on barrack walls devoted to "The Land in Which You Serve," not even a tiny corner can be found for troop commander Kyastutis, or government officials of European scale such as Gediminas, Algirdas and Vitautas, who made an inestimable contribution to the thousand-year history of the Russian state as well.

A time has come in which we can no longer divide the motherland into feudal, bourgeois and Soviet.

Going back mentally from today to the past, and yielding to my emotions, I begin to think that perhaps it is senseless for a Lithuanian (and not only him!) to leave his home, that his wanderings are senseless. Could it be that I (and not only I!) belong to those officers for whom, in W. Faulkner's words, it would better to erect a strong chicken coop? Should we officers not experience a sense of sadness owing to the tragedy of soldier A. Sakalauskas, owing to the destiny of Private R. Balkauskas and Sergeant A. Urbonavichyus (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 November 1988, YAUNIMO GRYATOS No 10, 1988)? Could it be that what I feel to be my convictions are only embellished illusions, paper flowers?

What has happened with the officers? I ask this not in order to rise on the wave of national rebirth and make a contribution to the flow of "popular" articles. There are more important things as well.

People of the military profession were, are and, of course, will continue to be among those the motherland needs the most. Service in the armed forces was and will be an honorable obligation of citizens. But we must serve our

motherland not because we are ordered to do so, but out of love. Lieutenant Colonel V. Eydukaytis shared his opinion as to how this could be attained (KOMYAUINIMO TESA, 15 September 1988, 24 November 1988). I agree completely with his proposals, but this is not enough. I think that we will not attain any high summits until we create national military units, like it was in the Lithuanian 16th Division, and like it was in the famed regiments of Red Latvian riflemen. After all, they did make an inestimable contribution to the motherland's protection.

It's not easy to create national regiments, battalions, divisions, squadrons, detachments and companies, or make the vessel "Komsomolets Litvy" a place of service for our Komsomol. But I simply think there is no other way. Service of Lithuanians in national units would raise responsibility, nurture real patriotism and become a school of real internationalism.

"For the moment it is very difficult to say for sure if Lithuanian formations are possible," said Major General S. Nekroshyus on television on 25 November 1988. I cannot but agree with the general. But we have no right to wait for manna from heaven.

#### **Response to Public Debate on Military Structure, Problems with Minorities**

18010624 Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-  
NYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 89, pp 3-11

[Unattributed article: "More Party Attention to Inter-ethnic Education"]

[Text] During the years of Soviet rule, historically significant work has been completed in the USSR for the unification of the inter-ethnic family of equal peoples in a united socialist state. A unique union of republics is the result of the efforts of the Communist Party and many generations of Soviet people. The realization of the revolutionary will and striving of more than 100 nations and peoples and the assertion of their inter-ethnic unity was predetermined by the common character of their historical fate, by the unity of the socialist choice, and by Marxist-Leninist ideology. Achievements in the regeneration and development of the status of the republic state system, national cultures, and acceleration of progress of previously backward regions are indisputable. An integral national economic system has taken shape and it is the material foundation of the Soviet peoples' unity. Economic, cultural, and cadre potential of all republics and autonomous republics has immeasurably increased and their independence continues to grow. The new historical identity, the Soviet people, has become a reality with the simultaneous growth of national self-consciousness.

Besides, many acute problems requiring resolution have gradually accumulated in inter-ethnic relations. Events in Alma-Ata in December 1986, events surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia and Azerbaydzhan, and the complicated processes in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and in a number of other regions very clearly showed that

much was absolutized in the resolution of the nationalities question, at times the desired was presented as the actual, and serious contradictions came to a head.

The 19th Party Conference, having comprehensively analyzed the state of Soviet society, provided a realistic assessment of inter-ethnic processes in the country and a clear answer to the question, why did these negative phenomena become possible. The Conference's resolution "On Inter-ethnic Relations" points out that the dynamism inherent in the beginning stage of the formation of the multiethnic state of the Soviets was substantially forfeited and undermined by a departure from Marxist-Leninist nationalist policy principles and by violations of the law during the period of the cult of personality, and by the ideology and psychology of stagnation.

The nationalist process control mechanism set forth by V.I. Lenin in the first years of Soviet rule was gradually lost. The requirements of the social, economic, and cultural development of individual republics, formation of autonomous republics and nationalist groups were at times insufficiently taken into account by central and local agencies. Therefore, solutions were not found in a timely manner for quite a few acute issues which arose due to the very development process of nations and nationalities. Naturally, this led and continues to lead to social dissatisfaction which at times takes on the nature of a dispute. Cases of nationalist egoism and arrogance, a free-ride mentality and parochialism continue to occur. Negative phenomena, which have accumulated for decades, were ignored for a long time, were driven inward, and did not obtain the required party evaluation.

However, the strength of socialism and its humanistic and inter-ethnic potential turned out to be so great that even a retreat from Leninist nationalist policy principles could not undermine the friendship of the Soviet peoples. The Great Patriotic War is a convincing confirmation of this. The hopes of the German-Fascist military-political leadership that the multiethnic Soviet State would disintegrate under the very first thrusts of the Wehrmacht were unwarranted. The union republics had different capabilities but each of them gave all it could toward achievement of Victory. The united multiethnic family of the Soviet peoples became the main character of the Great Patriotic War. Their genuinely fraternal relations and mutual assistance permitted the nation to revive the national economy in a short period of time. Residents of the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East, and envoys from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus helped the workers of Belorussia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia, and RSFSR rayons, through which the war passed like a barrage fire, raise factories, plants, cities and villages from ruins and ashes.

The strength of internationalism of the Soviet peoples was once again clearly manifested while eliminating the tragic aftermath of the earthquake in Armenia. They perceived this natural disaster as their own grief and

pain. Sorrow and human sympathy for those who perished and attempts to materially and morally support [the survivors] were truly nation-wide. The whole nation is genuinely doing everything possible to ease the fate of the victims and to restore destroyed cities and villages.

The Party, our State, and the multiethnic Soviet people have enormous experience in establishing inter-ethnic relations. And there is something to be derived from this treasure. Based on what has been achieved and drawing lessons from the past, the CPSU Central Committee is requiring all work on improvement of inter-ethnic relations to be raised to a qualitatively new level and to elaborate effective measures for implementation at the current stage of Leninist national policy. The Party's goals are noble—to achieve true harmony of interests of all the country's nations and nationalities on the principles of socialist internationalism, independence and responsibility, mutual assistance and fraternity and through these insure the consolidation and further development of the Soviet union multiethnic state.

A CPSU Central Committee Plenum will take place this Summer which will discuss the issue "On Improvement of Inter-ethnic Relations in the USSR." The Party has begun detailed preparations for it. The Central Committee will take counsel with primary party organizations, party agencies, workers collectives, scholars, writers, journalists, and artists on the problems of improving inter-ethnic relations. Communists and all Soviet people are boldly expressing new ideas and are introducing specific proposals directed at consolidating our society's inter-ethnic unity for the further improvement of inter-ethnic relations.

Army and Navy political agencies and party organizations are actively preparing for the Central Committee Plenum. The realization of the demands of the 19th Party Conference—to make service in the USSR Armed Forces a true school of inter-ethnicity—are becoming increasingly overcome by practical matters. In particular, the practice of personnel inter-ethnic education is being improved and renewed and a single management system is being organized for it. Commissions on inter-ethnic relations and, under the primary political agencies and party committees—inter-ethnic relations groups, are being established under the Army and Navy's Main Political Directorate and the military district political directorates, groups of forces, fleets, and political agencies of large formations. A major program has been planned for satisfying servicemen's national-cultural needs and a series of organizational and educational measures has been developed and is being implemented.

In spite of the nationalistic epidemics in a number of the nation's regions, both the appropriate level of political maturity and concern about consolidating the inter-ethnic unity of military units were manifested within the Army and Navy environment. Many officers, sergeants

and soldiers, petty officers and sailors proved themselves to be convincing propagandists for the idea of socialist inter-ethnicity in these complicated conditions.

At the end of last year, the USSR Ministry of Defense Collegium reviewed questions on the condition and measures for improving work on perfecting personnel inter-ethnic education and uniting multiethnic units in the Army and Navy. The tasks of intensifying inter-ethnic and patriotic education were discussed in military soviets of the military districts, groups of forces, and fleets, at meetings of party activists of large formations, and at primary party organizations. Scientific and practical conferences, entitled "Leninist Principles of CPSU National Policy and Urgent Tasks of Inter-ethnic Education," were conducted with the command staff in many military districts.

All of this has permitted us to more precisely determine the role and to increase to some degree commanders' and political workers' responsibilities for inter-ethnic and patriotic education and to impart a definite dynamism to the activities of party and Komsomol organizations. We have succeeded in doing quite a bit for activating two-way communications channels with servicemen which provides political agencies, party committees, and bureaus the opportunity to get involved in a timely manner in these inter-ethnic relations processes in military units and to predict them. The inter-ethnic educational material and technical base is being strengthened in political agencies, officers clubs, and soldiers clubs.

However, one cannot help but see that recently demand for improving inter-ethnic relations in the Army and Navy is outstripping existing content and forms of work in this area. The formal approach to the organization of inter-ethnic education is being very slowly overcome in many political agencies, party committees, bureaus, and Komsomol committees. Chronic notions still persist, especially at the regimental and ship section level of military units, about the lack of problems of inter-ethnic relations. Cases of national egoism, arrogance, and cliquishness according to national origin continue to occur. Nationalist and clannish formations in certain subunits and units frequently place themselves in a privileged position in relation to other servicemen and attempt to dictate their conditions to the whole military unit. Deviations associated with inter-ethnic relations are making themselves known even within the dynamics of military discipline. A certain number of flagrant incidents due to so-called "dedovshchina" have a nationalist overtone.

The influence of the demographic situation on the national structure of the USSR Armed Forces is becoming increasingly perceptible. Servicemen of Central Asian and Transcaucasian indigenous nationalities today account for approximately one third of Army and Navy personnel. But this is not being taken into account everywhere in the practice of inter-ethnic education. There is still quite a bit of "a toast to your health and the holiday" interpretation of those who have national problems and there are many

simplifications. Here is one example. The political agency in which Colonel V. Cherepukhin serves formed an inter-ethnic relations group and included three of its workers and several major unit staff officers on its staff. They did not even try to concern themselves with including representatives from among those nationalities who serve in its units and subunits. I ask you, who does this group represent? What benefit can be expected from such a formal approach to the very delicate matter of establishing inter-ethnic relations?

There are subunits and units in the Army and Navy where the Leninist conclusion that "One must not joke and one must be 1,000 times careful" when establishing nationality relations either has been forgotten or has not been infused with real vitality. As usual, emphasis is being placed on increasing measures but not on increasing their results nor on the renewal of the forms and content of educational work.

An unfounded approach toward servicemen of non-Russian nationalities has not been eliminated in everyday life in some places and at times the peculiarities of their national character, national psychology, customs, and traditions are not being taken into account. As usual, cases of treating servicemen of non-Russian nationalities rudely and inconsiderately and sticking contemptuous names and labels on them affecting national dignity occur from time to time. And certain leaders of military units, especially sergeants, act as if it never occurred to them that cursing someone's mother is the highest form of insult for some peoples.

Education of personnel on the examples of the heroic military past of the peoples of the USSR and popularization of the Russian people's and all USSR peoples' patriotic and inter-ethnic traditions has slackened.

All of our political and organizational work is slowly ridding itself of the hackneyed thinking of previous years and a blind belief in slogans and formulas. It is not enough to proclaim that the Soviet Army is a school of patriotic and inter-ethnic education. The righteousness of this indisputable fact does not relieve each commander, political worker, and party and Komsomol activist of the obligation for unceasing purposeful work to make the school function and yield a real return. Slogans do not solve problems. Only diligent daily ideological and political educational activity at all levels can raise inter-ethnic education to a qualitatively new level.

The mechanisms for acceleration on the main axes of perestroika are now being formed in the Army and Navy. Such a mechanism is also needed for renewing inter-ethnic education. Its driving force is the tireless explanation of the essence of Leninist nationality policy, the 27th Party Congress and 19th Party Conference resolutions on its practical implementation, and the formation of patriotic and inter-ethnic convictions among servicemen. Moreover, it will be correct to proceed from the position that all servicemen, regardless of



national origin and job position, need inter-ethnic education to in fact insure the principle of equal and equitable prescribed treatment for each of them.

A methodical approach to the resolution of this problem is well known: each serviceman, regardless of nationality, must feel exactly like he does at home while in the military environment, in the barracks, and in crew quarters. This is proper and this is an inter-ethnic approach. Its basis is satisfaction of both social, cultural, and other needs. But we need legal, not natural, regulation of interrelations in a military unit. The solid legal foundation of this work is the Constitution of the USSR, the Law on Universal Military Service, the military oath, and military regulations.

In the Spring of 1918, V.I. Lenin, while taking the objective conditions of establishing a new socialist army in a multiethnic country into account, was still emphasizing that we needed only an inter-ethnic army and "it must be educated in the spirit of fraternity of all workers." Meanwhile, one can now occasionally hear statements from some members of informal associations that each union republic can allegedly voluntarily have its own army and its own national military formations. Materials have begun to appear in the press which assert the allegedly urgent need of transitioning to the formation of an army on the militia-territorial principle. Officers' signatures are signed under some of the articles, including those of officers with academic degrees.

During the 70 years of its existence, our Army has gone through both the militia-territorial system and the extra-territorial and inter-ethnic (mixed) recruitment of troops, and through national military formations within the framework of a single army. Having experienced all of this, frequently through the trial and error method, it began to be structured on the existing system of military organization which was developed by the Party. This system withstood trial by war. And this is the main argument in defense of the existing principles of our military structure.

Our Army is inter-ethnic in its origin and socio-political status. The Red Army was established for the defense of the gains of the Great October Revolution which embodied the interests of all our country's nations and nationalities. It was created by the working class and by its party which were inter-ethnic in their essence. The aims of its creation, the method of its recruitment, the nature of missions carried out, the defense of the interests of precisely a federal and not another [type] of state, and a state of equal republics form the Army's inter-ethnic character.

Finally, our Army must be precisely inter-ethnic also because it is called upon to defend the gains of world socialism and to act as a sort of guarantor of peace in a union with the fraternal armies of the countries of the

Warsaw Treaty. Socialism and peace are inter-ethnic phenomena which can only be preserved and insured through the peoples' inter-ethnic efforts.

In a word, each commander, political worker, communist, and Komsomol member must himself profoundly understand and convey his convictions to others that today our Army can only be inter-ethnic and extraterritorial. And consequently, we must again and again compare our activities with Lenin's to unswervingly implement the socio-political principles of the structuring of a new type of Army developed by him which is the basis for the activity of the leading command-political cadres, political workers, headquarters staffs, and party organizations in resolving the problem of improving inter-ethnic relations in the Army and Navy.

Unfortunately, a study of the status of inter-ethnic education in large formations and units of the Transcaucasian, Baltic, and Turkestan Military Districts, the Moscow PVO District, in the Baltic Fleet and among military construction personnel by the Main Political Directorate showed that certain commanders and political workers are not well-versed in the main provisions of Leninist nationality policy and the CPSU documents on this issue. As a result, they cannot be deeply involved in or analyze the causes of aggravation of national relations which are occurring in military units, cannot eliminate them in a timely manner, and react poorly to nationalist manifestations. Thus, in one artillery regiment, Private Islamkhanov was constantly at loggerheads with Junior Sergeant Nasibov. A serious incident took place. Many in the unit knew that hostility existed between these two servicemen but no actions were taken to localize it. Examples of this nature once again prove the need to sharply react politically to negative phenomena and to more rapidly renew the forms and methods of individual and mass political work in accordance with the inter-ethnic composition of military units and attach special significance to knowledge of the attitudes and views of servicemen of different nationalities.

Meanwhile, the personal level of inter-ethnic community of those servicemen serving compulsory military service is poorly taken into account in educational work. Both commanders and political workers frequently forget that people will always belong to some community or other. Hence the attempt of each new recruit who has crossed the threshold of a military barracks to transfer both his socio-political and cultural reality into the situation of national relations in a military unit. And, in this connection, it is important to bear in mind the nation's historical and social memory. The nation's historical memory in many instances still dwells on the at times tragic pages of past national relations. Let us take this very "Karabakh" issue. Negative residue in the social memory also played a large role in exaggerating the conflict here. The Armenians and Azerbaydzhanians recalled all of each other's past offenses. All of this was undoubtedly transferred into the sphere of inter-ethnic relations.

To not allow passions to run high—this means, besides everything else, to tell the truth, no matter how bitter it might be. When we hold back "uncomfortable" historical facts, our enemies remind us about them and then the facts become extremely "uncomfortable." I think the Transcaucasus Military District's political directorate acted properly in having included its lecturers, inspector and instructor personnel, and the military district newspaper in the thorough discussion about traditions, customs, the historical past of the Azeri and Armenian peoples, and an explanation of the essence of points of view and ways of constructively resolving arising problems. The speeches of the secretaries and members of the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaydzhan Communist Party Central Committee Bureaus, and other responsible officials in military units are playing a major role in personnel inter-ethnic education. The military district sent over 3,500 Young Pioneer leaders from among sergeants and soldiers to schools. Military units subscribe to more than 3,000 copies of national newspapers. They have established 154 Russian language study groups. Meetings of inductees, reserve servicemen and soldiers' mothers have become traditional. And this undoubtedly is yielding results: military district personnel conducted themselves appropriately during the events in Sumgait, Stepanakert, Yerevan, and Baku and they contributed and continue to make a weighty contribution to the elimination of the tragic aftermath of the earthquake in Armenia.

Today when representatives of from 9 to 18 nationalities serve in companies, batteries, and squadrons, and up to 35 [nationalities] in regiments and divisions, and from 60 to 90 [nationalities] in military districts, the issue of better officer personnel training for work in multiethnic military units is sharply being raised. Scholars from the Institute of Military History polled a large group of young officers in three military districts. And they obtained the following statistics: from 55 to 70 percent of officers do not take the multi-ethnic composition of military units into account during educational work; up to 80 percent have not been taught to control interrelations among subordinates of different nationalities; approximately the same number do not know how to conduct preventive work for prevention of conflicts based on nationality. The results of the investigation, even with a correction for their lack of complete objectivity, must cause concern. Obviously, they are evidence that our military educational institutions are not including changes which are now occurring in their activities. Such issues as the national psychology and culture of inter-ethnic society, the history of the peoples of the USSR, national traditions, customs, morals and manners have almost disappeared from the programs of military institutions, institutes, military faculties, and academies. This is in the theoretical plan.

As for practical training, according to the assessment of students of Tashkent Military Officer Training, Tallinn Military-Political Engineering, Kaliningrad Higher Military Engineering, and Tbilisi Higher Military Artillery

Institutes, conflicts sometimes arise within their environment between representatives of different nationalities which are expressed in verbal insults and membership in cliques by national origin. How can military academy graduates strengthen inter-ethnic relations among the troops having obtained the "practical experience" of resolving them only with the aid of rudeness and humiliation of national dignity?

There is something for the organizers and leaders of commander's and Marxist-Leninist training to reflect upon in the plan for enriching officer personnel with knowledge of the content and methods of work with multiethnic military units. Our cadres and party activists can adopt much useful information from the invaluable experience of inter-ethnic work during the years of the civil and Great Patriotic Wars and the military structuring of the 20's and 30's. Even if we can recall the experience of the Turkestan Military District when M.V. Frunze led it. At that time, through the commander of troops' example and insistence, all commanders and political workers studied the language of the native population, and the history, culture, life style, and customs of the peoples of Central Asia. Mikhail Vasilevich's profound understanding of the national psychology of the Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Tadzhiks surprised everyone.

This experience is applicable even in our times. Study of the languages of the peoples of the union or autonomous republics by officer personnel, warrant officers, and members of their families, on whose territory their units and subunits are deployed, should be encouraged. Increasing concern in the republics that each youth of draft age can freely command the skills of conversational language and reading in the Russian language should be equally stressed.

Developing the very rich experience of inter-ethnic education means reinforcing military units' ties with party and soviet agencies in the union and autonomous republics, national oblasts and districts, and establishing close contacts with commissions and workers groups on inter-ethnic relations established under local party and soviet agencies by workers collectives, educational institutions, and servicemen's parents and relatives.

The problem of existing disproportions in the national structure of officer personnel worsens from year to year. For example, among young Kirghiz officers, one hundred all told; Turkmen, 400 hundred; Uzbeks, 1.6 percent, and representatives of the Baltic republics can be listed by name. Even without referring to the imperfections of statistics, it is obvious that there is an extreme shortage of officers from among the nationalities mentioned above at the company echelon where we must specifically work on improving inter-ethnic relations.

Military institutions have not moved ahead very forcefully in recruiting native nationalities. Non-competitive admittance and the establishment of specialized schools and boarding schools have not been fully used for these goals.

And who has properly asked the voyenkomats [military commissariats] of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus which do not systematically carry out missions for selecting persons of native nationalities for military institutions?

A multiethnic personnel structure is not the best method of taking into account now and during selection into CPSU and Komsomol ranks. Individual political agencies and party organizations manifest sluggishness here. In the Northern Fleet, for example, sailors and petty officers of Central Asian nationalities, the Transcaucasus, and Baltic total more than 10 percent of total compulsory military service personnel but they totaled only 1.4 percent of 1987's new party members.

The issue of national and nationalist awaits a more complete stock-taking in educational work. Here it is very important for political agencies and party organizations to actively oppose two extremes: any manifestation of either national nihilism or nationalism as an ideology of national superiority which is blind and easily slides into racism. Everything national is fruitful and respected until that time when love for one's people and pride in its achievements grows into pretensions toward some sort of exclusiveness, to superiority in comparison with other peoples, their culture, traditions, and customs. Any manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism, Zionism, or anti-Semitism are not permitted, no matter from whom they may arise. Any pretensions to national exclusiveness are offensive to other peoples including the one in whose name it is being expressed or is being made.

In a construction detachment which Lieutenant Colonel I. Yukhimenko commanded until recently, conflicts based on nationality arose because certain servicemen from among people of the Transcaucasian nationality placed themselves in a privileged position in relation to others. They refused to clean up their living quarters, wash floors, etc. (they said, "men do not do women's work"), and stated other pretensions. A higher echelon political agency and headquarters had to correct the situation in the detachment. In the interests of improving the moral atmosphere, previous leaders were removed and new ones designated who know how to establish inter-ethnic relations and observance of regulations.

Today we simply cannot get by in educational work without supporting the growth of peoples' national self-consciousness and resolution of issues of social justice in the development of national relations, and also issues associated with language, culture, literature and art, etc. All of these phenomena are positive in and of themselves. But it would be a mistake not to see that certain of them began to get complicated and to attain a nationalist overtone. Consequently, we need to scrupulously analyze national relations in units and on ships, the ideological situation, and expose the deep-rooted causes which give rise to a worsening of national relations among servicemen and we must actively come out against any nationalist manifestations.

Inter-ethnic relations in the barracks is an area of special concern. Delicate approaches are required here. Manifest political vigilance, decisively prevent discord on an inter-ethnic basis, and simultaneously avoid insufficiently considered and premature judgments and actions. To not dramatize a situation, but to efficiently resolve all issues which go against our inter-ethnic ideology and the principles of friendship of peoples of the USSR and to rebuff home-grown nationalists and demagogues. One of the political writers truthfully noted: Now many shouters have appeared who boldly lay their chest on the gun-ports, knowing beforehand that there is no machine-gun there.

An urgent task of political agencies is to more actively address inter-ethnic relations problems and inter-ethnic education of Army and Navy Komsomol to make it a full-fledged participant in the struggle for uniting multi-ethnic military units. It would be useful to concentrate Komsomol activists' efforts on the development, among young people, of a culture of inter-ethnic society and support of national traditions of male responsibility for defense of the Fatherland, women, and children, and to skillfully master weaponry which have been historically formed among many nations and peoples of our nation.

We must also ponder over how to more fully and constructively realize the great potential of Army and Navy social scientists in the area of inter-ethnic education. Problems such as broadening legal guarantees in the realization of soldiers' national cultural demands; ideological insurance of CPSU national policy in the Armed Forces; development of the theory and practice of inter-ethnic relations in military units; and improvement of the work of military cadres, political agencies and party organizations through patriotic and inter-ethnic education of personnel could more quickly come under their scrutiny.

Preparations for the Central Committee Plenum, which will discuss the issue of improving inter-ethnic relations, is a very important matter of military soviets, political agencies, party organizations, and for all communists of the Army and Navy. We need to intensify initiatives in each unit and on each ship for posing and resolving urgent problems in mutual relations in multiethnic military units. To be closer to people, to know their moods, needs, and to openly talk with them is to support the party's course. We need to fully activate the intellectual potential of party organizations for explaining and propagandizing the decisions of the November (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

We all know that the Plenum and immediately after it the 12th Special Session of the 11th Congress of the USSR Supreme Soviet came to the simple conclusion that this formula meets the interests of all Soviet people: a firm union is a strong center and strong republics. Both the Plenum and the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet condemned extremism, separatism, demagoguery, and nationalism in all of their manifestations and hues, and precisely and unequivocally supported the unity and



friendship of the peoples of the USSR. The future is not in isolating, dividing and confronting each other. It is in mutual tolerance, respect of interests, and in striving to meet each other half-way. This, in the final analysis, is most important and most crucial for our multiethnic Fatherland.

Hence also the main mission of party political workers in the personnel inter-ethnic educational sphere: based on strength of convictions, legal authority, and military regulations, decisively countering the smallest attempts to transfer the natural national feelings of servicemen into the destructive channel of nationalism and not tolerating the use of increasing democracy and glasnost for anti-democratic purposes.

Comprehensively consolidating and intensifying our common inter-ethnic gains means to create a spiritual atmosphere, in each military and workers collective, capable of strengthening the inter-ethnic unity, friendship, and brotherhood of the Soviet people. All of our experience in military structuring proves: The might of the Army and Navy is in consistent inter-ethnicity and real inter-ethnic education.

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#### **Col Gen Pyankov on His Program as Candidate for Deputy**

18010418 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
3 March 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Col Gen B. Pyankov, commander, Siberian Military District; by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col N. Fedoseyev, in the column: "Candidates for Deputy: Personal Glimpses": "Mere Promises Are Insufficient"; date, place, and occasion not given]

[Text] The District Election Committee has registered as a candidate for USSR people's deputy from the 280th Territorial Electoral District of Novosibirsk Colonel General B. Pyankov, commander of the Siberian Military District. His candidacy has been supported by the overwhelming majority of collectives in military units, industrial enterprises, organizations, institutions, and schools. He also received the required number of votes at the district pre-election meeting. Below we present a discussion between KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col N. Fedoseyev and the candidate for USSR people's deputy.

[Fedoseyev] Comrade Colonel General, we have come to the end of another phase in the election campaign which is the first we may say that has been conducted democratically, openly, and with glasnost. Those aspiring to acquire a deputy's mandate—and this includes you—had to wage an active struggle to win the support of each collective. The campaign became even more intense at the district pre-election meeting. How have you benefited from meeting with the voters and what thoughts and feelings did this generate?

[Pyankov] First and foremost, I saw once more that democratization and the expanding glasnost have done much to finally enable people to start shedding their social apathy and indifference.

At all meetings of collectives held to consider the candidates for the deputy's position and in talks with voters, we had open discussions on topics that are close to home for all of us: What is keeping us from living normal lives, working in a productive manner, and simply being as happy as is humanly possible?

I must admit that coming out a winner in what was a truly competitive struggle was no easy matter. There were eight candidates in this particular electoral district. It seemed to me that the people looked at each candidate very closely. They asked direct questions, such as: If we support you, what will you do to look out for our interests and resolve the problems of greatest concern to enterprises, the rayon, the area? You certainly are aware that making mere promises is not sufficient; people will not accept that.

[Fedoseyev] I understand that you were not always able to acquire the necessary majority of votes, since some collectives expressed a preference for other candidates.

[Pyankov] That is true. You must realize that since this was a matter of competition, it would be naive to think that you will be victorious every time. At a meeting of the Plant imeni Chkalov, for example, the majority of votes were cast for Hero of Socialist Labor G. Lykov, chief of the Sibakademstroy Trust. His name is known throughout the country, and he is a capable industrial organizer. A number of other collectives cast their votes for Production Association Director A. Gorb.

[Fedoseyev] Nevertheless, Boris Yevgenyevich, you came out the winner. I am certain that no significant role was played by your high position and rank of colonel general. Do you think that credit should be given to the pre-election program?

[Pyankov] My platform encompasses a wide circle of political, economic, social, ecological, and, naturally, defense questions. I, for example, am firmly convinced that people's deputies should devote their major efforts to resolving problems that have a bearing on the interests of every Soviet person. This includes housing construction; supplying the populace with food and industrial products; strict adherence to the principle of social justice in all areas of our lives without exception; and creating a healthy ecological environment everywhere.

I recently spoke with war veterans. These are people who deserve our utmost respect. However, many of them have yet to receive help from ispolkoms in their requests for housing, while others are languishing as they wait to be admitted into a hospital. In Dzerzhinskiy rayon of Novosibirsk alone there are 447 war participants waiting for apartments. Of them, 125 are invalids!

I believe that it is high time to build housing and hospitals for veterans on a priority basis in kray and oblast centers where internationalist soldiers could also undergo treatment and rehabilitation. This should be financed by funds provided by enterprises. Also by funds that are still being spent on construction of projects of secondary importance.

We frequently hear speeches made by persons in high positions citing the need for improving the people's well-being. This is proper. The party and government are doing much in this regard. But we are still making little progress. We suffer shortages of necessary food products; common consumer goods are often not to be found on store shelves, while those that are available are either of poor quality or simply are not affordable by families having average incomes. These problems are especially severe in the case of young families with small children and military families in which wives of officers and warrant officers frequently are not afforded the opportunity of working. This is not to mention pensioners, some of whom are barely able to make ends meet. It seems to me that we need a reliable and effective mechanism which could protect the consumer from arbitrary price forming practices of enterprises that discontinue manufacturing inexpensive products. Soviets with their committees of deputies can also play an important role here.

The time has come to grant interest-free loans repayable in three to five years to young families at the birth of a child. I also believe that the pending legislation on pensions should make provision for incremental payments to persons residing in areas of Siberia and the Far East, where the cost of living is considerably higher than in the Baltic, Moldavia, or the Ukraine, for example. I realize that there is no easy solution to these problems. The state treasury is not a bottomless moneybag. In this connection, I propose that the funds released as a result of the reductions in the Armed Forces be used primarily to increase the size of pensions and assistance and resolve social tasks associated with the construction of medical treatment facilities, schools, and kindergartens.

The pre-election program was largely based on topics that are on the minds of voters. In one of the talks, for example, we discussed equipment which people use in their work. Since I myself was a lathe operator as a young man, I have an especially good understanding of laborers. My view in this regard is that we must earnestly renew our inventory of machine tools, replace production lines, and realign enterprises.

[Fedoseyev] Did your talks with voters touch on problems relating to the Armed Forces?

[Pyankov] Of course. Virtually every discussion we had dealt with some aspect of the subject. We spoke of the state of discipline, combat readiness, and the forthcoming Army reduction.

I made it a point to speak openly and in great detail on problems which are on our minds and about difficult tasks that our personnel must accomplish today. It is unfortunate that Army-related discussions presented in newspapers and magazines have been one-sided. Perestroika is also going on within our ranks, incidentally. An increasing role is being assigned to the quality factor in organizing combat training, assuring combat readiness, and strengthening military discipline. We are focusing on problems dealing with personnel; promoting and supporting an initiative, forceful, and truly professional attitude on the part of officers; combatting all forms of patronage; and developing glasnost and democracy. Party organizations and officers' collectives are starting to play a more active role in the resolution of all these problems. These processes are gaining momentum. There can be no doubt that they must be supported in every way possible. I also see here a number of tasks facing me personally as a candidate for people's deputy.

#### **Candidate Profile: Maj Gen B.I. Kharchuk**

18010463 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian  
5 Mar 89 p 2

[Article by V. Balabin: "By Routes of Quest"]

[Text] [Biographical Information: "Visiting Card"]

Last name, first name, patronymic: Kharchuk, Boris Ignatyevich

Year of Birth: 1934

Nationality: Ukrainian

Education: Higher

Party: CPSU member

Position: Central Committee Chairman, DOSAAF of the Ukrainian SSR

Residence: Kiev

He believes his work with people to be the most important thing in his activities. The ability to listen and to understand a person, to help him appreciate a complex situation, and if necessary, to raise well-argued objections, did not come of itself. Behind him is an excellent school, 35 years of service in the Armed Forces

He studied at an armor school and a military academy. He passed through all the difficult stages of a commander's growth in line units. He did his international duty in Afghanistan. For selfless service to the Motherland and bravery he was three times awarded orders and many medals.

In January 1988, Maj. Gen. B. I. Kharchuk was elected chairman of the CC, DOSAAF of the Ukrainian SSR. A man of word and deed, he quickly adjusted to his new duties. And soon people sensed that an energetic, competent, and thoughtful leader had arrived. The style of administrative work in the defense organization of the republic changed markedly.

We read in the election program of B.I. Kharchuk, "All our thoughts on the future of the country are associated with the young generation. This means we should involve young people in the sphere of work to further the teaching of industriousness, moral and physical improvement, development of technical creativity, and training for military service. To support this process we need to create up-to-date training and athletic facilities."

As we can see, his policy for today and the future is marked out rather clearly. But of course, its chief value lies in its practical implementation, especially in the effectiveness of first steps. It is for this reason that Boris Ignatyevich seeks new, non-standard ways of developing defense-mass work, analyzes the experience of DOSAAF organizations, listens to public opinion, and consults with people.

Just recently he met with a group of activists. An "SP" correspondent was able to be present at this meeting. It illuminated both the platform of the candidate to the People's Deputies, and his credo as the CC Chairman of the largest republican organization of the Defense Society. Therefore we offer the readers a compressed record of the conversation that took place.

[Kharchuk] Comrades, the election campaign, the struggle for the votes of the electorate is in full swing. I have already had occasion to discuss my program, to receive both approval and rebuke. I am certain that today's meeting with you will help me even more precisely to determine the extent to which my plans correspond to the spirit of perestroika.

[A. Voronin, design engineer of Kiev Mechanical Plant, Chief of the Center for Aviation Scientific-Technical Creativity] There are around 200 men working at our center now, blue and white-collar workers, students. The doors are open to all who want to be both an athlete and a designer. The members of our club themselves make the calculations, the drawings, and with their own hands they build the sailplanes, the hang gliders, and other aircraft. The boys are enthusiastic to the point of self-oblivion. Often they don't go home until midnight. There are many bold, original, and at times unexpected ideas and designs.

But the building that we have is becoming crowded. We need to expand. Now we propose to create a Center for Aviation Creativity of Kiev, on the grounds of the "Chayka" sports complex. At our plant we have architecture enthusiasts who have long dreamed of doing their part. However we are held back by the absence of documents allowing us to begin design.

[Kharchuk] I am a supporter of your remarkable plan, and I think that we can realize it through our joint efforts. After all, it will be a technical, sports, and methods aviation center. But the design is hampered by the fact that "Chayka", paradoxical as it may seem, does not have a general plan. We are now working at this. We

in the republic everywhere should turn toward aerial types of sports and aviation creativity, seek ways to meet the needs for hang gliders and sailplanes. We need our own plant, our own shops...

[Yu. Makhno, engineer, committee chairman of the primary DOSAAF Organization of the DOSAAF plant "Kievpribor"] Resolution VI of the DOSAAF Congress of the Ukraine says that for purposes of strengthening the material-technical base of primary [organizations]...they should be given a portion of the property and sports equipment allocated to the obkoms and the Kiev Commander of DOSAAF. However in fact nothing is ever received. Indeed, why speak of equipment, when just recently I was only able to obtain one copy of the DOSAAF Charter: to this point there is a great shortage.

[Kharchuk] The criticism is fair. And overall the question of strengthening the base of primary organizations should be thoroughly studied. I have a favor to ask: annoy the CC, DOSAAF of the republic more often. As for the charters, they are obtained in a great quantity. And if they don't reach you, that means they are gathering dust on the shelves of irresponsible employees.

[Yu. Makhno] The primary organizations are holding a so-called campaign to collect membership dues and distribute lottery tickets. I must say bluntly, this is an unpleasant matter for us due to the negative attitude of many people toward this. And I believe the reasons are the violation of the principle of volunteerism, the conservatism of conduct of the lottery, and the formalism of DOSAAF membership. Of course, the 10th Congress of the Defense Society made a definite step forward. But there has still not been a radical breakthrough. How does the primary organization restructure itself? What must be done for it to truly become a vital cell of the Defense Society? There is no clearcut answer. That is why I want to turn to the future deputies with a mandate to work hard at restructuring and the renewal of our Society.

[Kharchuk] Yes, you are right on the mark. Caught up in the recent past in the race for an enormous number of DOSAAF members, we have diminished in quality from year to year, and as a result have lost prestige.

Today many people are concerned: what will the primary organization be like? In my view we cannot examine this question one-sidedly. At the plant, the institution, the general-education school, the institute, different conditions for DOSAAF work objectively exist. Probably we should approach them in a differentiated manner, grant the right to the collectives themselves to choose the forms of organization.

[I. Vodyako, chairman of the Republic Federation of Motorsports] We are poor in terms of up-to-date sports equipment, clothing for the teams, and other equipment. It is dangerous to hold training sessions at "Chayka". The course, and indeed the hotel, require capital repair and reconstruction.



[Kharchuk] I admit, I was ashamed at the open championship of the Ukraine: our teams did not have their own sports uniform with DOSAAF markings. In the republic there are several combines at which we could open special shops to sew them. We already went to Sovmin with this suggestion. But it is not permitted even for cooperatives to fill our orders. Now regarding the "Chayka" sports complex. Around 7 million rubles are needed for reconstruction. At present we don't have that kind of money. But if we calculate it well, perhaps the sum can be reduced. We will certainly renovate the hotel. We also plan to construct a new one.

[I. Vodyako] The Federation is proposing to create major hubs of motor sports, concentrating its main equipment at them. Just in the near future we could form 6 to 8 such points on the basis of strong organizations, where they have their own traditions and training cadres.

[Kharchuk] I support this. Experience shows that it is not advisable to disperse all the equipment among small organizations, where it quickly breaks down. I am for the construction of major centers. And indeed, we already have the experience.

[I. Prus, deputy chief of the Kiev automotive school of DOSAAF for training and educational work] Our duty is to teach not only technical specialists and athletes. A reliable defender of the Motherland is inconceivable without strong ideological-moral tempering. And I

believe the program of political training by which we are guided has become outmoded. Today, when democratization and glasnost have illuminated questions that were previously so hushed up, when the problems of morale and culture in the youth environment have assumed their full stature, the subject matter for political classes proposed from above appears imperfect.

[Kharchuk] I would place half of the subjects of political classes at the discretion of the heads of the DOSAAF schools. After all, they are the ones who are familiar with the level of the general-education training of conscripts, the local economic, national-historical, religious, and other particulars, and it is clearer to them what questions should be given more attention. I add that to raise the quality of training of young men for military service, plans for the near future include supplying training bodies with modern equipment and bettering the life and leisure of the cadets, in addition to improving work with the pedagogic staff.

In conclusion I would say that in the interests of defense-mass work and meeting social needs, we must become zealous administrators, must ably utilize cooperatives and leasing contracts, and persistently learn cost accounting. Thank you comrades, for your criticism, for your suggestions and requests! I accept them as a kind of mandate, as a call for increased prestige, for the rebirth of the best traditions of our defense-patriotic Society.

**Military Requests Improved Russian Language Teaching**  
18330403b

18330403b [Editorial Report] Frunze SOVETNIK KYRGYZSTAN in Kirghiz on 15 December 1988 carries on page 2 a 900-word KirTAG report on the Frunze meeting of the Military Council of the Central Asian Military District; the report is headlined "We Must Prepare the Faithful Defenders of Our Country." Reports were delivered by Colonel General A. V. Kovtunov, commander of the Central Asian Military District, and Lieutenant General G. I. Chuchkalov, chief of the military district's political directorate. In the meeting, the question of the Russian language knowledge among the youth as a "means of communicating among nationalities and mastering complex military skills" was stressed "especially." Also present was A. M. Masaliyev, Kirghiz CP CC first secretary, who emphasized the need for "basic improvement" in Russian language study in secondary schools. He pointed out that in this matter "more perestroika is needed—not in words, but in deeds."

**Maj Gen Justice Zaika on Strengthening Discipline, Legality in Armed Forces**

18010415b Moscow CHELOVEK I ZAKON in Russian  
No 2, Feb 89 pp 85-91

[Interview with Maj Gen Justice Leonid Mikhaylovich Zaika by M. Pastov; date and place not given: "The Main Military Procuracy's Office Believes..."]

[Text] We are providing room on our pages to military lawyers more and more often. And while in former times the army was discussed in a habitually and unrestrainedly laudatory tone, today we are beginning to discuss its problems. This is perhaps precisely why the interest of our readers in the army's legal problems has grown so significantly, as is evident from our mail. The questions it contains were asked of Major General of Justice Leonid Mikhaylovich Zaika, first deputy main military procurator. Journalist M. Pastov met with him. Their discussion is offered to the reader below.

[Pastov] Leonid Mikhaylovich, the problems of strengthening socialist legality, and legal order in the armed forces trouble not only servicemen, young people of preconscription age and soldiers in the reserve, but also people of the most different ages. The editor's office receives many letters from mothers anxious about the practice of "dedovshchina" that has established itself in the army. But we know that as in all of our society, restructuring is proceeding in the army. Please tell us what in your opinion is most important today in the work of organs of the military procuracy.

[Zaika] As we know, the military procuracy maintains surveillance over execution of laws, military relations and other existing legislation by all organs of military administration and by military units and services. I am not about to list them—the range of the activities of the

military procuracy is considerable. But the fact is that not all that long ago, assigning functions to the military procuracy that were atypical of it was considered to be normal. For example making sure that fines imposed by the railroad department for inactive rail cars are collected from those responsible, and so on.

It was felt that the main task of the military procuracy was to fight law violators, and not maintain surveillance over the execution of laws. And yet both commanders and military procurators understand that reduction of the number of transgressions of the law begins with improving the socioeconomic situation, with raising legal culture and the culture of administration. This is precisely the objective that surveillance by the procuracy serves.

The military procuracy is obligated to take steps, when necessary and in the manner established by law, to restore the violated rights and legal interests of servicemen. No matter who is responsible for a given violation, the law is binding upon all, irrespective of title and position.

For example in spring of last year, in response to a protest from the Main Military Procuracy the USSR deputy minister of defense repealed unjustified limitations on reserving housing space for servicemen serving in distant regions of the country.

[Pastov] The readers of the journal CHELOVEK I ZAKON highly value the enormous work being done both by the Main Military Procuracy and by local military procuracies. But it is no secret that in the years of stagnation, phenomena such as protectionism, corruption and "creative accounting" became widespread in the army as well. The situation is now changing. The fact that the number of law violations in the army decreased by almost 25 percent in comparison with 1985, that it has simply become disadvantageous for commanders to hide law violations, and that, for example, in 1987 almost half of all criminal cases were brought to trial at the initiative of commanders was discussed in one of the April issues of the newspaper IZVESTIYA last year. But at the same time as things are put in order, one would think that the number of law violations that are documented should grow—this is understandable to all. Let me assure you that sober-minded citizens will not reproach the army for such negative statistics—on the contrary they would be pleased with the new order, with reinforcement of real army discipline.

[Zaika] Perhaps unsuspectingly, you have just touched upon a highly important problem—the relationship between the command's adherence to principles, and the status of legal order. You must agree that when commanders, political workers and the army and navy public are active, when they are exacting in their efforts to reveal and correct law violations and their causes, the legal statistics do in fact improve. This happens because negative behavior is curbed at the misdemeanor stage, before it develops

into criminal behavior. If a crime is nonetheless committed, then deep analysis of the factors which brought it into being, and promoted it, makes it possible to adopt effective measures to eradicate them from the given military collective. And of course, prevention of their appearance in other collectives. The tendency for the number of law violations to stably decrease in the last few years, including in the past year, is one more confirmation of the validity of this statement.

It would also be useful to add that military procurators enjoy rather broad possibilities for obtaining information characterizing the state of legality in a given military unit. The leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the command of border and internal troops are persistently introducing, into the military collectives, an atmosphere of intolerance toward cases of concealment of law violations.

Unfortunately military science has not yet come up with a precise criterion by which to evaluate military discipline. Numerical statistics were the main criterion in previous years (and even now in some places). The fewer the incidents, the better it was for the commander (the more praise he received) and the faster he was promoted. All of this generated fraudulent reporting and concealment. I would like to talk especially about concealment.

I would conditionally distinguish four types of it: the first—a commander institutes criminal proceedings, conducts an inquiry, and then for some situational considerations he fails to report to his higher chief and the military procurator; the second—a commander reports to his immediate chief but fails to begin an inquiry; the third—he refuses to institute criminal proceedings despite the existence of the elements of a crime, without the consent of the military procurator; the fourth—concealment without any kind of investigation.

The last is the most dangerous; not only is it an open violation of the law, but it also has a corrupting influence on fellow servicemen and subordinates. The guilty must be held accountable to the law.

But we need more than severe punishment for concealment. Many servicemen have become strongly aware of the extreme necessity for "cleaning out the backyard." For cleaning it out utilizing the force of law. For getting down to the roots of unlawful behavior, and finding the ways of eliminating them. This was noted in the 13 October 1988 decision of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo on progress in fulfilling CPSU Central Committee decrees on tightening military discipline in the Soviet Army and Navy. We unfortunately still have some shortcomings, but all effort is being applied to correct them.

[Pastov] I would think that success would be possible, were military lawyers provided assistance by courageous, uncompromising officers. But cases are known where some commanders have taken bribes from soldiers for short leaves and even passes.

[Zaika] Individual cases have in fact occurred. For example Officer V. Gorskiy, a section chief in a certain training unit, was criminally punished for receiving bribes to help servicemen get positions within the central oblasts. Military commissariat workers A. Cherakhchan and B. Plotkin were convicted for taking bribes to free individuals from the draft and release civilians from training. However, I feel I need to emphasize that receiving and giving bribes are not typical of the armed forces. To be more precise, bribery makes up less than 0.2 percent of the structure of crime. Such that it would be valid to say that we are dealing only with isolated cases.

[Pastov] I already mentioned the fact that many letters from the readers discuss that infamous "dedovshchina." We have published some of them, and perhaps you may have read them. As you know, readers write about "dedovshchina" and about the grossest violations of the official rules governing mutual relations between military servicemen not only in our journal but also in other publications. We will never forget that letter from A. G. Gavrikov, a father of six: His son was pushed to suicide in the army—he shot himself. And later on the marks of beatings were discovered on his body.

[Zaika] Aleksandr Gavrikov did in fact commit suicide after being beaten by fellow servicemen. The participants of the examination of the circumstances of his death included military procurator Colonel of Justice A. Osadchiy, his deputy, a criminological procurator, and other experienced workers of the military procuracy. Prior violations of the rules of proper military mutual relations were established. A number of the culprits, including V. Baskov, who had beaten A. Gavrikov, were subjected to criminal punishment. Strict punishment was meted out to unit commander Officer V. Davydov and other officials.

Such an incident is unconditionally an exceptional event. If as in this case a suicide is the consequence of the violation of the rules of proper mutual relations between military servicemen, then in accordance with Paragraph "c", Article 8 of the Law on Criminal Liability for Military Crime the culprit may be imprisoned for a longer term than that foreseen by Article 107 of the RSFSR Criminal Code for inciting to suicide under other conditions.

Such crimes earn a stiffer criminal punishment for the serviceman because they transgress not only upon the personality but also upon the order of military service, protected by law.

[Pastov] I deliberately turned your attention to what was, as you emphasized, an exceptional case. But "dedovshchina" is universally recognized, it exists, and its roots have managed to grow deep. Is the law really powerless in the army milieu? To whom does the young soldier turn for protection?



[Zaika] A soldier should not endure indignities silently—he has certain rights, and there are those who can defend them. He should not be silent, he should not conceal things, he should cast off the wrong ideas about “snitching,” and submit a complaint in order to protect his rights, as is required.

For the most part, commanders, political workers and party, Komsomol and legal activists react promptly and correctly to such appeals. The operational staffs of military procuracies are very attentive to them. This has been especially true after the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, which conducted a very serious discussion on the effectiveness of Soviet laws and on the fight for human worth.

[Pastov] Here is one more letter pertaining to what was also once a forbidden zone—international relations in the army. Yes, sad as it may be, we need to talk about the army as well, though fabulous traditions of internationalism have been established in our armed forces; there are many examples of this, and not only from the history of the Great Patriotic War. But here is what V. Smirnov, who was discharged into the reserve, writes:

“The first night after I arrived in the unit, a fight broke out in our barracks because of some national discord I have yet to understand....”

It is clear to me, Leonid Mikhaylovich, that it is a bitter thing to admit to such things when the discussion turns to our army. But it was not all that long ago that we “did not have” a drug problem, and now it is harder to treat this illness. I might also recall “zemlyachestvo”—the presence of ethnically based gangs; it is treated as if this phenomenon is absent from our army as well. But servicemen discharged into the reserve assure me of the reverse.

[Zaika] It may be true that the conflict between servicemen mentioned in the letter did occur. It is hard to judge without an objective inspection. In cases where similar incidents have been investigated by the military procuracy, the causes of the conflicts have been found to be varied. In any case I think that national discord is not at their basis.

Servicemen of a particular conscription call-up often join a subunit as a group from one particular location. When owing to mistakes in organization, in education and in international indoctrination improper mutual relations arise between servicemen at different points in their time of service, mutual protection based on ethnic background comes into being. We consider all of these factors in the preventive work we do together with the command and political organs. In this case the reports of the military procuracies objectively reflect the status of the rule of law in my opinion. These reports indicate that the number of violations of the rules governing proper mutual relations between servicemen, including ones of

different nationalities, has been decreasing over a period of several years. But such cases do occur, and the causes of each of them are analyzed deeply and thoroughly.

I think that it is wrong to conclude that military service aggravates national relations. Nor should we overstate the legal means, especially those of criminal law, of combatting negative manifestations. The existing law ensures real equality among servicemen of different nationalities, and foresees strict punishment of those who attempt to sow national discord. International indoctrination of servicemen has, among its objectives, development of a sense of national worth, patriotism and pride for the military contributions and labor traditions of one's fellow countrymen.

When it comes to servicemen, the concepts of nationality and ethnic association should not be treated as being only unfavorable. Consideration of the multinational nature of military collectives is traditionally the fundamental principle of organizing indoctrination. That serious attention is being devoted to international indoctrination can be seen from the attentive analysis made of this issue by the recently created psychosocial service of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Participation of military procuracies in this important effort is improving as well. This is evident from at least one of the techniques used in the multifaceted legal propaganda provided by the military procuracy of the Kiev garrison, headed by Colonel of Justice A. Lisovets. Discussions in the different languages of the peoples of our country were staged and taped-recorded here as a way of explaining rights and responsibilities to new soldiers. We also rely on the substantial contribution made by the mass media. We have never concealed any of these issues from the press. The reverse is more likely to be true: There have been times, when we have aired our problems, that journalists have shown little interest, from all appearance because of a dearth of unsavory facts. No offense to you, but the stories were simply not sensational enough.

I would also like to say a few words about the coverage of the fight against drug addiction. The USSR Procuracy and its organs have long been proposing, together with the USSR Ministry of Public Health and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, encouraging other state and business organs and the public to participate in the effort to surmount the dangerous trends that have revealed their presence. The CPSU Central Committee has supported this line, and it is a good thing, because our society now recognizes the urgent need for practical measures. And they are being consistently implemented in the armed forces.

[Pastov] Some of our readers assert that, as an example, improper relations had always been very rare in the airborne troops, and that they are practically totally nonexistent today. And yet common sense once again suggests that it is precisely in the specialized troops that

it is especially difficult to establish a moral counterweight to improper mutual relations. I think that this can be seen to be true from the unruly behavior of former paratroopers on what you might call their professional holiday of 2 August, when public recreation areas recall disturbed beehives, and the entire police force is on alert.

[Zaika] One usually finds, behind every law violation in the army, shortcomings in the organization of work in the subunit, mistakes in indoctrination work carried on by commanders, and omissions in the preventive work done by the military procuracy. We are the first to recognize our responsibility, and we are seeking our ways of effective prevention: We are coordinating with the command and with political organs. Introduction and maintenance of a proper atmosphere of work, combat training and personal life is a guarantee of normal relations in a military collective and consequently of its capacity for preventing law violations.

Nonetheless I feel that the causes of law violations cannot be reduced only to flaws in the organization of military service. And it is even less valid to seek them in particular features of certain branches of troops. We should not underestimate the influence persons whose antisocial views were shaped prior to entering military service have upon the moral atmosphere in military collectives.

According to our information around half of the violators of the rules governing proper military mutual relations are servicemen who had been convicted of hooliganism, drunkenness, fighting and disturbing the peace prior to joining the service. These deficiencies in the education of young people also manifest themselves in the army milieu. Thus a recent survey of persons in a certain military district convicted for harassing fellow servicemen offers food for thought. Almost two-thirds of the respondents declared that before the army they had ridiculed their peers, or had themselves suffered indignation. One out every five was advised prior to being called up to endure the expected oppression by older servicemen silently.

Obviously we have not made a real effort to instill a feeling of personal worth in young people. Many have been inculcated with the wrong rule of behavior for many years: "If they're fighting—move away; if they're pestering—don't get involved; if they're brawling, don't interfere." But a totally different rule should be followed in the army: If a comrade is being pestered, stand up for him, if you are being insulted, fight back. No matter how much we would want it to be so, not every military collective is able to neutralize antisocial attitudes maintained by certain young people and develop civic and social activity in just 2 or 3 years. This is why it seems to me that those who see the problems of the army and navy as a reflection of the problems of the entire society are right.

[Pastov] Here is one more unpleasant letter, Leonid Mikhaylovich. It was sent by A. I. Mikhaylov, a former officer of the missile troops: "From 31 August to 1

September 1985 I was in the hospital; I was once awakened by noise in a neighboring ward. I went there to see what was going on—older soldiers were harassing younger ones. I reported this to the duty surgeon, but the surgeon told me not to worry about it. 'Dedovshchina' was something that we fought in our unit, and so I vowed that I would report such concealment to the political department. I was then packed up and carted off to the psychiatric ward.... To this day, none of the local military medics or the unit command have been punished or subjected to criminal proceedings."

How can we explain such strange liberalism in this scandalous case? And all of this happened before the eyes of fellow servicemen—soldiers and officers. How can we now expect them to react to evil in a principled fashion?

[Zaika] I checked up on the grounds beneath the decision made by the military procuracy in regard to placement of A. I. Mikhaylov in the hospital's psychiatric ward. The warning given by the procurator to the hospital chief and medical officers V. Ilichev, V. Stelmashonok and A. Maltsev concerning the impermissibility of violating the law, and their disciplinary punishment correspond to the severity of the transgression, and account for the specific circumstances and behavior of all participants of the conflict. As far as criminal punishment is concerned, in this case it was contraindicated.

[Pastov] Just a minute ago you condemned indifference, and discussed instilling a feeling of personal worth in young people, and teaching them a different rule: "If a comrade is being pestered, stand up for him, if you are being insulted, fight back." I am certain that I am not alone in supporting your point of view. But let's assume that a fight is going on. Does one have to go very far to overstep the bounds of necessary defense? And in general, does the institution of necessary defense not require further improvement? What if a soldier or an officer was acting within the bounds of necessary defense, but he is accused of doing otherwise?

[Zaika] It is true that mistakes in determining whether or not someone has overstepped the bounds of necessary defense are encountered in the practical work of military tribunals, though this is a rather rare phenomenon. If there are circumstances that preclude criminal liability, or if there are grounds to release a person from it, the law allows us to close a criminal case at the stage of preliminary investigation. We have not as yet been able to completely exclude shortcomings in investigative work. However, we treat even an isolated case of imposing criminal liability without sufficient grounds as an extraordinary event, and it becomes an object of meticulous examination and principled reaction.

As far as necessary defense is concerned, its principles have been carried over to the draft of the new criminal law, and one of its forms—fulfillment of an order—has been isolated as an independent norm, and defined specifically. What we need to talk more about today is not improving the law but

surmounting the psychology of noninterference, including among servicemen. We recently began actively explaining that being intolerant of antisocial deeds is a constitutional obligation of a USSR citizen. We make sure, for example, that in addition to other visual propaganda and agitation resources, legal education classes are also supplied with information on the norms of necessary defense.

Officers of the military procuracies are taking a most active part in organizing universal legal education in the USSR Armed Forces. Their efforts are based on resolutions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. In these resolutions, the present stage is described as one in which all development of the defense establishment is oriented predominantly on qualitative parameters. In this regard, the work of the military procuracies is an integral part of the processes occurring in the USSR Armed Forces. Concurrently, Lenin's principles of surveillance by the procuracy are being gradually restored in the work of the military procuracy as an inherent component of the single centralized system of organs of the USSR's procuracy.

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**Commander, Turkestan MD Writes on Army-Navy Day, 1989**

18010444 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
22 Feb 89 p 3

[Article by Lt Gen I. Fuzhenko, commander, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Safeguarding Peaceful Labor—Tomorrow Is Soviet Army and Navy Day"]

[Text] The country is about to celebrate a national holiday—the seventy first anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy—in an atmosphere of ongoing development of perestroika, which encompasses all areas of the life and interests of millions of people. "Perestroika," it was stressed in the appeal issued by the CPSU Central Committee in connection with the forthcoming elections for USSR people's deputies, "is the only choice to make. For us there is no other way. We will be steadfast in realizing the large-scale plans for reforms and in accelerating movement forward." This multipronged work is the basis of further improvement of combat readiness of our Armed Forces—the reliable protector of creative labor of the Soviet people and peace on earth.

The entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces is a vivid example of the fact that the CPSU in its policies is guided unflinchingly and constantly by the Leninist thesis that all revolutions are worthwhile only if they can defend themselves.

Lenin's decrees on the organization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army served as the basis for forming the first units. Their combat readiness increased and their ranks expanded during the struggle against the enemies of the revolution. The young Red Army smashed the

combined forces of the internal and external counterrevolution and made it possible for the Soviet people to undertake the construction of a new society.

The Army developed and grew strong along with the entire country. However, subsequent years saw the consolidation of the administrative command system, about which we had been warned by V.I. Lenin. The personality cult was accompanied by violation of the law and arbitrary rule. Many Soviet people, including military cadres, were subjected to mass repressions. This had the effect of harming the combat readiness of the Army and Navy. The repressive measures touched many outstanding military leaders, including V.K. Blyukher, M.N. Tukhachevskiy, A.I. Yegorov, I.E. Yakir, I.P. Uborevich, and others.

An unprecedented and severe test of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces was the Great Patriotic War.

The entire country took up mortal combat with the enemy. The party at that difficult time headed the titanic effort of converting the economy to a wartime footing, and it united the front and the rear into a unified and powerful camp. "The party of Lenin," remarked CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev, "became a fighting party, one which became one with the embattled people. At a most difficult time in the military aspect of our history, it rose to the occasion by carrying out the enormous responsibility for the fate of the Motherland, and it led the country to victory."

The Soviet soldier exhibited great amounts of moral superiority and ardent patriotism from the first days of the war. The enemy encountered on our land the most stubborn resistance he had ever seen. He suffered the first major defeat in December of 1941 in the battle near Moscow. It was there that the Hitlerite plan for his "blitzkrieg" against the USSR was shattered and the invincibility of the Wehrmacht dispelled before the world, while the fighting at Stalingrad heralded the major turning point of the Great Patriotic War and World War II in general. The Battle of Kursk buried forever the Wehrmacht's offensive strategy.

The Great Patriotic War was further proof that heroic deeds performed for the Motherland are the norm for all Soviet people, regardless of their ethnic origin.

A considerable contribution to ultimate victory was also made by Turkmenian soldiers. Their unparalleled courage and valor is attested to by the fact that more than 800 Turkmenian soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union, with four of them receiving this award a second time.

The district was an important source of trained combat reserves during the war. District headquarters and party organizations of the Central Asian republics combined their efforts to form several dozen combined units (soyedineniya) and units for the front. Officer cadres were also successfully trained by replacement subunits, military academies, military schools and courses, and



reserve units and training units located in the district. Thousands of officers were trained in two of the oldest schools alone - the Tashkent Combined Arms School and the Tashkent Tank School. The district trained pilots, navigators, and other specialists for the front.

Enemies of socialism cherished the hope that the destruction and losses suffered by the country during the Great Patriotic War would doom it to backwardness and dependence on the West. This was another case of miscalculation on their part.

By attaining strategic military parity with the forces of imperialism in the early 1970s, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies imposed substantial limits on potential aggressors' capabilities of unleashing a nuclear war.

The Armed Forces are exerting intensive efforts to make perestroika's ideas a reality. The main focus of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations is on achieving quality factors in troop training in consonance with the directives set by the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

The orientation toward quality parameters is in complete agreement with our defensive military doctrine.

The Soviet Union decided to effect unilateral reduction in our Armed Forces. The program for this reduction was announced by M.S. Gorbachev on 7 December 1988 in his speech at the UN. The volume of reductions and nature of structural changes proposed for the Army were determined by careful analysis of the relative strengths of the two military and political alliances—the Warsaw Pact and NATO organizations.

Our country certainly has no intention of oversimplifying the world situation, which is still fraught with troubles and dangers.

"We," stressed M.S. Gorbachev in speaking of this, "will continue to maintain the country's defensive capability at a level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency such that no one is tempted to infringe upon the security of the USSR or its allies."

This approach once more presents us with problems of training troops and requires that all Turkmenian soldiers exert greater efforts to improve the quality and effectiveness of combat training and strengthen military discipline and order. To accomplish these tasks, the district's troops have at their disposal first-class materiel and personnel that are boundlessly dedicated to the party and people. Many Turkmenian soldiers have gone through the hard school of Afghanistan, where they displayed exemplary courage and heroism. District troops are honorably carrying out responsible tasks set by the party and government for the purpose of protecting the southern boundaries of the Fatherland.

District troops are promoting to an ever greater extent a perestroika-connected patriotic movement for acceleration among soldiers; promulgating a sniper movement; and following the democratization route to activate party, Komsomol, and other social organizations in units and subunits. They are acquiring on the basis of past experience a new quality: an approach to international education of personnel.

In carrying out combat and political training tasks, we feel the benefits of the constant concern and practical assistance on the part of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, republic government, local party and Soviet organs. Each new year sees a strengthening of soldiers' friendly ties to youth and the republic's labor and creative collectives. This work is becoming even more fruitful at this time of preparing and carrying out the elections for USSR people's deputies.

The joint mass political measures enrich the spiritual life of Army collectives; they promote the activation of military patriotic education of the republic's youth and prepare the latter for their difficult tour of duty in the Army.

Our people rightly consider their Army to be a school of courage and political and social conditioning. Inherent in this—in addition to a high evaluation of the role it plays in society's life—is the great responsibility for discharging its assigned function of protecting the peaceful and creative labor of the Soviet people and peace on earth.

#### **Past, Proposed Responses to Materiel Waste, Failure to Economize**

18010446 Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL* in Russian No 3, Feb 89 pp 69-74

[Article by Col Yu. Tropin, chief of Scientific Research Laboratory for Military Finance Service Problems, Military Finance-Economic Faculty of MFI (Moscow Finance Institute), candidate of economic sciences, under rubric "High Quality for Training and Indoctrination": "Who is the Proprietor in the 'Home'?"; first paragraph is *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* introduction]

[Text] Our time, a time of perestroika, posed many problems for Armed Forces personnel, one being the need to seriously improve the quality of the training and indoctrination process. In what direction must commanders, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations work here? The editorial mail attests that this can be achieved based on substantial shifts, particularly in our attitude toward resource conservation and toward the rational use of fuel, energy, metal and other materials. The approaches must be changed in this direction of work, which is what the author of this article considers.

The materiel needs of our Army and Navy grew very strongly over recent decades for a number of objective reasons. For example, the average materiel consumption

of the motorized rifle or tank division increased by more than half just in the early 1980's compared with the previous decade! The state is taking steps to provide everything necessary to units and ships promptly and completely, but there have been and continue to be difficulties due to a certain limitation of capabilities in this respect. Not all problems here are resolved successfully to an equal extent. It is understandable that this has a very direct effect on the status of combat readiness.

For example, infantry fighting vehicles stood idle for a week or more due to an absence of one-ruble bearings in the unit where Lt Col N. Zemlyanoy is the armor service chief. As a result, the personnel had no opportunity to engage in scheduled training and the quality of specialist training suffered.

Similar examples could be continued. The differences here would lie only in the descriptions of deficient parts, in the incomplete or late delivery of fuel, in a shortage of electrical power, and in the models of idle equipment. It must be noted, however, that the scarcity of particular physical assets is not always connected with limited capacities of our industry or with supply costs. Herein, in my view, lies the principal essence of this problem, which to a considerable extent was born of extravagance and inefficiency.

The example of the collective where Gds Lt Col A. Ilichev is motor transport support service chief is indicative in this connection. Time periods for equipment repair dragged out because of interruptions in the supply of spare parts and tools which existed here, and in the final account the training process suffered. Meanwhile, results of a comprehensive inspection showed that the difficulties were determined not only by the weakness in the collective's logistic support, but also by the absence of control and by extravagance in using the allocated materiel. Supply accounting was in a neglected state. It was discovered in particular that many invoices for issuing physical assets were not even recorded. Machine units and spare parts received by maintenance and other subunits did not appear in documents. There was an absence of control over the use of tools. In short, after physical assets were received by the subunit, they were seemingly no longer anyone's responsibility, which could not help but lead to abuses and to irrational and unjustified expenditures. Judge for yourself: just property which was not shown anywhere as having been received and which was being used without control was identified in the amount of several tens of thousands of rubles!

What was most astounding was that such "management" occurred during work by the large unit's party-economic aktiv and during a gathering of party organization secretaries, where there were long conversations about the need to indoctrinate personnel in a spirit of a thrifty attitude toward socialist property. Is such an isolation from life and lack of specifics really admissible?!

The fact is that it is in the Army and the Navy that many of tomorrow's workers and engineers and the future captains of industry receive their first lessons in management. What a pity that these lessons are not always instructive! I believe that results of an anonymous survey of 200 servicemen which I would like to cite also are not surprising in this context. The majority of those questioned stated that their sense of thrift had not been strengthened during their service. One might ask whether or not it can be strengthened in a situation where, according to one of the servicemen, "the paint flows in streams, heaps of spare parts rust in the supply yard, and cotton clothing is washed in gasoline" in their collective. I will note that there were many similar statements made in the course of the survey.

One can talk and talk about reasons for our mismanagement, reasons that are moral, economic, organizational, legal and methodological. The amoral features of the past lie for now like a heavy burden on the Army and Navy economy. In the period of stagnation ostentation, complete licence, impunity for abuses, and command-bureaucratic methods of solving problems penetrated deeply into all pores of society. We will look truth in the eye: the reference point clearly was incorrectly chosen with respect to economic indoctrination. The fact is that literally until recent times our literature contained a popular impression of the country's allegedly inexhaustible military-economic potential. The burning questions of a rational use of materiel, financial and, finally, human resources remained in the shadows, however, and were undeservedly pushed into the background, which inevitably led to a free-ride mentality, a lack of receptivity to the idea of the need for resource conservation, and a light attitude by responsible persons toward unjustified expenditures.

Meanwhile there were enough strict orders and various directives and instructions on economy and thrift, but all this hung suspended in midair without exerting substantial influence on the very process of a rational attitude toward materiel. I believe it is apropos to refer to the following example here. Many probably recall that a loud campaign for economy of fuel and energy resources was unfolded in units and aboard ships at the beginning of the present decade. But the good objective did not produce the desired effect: it was crushed by pointless logomachy and paperpushing.

For example, one only had to check the validity of gasoline write-off in the unit where Maj S. Onishchuk is motor transport support service chief to reveal its lack. The impressive figure—over 30 percent of the amount actually received by vehicle drivers—possibly would have forced some commanders, party activists and the soldiers themselves to ponder. It is difficult even to calculate the moral damage suffered by the personnel with such an attitude toward materiel. It is understandable that under such conditions words about economy and thrift generated no more than a skeptical smile in people; those words continued to poison the consciousness and they did not facilitate matters.

Today it is crystal clear that resource conservation must be taken under special party control everywhere and the broad Army and Navy public must be included in it. The fact is that thrift is a category that is not only economic, but also moral and, if you like, political. This is why concern for rational use of military property for the sake of high combat readiness, the moral indoctrination of personnel and the formation of a genuine proprietary feeling in each serviceman becomes a matter of primary importance. It is without question, however, that nothing can be achieved here on the rails of well-worn approaches. Constructive steps of a perestroika nature and the full engagement of our mechanism of glasnost are needed. Unfortunately, today many unit and ship party organizations lack this for now.

Let us take, for example, the collective of the military unit where Officer N. Bolshakov serves. The party members here of course have taken and are taking measures involving the need for reinforcing the effectiveness with which materiel and funds are expended, but why do many of the measures not reach the objective? Well, because more and more they are in the nature of enlightenment. For example, party members often start up a conversation about the procedure for using materiel and funds, about financial liability of servicemen for damage to the state, and so on. It is understandable that such work also has to be done, but in my view it would be more useful to refer more often to just what is important for CPSU members and all personnel actually to do at a particular moment in order to increase the effectiveness of using materiel, which means improving the quality of specialist training. The initiative here, of course, must stem from the political entity.

I would especially like to emphasize the following thought in this connection. In my view, the restructuring of party work toward strengthening the influence of party members on the sphere of resource conservation is best accomplished in parallel with the restructuring of our entire military economic mechanism. The fact is that one of the reasons for servicemen's weak receptivity to the need for resource conservation lies specifically in the fact that measures taken often do not affect the very system and methods of economic operation to the proper extent and often bear a declarative, fit-and-start, over-organized nature. Although conclusions of specialists, scientists and practical workers on this score are not directly refuted in the majority of cases, at the same time they are not actually implemented locally. Moreover, abuses which still exist in places as a rule are hushed up or clothed in semi-justificatory phrases. For example, instead of "gasoline has been stolen," we hear or read "gasoline was drained from the vehicle tank." Instead of "spare parts and tools were stolen," we hear "the vehicle was taken apart." The urgency of the problem thus is gradually dulled, even though perhaps particular deeds or actions of quite specific persons did border on abuse of office.

For example, a considerable shortage of spare parts, tools and accessories for "NZ [emergency reserve]" vehicles was found when Gds WO V. Boltukhin was taking over

his position, but there just was no administrative investigation of this scandalous matter. The guilty parties remained in the shadows and no one held them liable. The bulk of deficient property was restored at the expense of current supply. And this, we will note, occurred with the tacit consent of the commanders and party members! Of course, appropriate measures were taken later after the intervention of inspectors, and justice, as they say, triumphed. But I will repeat that it was only after intervention; it should have been before.

It will be extremely erroneous, however, to think that the problem of resource conservation can be solved only by moral doctoring and by an expansion of glasnost and truthfulness. It is also incorrect to categorize existing deficiencies in use of state assets only as a lack of principle on the part of appointed officials of units and ships and as the inactivity of commanders and supervisors. The principal reasons for wasteful use of physical assets lie enormously deeper and are determined by a weak organization of military-economic work in general in the troops and in the fleets. Here is where main efforts, including those of party organizations, must be directed.

In my view, we can include among the priority problems and demands of perestroika in military-economic work ones such as assuring a close relationship in evaluation of the economic and military result; creating an effective mechanism of economic incentives; performing a certain reorganization of economic entities; improving the system of control; and elevating the level of the personnel's legal indoctrination and economic training. In our real life the results of resource conservation, as they are broadly understood, unfortunately are not yet having a direct influence on results of the work of military units and ships. Moreover, the ostentatious aspect of the matter often prompts many commanders to unreasonable expenditures and excesses. Therefore even today mismanagement, unrecorded use, and misappropriation of physical assets go peacefully hand in hand with a good mark in combat and political training. For example, at one time the unit where Lt Col A. Garkusha serves was evaluated as "good," although a certain amount of shortages, damage and illegal expenditures of physical assets was found. Last year violations here increased by more than tenfold, with the very same mark given. This means, alas, that the relation between the result of economic management and the result of combat and political training continues to be missed.

There is also no such relation between the activity of political entities, party activists and people's controllers on the one hand and the rational use of materiel on the other, as if concern for economy and preservation of military property is not a party affair. As we know, however, thrift is achieved to a considerable extent through day-to-day, painstaking indoctrination work with people by commanders, political workers and party organizations. This means that today when, let us say, a party committee or party bureau session or a party meeting



is discussing what party members must do to improve combat readiness, we also cannot avoid such an acute problem as the effectiveness of using materiel.

Another reason for our mismanagement is an unjustifiably weak application of economic incentives in resource conservation, although again practical experience confirms with all obviousness their vital need and high results. For example, such incentives were widespread during the Great Patriotic War, when in general there would seem to have been no time for them. Thus, payments for fuel economy and for collecting spent casings became the practice, and results were impressive. In 1943 alone 94,900 tons of very scarce brass were returned to the country from the turn-in of artillery shell casings.

Excellent results in resource conservation cannot be attained without proficiency and a thrifty attitude toward equipment. This is the truth, but at times some commanders and political entities do not attach proper significance to it. The role of party organizations and Army and Navy party members in promptness, correctness and comprehensiveness of studying and solving the problem of resource conservation, in creating a favorable and exacting psychological atmosphere among the personnel, in bringing assigned tasks to a logical conclusion, and in activating economic incentives is not always equal to the occasion.

For example, a survey of personnel in the unit where Lt Col N. Zyryanov serves showed that 90 percent of them essentially take no part or take part occasionally in the economic use of physical assets. By the way, 88 percent of those surveyed admitted nevertheless that there are opportunities for this. The absence of an economic incentive was specifically mentioned as one of the primary reasons for weak participation in economic work. This means, I assume, that there is something to think about here. Finally, it is necessary to shift from general discourse to serious studies and bolder experiments in this direction.

It would also appear that a need has matured for establishing a unified economic service in the troops and in the fleets, which really does not now exist. The supply entities of large and small units and ships still function in an autonomous mode independent of each other and in essence are strictly for supply, except that they have an expanded set of tasks. Each of the services has full control over all processes connected with planning, receiving, accounting, controlling and writing off "their own" materiel for expenditure. Often the principal processes (receiving, expending and accounting) generally are fully controlled by one person—the chief of a particular depot. Such departmental isolation permeates the entire system. Commanders, political workers and party activists remain aloof from resolving this problem, knowing full well that something akin to economic entities is entirely absent right in the subunits. Mismanagement is practically inevitable in such an isolated, "natural" organizational structure.

This is why, I believe, it is advisable to concentrate the economic activity of a military unit, ship or large unit in a single entity such as a planning-economic entity established from a certain reorganization of presently operating services. At the highest level of military management a specially formed working bureau or committee (under the USSR Ministry of Defense or on the Armed Forces General Staff) with broad rights and responsibility in the given area apparently could be taken as the basis for an organizational beginning, since the accumulated problems cannot be resolved within interdepartmental bounds (in the center and locally).

There are also many other "hot" spots directly linked with resource conservation in the sphere of troop economics, and legal ones can be included among them with full justification. While dealing with enormous materiel and labor resources, the units and ships are literally regulated by trifles in use of funds for current needs. It is difficult even for a specialist to "force his way" through the artificially created encumbrance of articles, paragraphs, kinds, limitations and addenda. There is no benefit from this, while the damage is unquestionable. Relationships of units and ships with higher entities are clearly not worked out. It seems that in this respect much benefit could be derived from a careful study of experience in applying the USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association) with consideration of the specifics of troop and fleet activity.

The methodological problem also is one of the urgent problems of resource conservation. There is as yet no clarity or precision on many provisions in the question of what to include in economy, how to define it, and who is to define it. This often generates subjectivism and formalism in calculations and creates various difficulties in evaluating the real state of economic activity in the unit and aboard ship. Without precision and objectivity it is also difficult to speak of the objectivity of party work, in which everything is important, especially when it is a question of the qualitative and quantitative end result.

One also cannot ignore a problem such as the attitude toward economic training and selection of personnel. While 40 hours were set aside for questions of managing the unit administrative and support services in the Great Patriotic War years even under an accelerated commander training program, in our days only 12 such hours are allocated in military academies with a command profile! Based on results of a survey of 74 chiefs of unit services, commanders of maintenance subunits, depot chiefs and clerks it was found that the absolute majority—86 percent—previously had engaged little or not at all in such activity. In time other people, also not prepared, will take their places.

I realize that the thoughts I have expressed are far from indisputable and do not take in the full set of difficulties of troop economics. The problem of effective use of materiel is rather complex. Many problems have accumulated here, but they must be solved and solved

seriously, from fundamental party positions. There are opportunities for this. We need only an awareness by commanders, political entities and party organizations of the importance of the problem, their desire to solve it, and the responsibility of each party member for the assigned job. Today it is not embellishment, but a real restructuring of one's work that is needed. The important thing is that an atmosphere be created in every unit and aboard every ship (which essentially are the servicemen's homes) where all personnel would feel themselves to be zealous proprietors and not temporaries, and that there be no indifference to what is occurring in it and how the people's resources are being used.

And further, to solve the problem of resource conservation we need a specific program of action, an authoritative organizational center, and practical steps and studies. Who will do this? Perhaps the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy will assume the organizing role? I would like to hear an opinion on this and on other matters I broached from appropriate interested entities, party members, and nonparty persons.

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#### Editorial on 'Decline' of Prestige of Military Profession

18010460 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA  
in Russian No 2, Feb 89 p 1

[Editorial by A. Utkin under rubric "A Writer's Reflections": "The Soldier"; first paragraph is VOYENNYE ZNANIYA introduction]

[Text] Many of our country's citizens proudly call themselves by this generalized name of profound meaning, but there are other people...

The date 23 February is a generally recognized male holiday. On 23 February people everywhere honor the "strong" half of our state's population, which accepts congratulations and gifts with restrained dignity. All this has become so customary that at times the age-old meaning of the celebration seems to fade into the background: the fact is that toasts are made not simply to men as such—they are made to the man in the military, the man-soldier, regardless of whether he removed his uniform many years ago, was wearing it only yesterday, or is merely preparing for now to join the combat formation.

Meanwhile, among those who feel themselves to be heroes of the day on the 23d are many people firmly convinced of the needlessness, senselessness and uselessness of a soldier's service. They fear it like fire. Often they resort to all kinds of ruses to avoid the draft.

Once K. Mazurov, chairman of the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans, related that it turns out that of all the families living in his apartment house, only his family had seen off a lad for active duty in recent years, his grandson. This generated unconcealed astonishment in his neighbors, who are responsible workers.

What did I wish to say in citing this example? Just one thing: the prestige both of military service and of the proud name of "soldier" now is at a very low ebb.

"How can that be?" the reader will ask in amazement. "Low prestige of a proud name?" Do not accuse me here of an absence of logic, please. The name "soldier" continues to be a proud, honorable name for the author of these lines, as I am sure it is for the majority of readers. Its prestige lies in those exploits which were performed by people defending the honor, freedom and independence of the homeland.

It was 1812. Fierce fighting was going on for Smolensk, where Napoleon's hordes fully experienced the fearlessness of Russian soldiers. "In particular, . . . one Russian chasseur situated right opposite us on the very bank behind the willows stood out in his courage and staunchness," recalled French Col (Faber dyu For), a participant of the battle. "We were unable to force him to be silent either by rifle fire concentrated on him or even by the action of one gun especially assigned against him. It shattered all the trees behind which he was operating, but he never quieted down. He fell silent only toward night. On crossing to the right bank the next day, out of curiosity we took a look at this memorable position of the Russian rifleman. We caught sight of our enemy, an NCO of the chasseur regiment, prostrate. Killed by a cannonball, he had fallen courageously here at his post."

The year was 1941.

F. Halder, chief of the German Army General Staff, was forced to enter in his diary: "Information from the front confirms that the Russians are fighting everywhere to the last man."

Courage, valor and military proficiency are what have always distinguished, and distinguish to this day, the Soviet soldier, a person whom the Motherland entrusts with performing the most important, the most responsible mission—ensuring her security. What can be more honorable? Nothing! Is this really not understood by those who consider two or three years of military duty to be time lost in vain? More precisely, they do not sufficiently understand the full measure of responsibility of every citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for maintaining the country's defensive capability at the proper level. "Let someone do it, just not me"—this "popular" motto which originated in the period of stagnation is, as a matter of fact, characteristic both of the attitude toward "civilian" affairs and toward the job of defending the Motherland.

"Bayonets and tea will be found in the Red Army"—the words from the well-known Civil War song still accurately reflect the narrow point of view on performing the most important constitutional duty.

There are many reasons for its tenacity. Unquestionably the Armed Forces themselves also are to blame. They have been infected, like all our society, with indifference and a striving to pass off what is desired as reality, and the notorious hazing of new conscripts, which has become encrusted with conjectures and fables, struck root in them long ago. Upcoming service naturally frightens some youths and their friends and families, who have heard plenty of stories about the humiliation and mockery of young soldiers by soldiers of earlier call-ups.

But still, many are frightened even more by upcoming difficulties of exercises, guard duty, details, field problems and alert duty, since from childhood these lads have not been accustomed either to work or to discipline or to responsibility for their acts.

There was an extraordinary occurrence in one of the Moscow Military District training subunits: a cadet disappeared. He was found several days later in a temporarily empty summer settlement not far from his home. An investigation of this incident showed that the young man, who had neither worked nor studied anywhere before call-up and who had been accustomed to live as he pleased, could in no way "fit himself in" to the rigid daily routine and the strenuous rhythm of Army life. He had neither the strength, physical or moral, or the character to overcome the hardships of the first days of service.

The editorial mail shows that some VOYENNYE ZNANIYA readers who are military training officers and who express alarm in their letters over the drop in prestige of the military profession and a lack of desire by some of the youth to serve in the Armed Forces, see the "root of evil" to lie in pacifist statements appearing in the pages of a number of newspapers and journals and in radio and television broadcasts. Of course, there is a portion of truth in their accusations, but only a portion.

In my opinion, some military training officers forget about their own personal responsibility for elevating the prestige of the name "soldier." I would like to ask them: "Have you had a talk with your pupils on such acute topics as, for example, the military danger still emanating from the most aggressive circles of imperialism? Have you found convincing facts for these talks refuting the excessively optimistic forecasts of some writers, journalists and scientists who believe that the possibility of aggression against the USSR and its friends and allies no longer exists? Have you organized meetings with soldiers who have come home on leave? Have you backed up your words with actions—strenuous, daily practical preparation of the boys for call-up for active duty?"

A great many of our readers probably are familiar with material published in OGONEK by that journal's special correspondent Artem Borovik about the American Army. Unquestionably the life of the U.S. Army Training Center was shown in a very interesting way and much of it also would be desirable for us to borrow except, unquestionably, for one "mundane detail"—a poster in the messhall entitled "Who is Your Worst Enemy? Ivan!" Nothing of the sort ever will hang in our barracks or messhalls.

And until such posters disappear from NATO barracks we have to do everything possible to see that "Soviet soldier" remains one of the most honorable and most prestigious titles in our state. This is facilitated both by glasnost and by democracy, which allow us to openly discuss all burning issues, including the attitude toward military service.

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#### **Telegraphers School Faced with Training Non-Russian Speaking Operators**

18010415a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
1 Mar 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Sr Lt A. Shevtsov: "Wanted, Translators."]

[Text] "Our training subunit," Major V. Mikhaylov told me, "trains radio-telegraphers and telegraphers. This is difficult work, and much depends here on the capabilities of the students, on how quickly and deeply they assimilate everything we teach them. But how can they succeed academically if half of them, particularly those from Transcaucasian republics, do not know Russian?"

The lesson I chanced to attend was in fact being conducted by the subunit's sole "home-grown" translator—Private M. Akhmedov, who was able to communicate in the languages of the Transcaucasian republics. Let me say frankly that Major Mikhaylov was in a difficult position. This brings up the same old urgent questions: Why don't local soviet and party organs and military commissariats show due concern for preparing conscripts? Why should commanders have to make up for their shortfalls? In the meantime staffs and political organs might think about training translators from among soldiers capable of such work, and about distributing them properly among the units. The demand for translators, one would expect, will grow even more in connection with the well known "language problems" coming to the forefront, not in the best light, in a number of republics.



### **Air Defense Training Experiment Yields Mixed Results**

18010436 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Mar 89 Second Edition p 1

[Report by Lt Col O. Falichev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Combat Training: Facets of the Restructuring": "Before and After the Experiment"]

[Text] Only by drastically altering the view on the handling of combat training could we breach the wall created by the old ideas on it and by the thinking involved?. Only independence in the combat training would help the commander to reject petty tutelage and arrange the life and training of the unit entrusted to him as he himself sees fit. An experiment was to be the battering ram, figuratively speaking. The old combat training program and other documents rigidly regulating the training process, which could not be bypassed without violating them, continued to be in effect. The main thing is that no one could provide any guarantee that upon receiving complete independence the regiment would not lower its combat readiness. What actually happened?

First of all I need to stress the fact that the regiment itself received the news with joy and a desire to demonstrate the effectiveness of the innovation in action. The comprehensive exercises are a good example. The idea of conducting them was essentially not a new one. Many drills have long been conducted with the comprehensive method in the Ground Forces. Departmental barriers prevented the Air Defense Forces from adopting the progressive experience. However, the restructuring forced Maj Slipko, who replaced Lt Col S. Razygrayev in the middle of the training year, to make comparisons and seek new training procedures.

Today, in retrospect, we need to say that certain excesses were committed. The stress on comprehensiveness and the combined-arms orientation of the classes at one time literally pushed the special training into the background.

"It was somewhat scary to entrust the subordinates with the extremely complex electronic equipment after that kind of physical exertion," Maj Slipko says.

The officers had to overcome this psychological barrier. The work was not in vain, however. The new combat training course organically combines elements of combined-arms and special training and the tactics of the antiaircraft missile troops.

The unit gradually abandoned meteorologist's, chemist's and swimmer's days and certain classes for non-T/O teams.... A great deal had to be reconsidered and organized anew, as it were. I hope the reader does not get the idea that the regiment took the easy way and abandoned many subjects and classes.... No, the commander and the political section did not make life easy for themselves. They merely proceeded from expediency. Everything

superfluous and superimposed which had not acquired practical, applied importance was discarded. Moreover, and this needs to be particularly emphasized, the very conditions under which the search was conducted for more effective, optimal forms and methods for training the personnel forced them to experiment and test.

Take the tactical test exercise. How was it performed? Officers assigned to higher headquarters visited the regiment and put it on readiness alert. The regiment went through a firing drill and was given an evaluation. The efficiency of the exercise—or more precisely, a part of it, the firing—was poor, however. This was primarily because the lion's share of the time was allocated for the initial stage—the muster, movement to the weapon positions and the performance of hypothetical, intermediate missions—and only a few minutes was allocated for the firing itself. At the insistence of regimental officers higher headquarters arrived at the idea that such test drills should not be abandoned entirely but should be conducted as necessary, as part of the system for testing the unit's combat readiness.

It should be noted that the tactical test drill is not included in the combat training program this year. It appears that the unit soldiers trod the path to this decision by trial and error.

The unit methods council has also worked out a system for analyzing the fulfillment of the combat training program right in the subunits.

The alert signal sounded one day during my visit in the unit. The commander issued the warning order in a procedure worked on until it had become automatic and then sprang into his vehicle: "To the command post"! I barely kept up with him.

Capt N. Rogoshchenkov, duty officer, rose to meet us at the command post.

"Control targets in the regiment's coverage zone," he reported.

What does the commander do in such cases? He assumes command of the battle. And in the meantime the service OICs and other specialists would have dropped everything and begun arriving at the command post. This is the way it would have been this time as well. The commander had already taken up his work station, however, when the order came from Lt Col V. Chimlekchiyev at the higher command post for the duty personnel at the command post to conduct the battle.

I shall not describe how it went. I shall say only that Capt Rogoshchenkov and the other soldiers successfully handled the mission. The thought came to me that it is a good thing the people at higher headquarters have begun soberly assessing such situations and assigning the missions based on expediency and reasonable need for specialists at the command post.

There has been excessive consumption of electric power and engine life in the unit in past years. The radar equipment operated more than the norm. Why was this? Any commission arriving in the unit frequently began its work by checking the equipment and giving the readiness signal. And what did this mean? Additional, unplanned activation of the equipment and assemblies. This inevitably entailed unforeseen consumption of energy and engine life. Did this somehow influence the experiment?

"While the operating time of the radar equipment—in the combat control compartments, for example—previously amounted to 96 hours during the months of most intensive combat training, the figure is now only 76 hours," Maj V. Parshukov, deputy regimental commander for weapons, commented, not without an air of satisfaction.

The same thing is to be found in the battalions. The gain has amounted to 8 percent in the battalion commanded by Maj V. Lezhenkov and 17 percent in Lt Col Yu. Semenko's battalion. What is more, this has had no effect whatsoever on the training level of the crews, since it was achieved primarily by making more efficient use of the simulators, which was more thoroughly conceived and "linked" to the local specifics of the experiment.

"Now, when we conduct technical training, it is always on at least the battalion scale," Maj Parshukov continued. "Why? In order not to switch on the power to one and the same compartment several times...."

We see that "economic accountability" in the combat training has forced people to think about hidden reserves and to calculate. It would no doubt be incorrect to weigh the value of the experiment on the scales of economic benefit alone, however. I met with many people in the regiment. Maj V. Khalturin, OIC of the motor vehicle service, Maj V. Fedotov, political worker, Lt Col Yu. Semenenko, battalion commander, and others had only good things to say about the embodiment of this idea. "I have to render fewer accounts and I can work more," said Capt V. Miroshnik, a service chief, for example. The soldiers have openly and boldly begun expressing what bothers them and criticizing shortcomings. A sort of vote of no confidence, for example, was expressed at the report and election conference with respect to Maj V. Kulishev, secretary of the party commission, whose standing prior to this had appeared to be very solid. It was clear after the speeches by rank and file Communists, however, that this had only been an illusion of well-being of a party worker detached from the masses. He was saved only by a sincere acknowledgment of his errors and a firm promise to correct his performance.

Or take this example. Oral instructions came down "from above" to prepare the necessary documents for promoting one young officer. This had happened many times before. It was now decided, however, first to discuss the officer's candidacy at a general meeting, where it was frankly stated that he still did not measure up to the demands made of him as a specialist and an officer. The voice of the community proved to be more powerful than "telephone authority."

And what about interference from outside and petty tutelage? Have they been avoided? Was the purity of the experiment and its independence from the influence of subjective factors, so to speak, ensured?

I recently visited the regiment again and saw that various commissions and inspectors had in fact almost stopped visiting the unit, and far more time is now being devoted to the actual combat training. I also learned, however, that along with granting the commander freedom of action, so to speak, there was a simultaneous increase in coded messages from higher headquarters with various instructions. Capt V. Grishunin, deputy chief of staff, reported that while there were 2,450 various coded and telephoned messages in 1987, more than 3,000 were received in 1988. It turns out that the leadership of the district formation gave its blessing to independence for the unit with one hand, while continuing as before to send instructions with the other.

And so, the problems remain. There have been results, however. There was no infraction of combat alert duty in the unit last year. The combat crew commanded by Maj I. Ivanovskiy took second place in the district competitive review of combat skill. And the command post crew headed by Sr Lt O. Fedotov took first place. The regiment passed the final inspection with excellence and was awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU.

"There is no denying the fact that the results have been good," said Lt Gen Avn P. Khatylev, deputy commander for combat training of the Moscow Air Defense District. "The results of the experiment were predetermined in great part by the fact that the units and subunits of our forces are now training under new combat training programs. Unfortunately, we have not entirely eliminated the habit of playing it safe or formalism among the officers. After analyzing the year's results, we made adjustments and worked out recommendations for applying the new combat training program. Incidentally, this work is still going on...."

**Col Gen Kozhbakhteyev on Changing Role of Civil Defense**

18010462 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA  
in Russian No 2, Feb 89 pp 20-21

[Article by Col Gen V. Kozhbakhteyev, chief of staff of USSR Civil Defense, under rubric "Perestroyka Depends on Everyone": "A Minimum of Risk"; first paragraph is VOYENNYE ZNANIYA introduction]

[Text] A minimum of risk for people and nature is the public's insistent demand. What role do civil defense staffs and formations play here?

An analysis of events at the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Station and in the Armenian SSR and of other accidents and natural disasters forces us to take a different look at the problem of safety in peacetime. Atomic electric power stations; chemical, metallurgical and biotechnological enterprises; and oil and gas pipelines present a great danger both to the population and to the environment and inflict economic damage in case of accidents.

At the same time, I would like to emphasize that many misfortunes are not fatally inevitable; their number can and must be sharply reduced. For this we have to eliminate laxity and disorder, maintain order and firm discipline, elevate the responsibility of every worker everywhere in his entrusted sector, and rigidify demands and control.

A humane task is being moved to the forefront today—to reduce risk to people and nature to a minimum. The party and government made it the responsibility of civil defense to implement this task. Being genuinely of all the people, civil defense is a component of statewide social and defense measures taken in peacetime and wartime to protect the population and national economy against the consequences of accidents, catastrophes and natural disasters as well as against modern weapons. It is the immediate obligation and patriotic duty of all USSR citizens to take an active part in these measures.

For this everyone needs certain knowledge and skills to be able not only to protect himself at the necessary moment, but also to help victims. One must learn to act precisely in response to CD warning signals and capably perform rescue and other urgent work. Finally, one must develop those mental qualities which under extreme conditions will allow opposing fear and panic and displaying staunchness, courage and a sense of civic responsibility and awareness.

Experience shows that eliminating the aftermath of accidents such as Chernobyl and fighting the elements in Armenia demand readiness of control entities and enlistment of very considerable forces and resources whose actions must be coordinated, monitored and directed, and all this has to be done efficiently and in compressed time periods. Permanent extraordinary commissions are being established for this purpose under the council of

ministers of each union and autonomous republic and under executive committees of kray and oblast soviets of people's deputies; these commissions operate under the immediate direction of corresponding local party and soviet entities. For example, the purposeful, vigorous activity of such a commission in Gorkiy Oblast permitted quickly eliminating the consequences of an explosion at Arzamas Station.

At the same time it is advisable to make an advance forecast of the possible situation in a region and at installations, provide for different options of commission actions, and work out the functional duties of its members in advance in order to avoid haste and rash decisions later. CD staffs play a large role here. In essence, they are the principal organizers of CD measures at all its levels. It is not by chance, for example, that the Statute on the Permanent Extraordinary Commission of Moldavian SSR states that the republic CD staff is its working entity. The peacetime Moldavian CD plan serves as the basis for organizing work of mopping up in the aftermath of possible natural disasters, accidents and catastrophes. Such trust in the staff is dictated above all by the professional competence of its officials and by their extensive experience in performing rescue and other urgent work while mopping up in the aftermath of earthquakes, floods and landslides, which at one time inflicted great damage on the Moldavian national economy.

CD staffs also are responsible for operational planning, organizing citizen training in methods of protection in emergencies, and training formations. They are obligated to see that technical equipment for warning the population of the appearance of danger is kept in constant readiness and to ensure stable command and control of forces and resources in performing rescue and other urgent work.

Accomplishing these tasks presumes having a close coordination of CD services and of establishments, organizations and installations of the national economy, which also must be under the staffs' constant supervision. This is why the positive experience of their activity under peacetime conditions must be broadly generalized and disseminated.

Unfortunately, one often has occasion to hear that there are many persons of pension age on the staffs, and above all in positions of chiefs of staff of national economic installations, and that this allegedly has a negative effect on performance of CD tasks. In fact, many officers and generals continue to work productively on going into the reserve or on retiring and it is at the very least strange if a person cannot see the positive aspects of this. Abundant experience of serving in the Army and Navy, a knowledge of military affairs, and military discipline permit them to capably organize and conduct CD measures.

In examining the basic directions of CD activity in peacetime, one cannot help but dwell on CD services, which have been universally recognized for their actions



in emergencies. Services for warning and communications, radiation and chemical defense, protection of public order, firefighting, power supply and light discipline, emergency equipment, refuges and shelters, transportation, and logistics usually are established in the rayon or at an industrial installation. The practice of rescue and other urgent work, however, introduces substantial adjustments to the existing stereotype. For example, in addition to all else the commission in Armenia had to provide victims with food and shelter for the night, compensate them for material damage they suffered, search for missing persons, and arrange to bury the dead and unload aircraft and railcars.

As we see, new services also can be established when necessary, but we must approach this thoughtfully, in conformity with expediency and with realistic consideration of local conditions, capabilities and requirements.

The nonparamilitary formations are the most numerous in the CD system. Together with personnel of CD units, they have rescued people more than once in critical situations and equally shared the risk and hardships. True, the experience of fighting the elements and mopping up in the aftermath of major accidents and disasters has advanced the demand to increase their readiness and mobility. In a number of cases rescue groups which arrived in Armenia from other countries considerably surpassed our formations in gear and technical outfitting. This should be a good lesson for us.

Medical detachments occupy a significant place among nonparamilitary formations. In peacetime they are used to give first aid to victims of industrial accidents, earthquakes, fires, hurricanes and other natural disasters. In day-to-day life they help health agencies in sanitary-health, preventive and anti-epidemic measures. For example, medical detachments at the Moscow Prozhektor Plant and at the Tushino Stocking Factory take part in clinical examination and treatment of workers and employees. In some places they give advice on medical subjects at CD consultation points.

But here is what I would like to say. While one runs across press announcements about selfless actions of medical detachments in emergencies, we know little about their affairs on ordinary days. The fact is that situations often arise where urgent medical intervention is required to save a person's life.

I will give the following example. An accident occurred in the technological institute where V. Kirilina works as chairman of the Red Cross Society primary organization: one of the associates received a serious injury and the person's life was in jeopardy. Every minute counted. At this critical moment the medical detachment personnel came to the person's help. They did everything possible to ease the victim's condition and deliver him to a medical establishment as quickly as possible.

The circumstance also should be noted that many medical detachment personnel are blood donors and actively propagandize free donorship in enterprises, establishments, kolkhozes, sovkhozes and residential sectors.

The question of the population's timely training in basic medical skills arises now more acutely than ever before. Under present-day conditions this must become a most important state task. The fact is that over the last five years more than 220,000 persons died and more than a million were injured in highway accidents. A significant number of fatalities arose not so much from injuries as from tardy first aid, and around half because of the inability of those around to give it.

How should it be? Everyone must be ready to save a life whether an elderly or sick person has a heart attack on the street or in transportation, a need arises to apply a tourniquet on a victim, or urgent assistance is required for a person poisoned by gas or vapors of highly toxic substances. Thus it is necessary to change existing forms and methods of training and involve television, radio and other mass media in this work more widely.

Timeliness and reliability of warning the population about an imminent threat also becomes a priority among CD tasks. The success of the matter depends to a considerable extent on how promptly and fully people will be informed about the existing situation. At the present time steps are being taken to notify all city dwellers and a considerable portion of village residents about a mishap that has occurred or is imminent in the shortest possible time. Territorial notification systems have been established and are being improved in the country for this purpose. One can say that this problem has been resolved technically, but there is another side to the matter. It is a question of people's reaction to CD signals. For example, on hearing the sound of a siren some pay no attention to it and others become confused, flustered, and do not know what to do. It would appear worthwhile to recall the time from our history when people immediately gathered together at the ringing of the bell or tocsin to decide how to fight imminent danger.

The primary method of notifying the population is to transmit announcements over the radio and television. Sirens as well as whistles of enterprises and means of transportation now will be used in emergencies to attract people's attention and force them to promptly turn on televisions and radios. The howling of sirens and the intermittent whistles of enterprises and transportation signify the CD signal "Attention everyone." On hearing it, one must immediately turn on the television or radio and listen to the announcement of local authorities and the CD staff.

In recent years many republics, krays and oblasts have gained considerable experience of working under emergency peacetime conditions. For example, the management agencies and CD personnel of Armenia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan went through the school of battling the

consequences of earthquakes; those of Georgia and republics of the North Caucasus—floods and avalanches in the mountains; and those of Ivanovo and certain other oblasts—the devastating effects of a water spout and hurricane.

In this regard I would like to emphasize that we must carefully study, accumulate and store experience in mopping up in the aftermath of natural disasters, industrial accidents and catastrophes, remembering its applicability under wartime conditions. This also has to be considered in CD propaganda, which is a component part of mass defense work and military-patriotic indoctrination of the population. Experience shows that it helps the population master skills of protection in case of industrial accidents and natural disasters.

Propaganda is carried on purposefully and actively in the Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia and in the Bryansk, Kaluga and Kirov oblasts of the Russian Federation. Public organizations are widely used here to accomplish CD tasks. CD staffs, culture establishments, the press, television, radio broadcasting, trade union and Komsomol entities, DOSAAF organizations, and the Znaniye and Red Cross societies function in coordination under the immediate direction of local party entities based on comprehensive long-range plans.

Unfortunately, the lessons and conclusions from mopping up in the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Station are beginning to be forgotten in a number of places and are not finding proper coverage in the press, in television and radio broadcasts, verbal propaganda and visual agitation. This leads to a situation where the attitude of many citizens, including unfortunately some leaders, is slowly changing toward protective measures.

The growing number of accidents on the railroad, which accounts for almost half of all our misfortunes, also is alarming. Accidents in Sverdlovsk and at the Ravnina Station of Mary Oblast of Turkmen SSR followed on the heels of Yaroslavl, Arzamas and Bologoye. Mopping up in their aftermath takes away a large part of CD forces and resources. All this persuades us that the steel mainlines are chemical, explosion and fire hazards and that along with an acceleration of their re-equipping it is necessary to urgently bring the structure and training of CD formations on rail transportation closer to actual conditions.

The public is demanding more and more insistently that the role of civil defense be increased in peacetime. As confirmation of this I will cite an excerpt from a letter from the Khudyakov family living in Voronezh Oblast about the article "Alert Declared" (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 17 June 1987): "The entire family read the article. . . . We were convinced that civil defense exists only in case of war, but the newspaper opened our eyes to a great deal. Every day we must be ready to protect ourselves against the consequences of accidents at atomic electric power stations, at various chemical installations, and against hurricanes and floods. It is very poor that for now we are not ready for this even though the lessons of Chernobyl are fresh in everyone's memory."

We must draw serious conclusions from results of mopping up in the aftermath of the earthquake in Armenia. The experience gained there must be used in a most active manner in training staffs and formations.

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## Conversion of Defense Industry to Civilian Production

### Belousov on Plans for APK

18010519 Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK  
in Russian No 4, Feb 89 p 2

[Article by I. S. Belousov, deputy chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, under rubric "Toward the CPSU Central Committee Plenum": "Addressed to the Agricultural Industry"]

[Text] The conversion of military production... This concept already is backed up by real affairs in our country. The considerable potential of defense sectors of industry is being used more and more widely to solve pressing national economic problems, the most important of which is an accelerated saturation of the market with food products.

Considering all the acuteness of the situation in this sphere, the problem posed for defense sectors is to provide agriculture and processing industry enterprises with modern technology and high-capacity equipment.

It would be incorrect to think that they have just now joined in to resolve the problem. Now it is a question of having enterprises of defense sectors increase the deliveries of different kinds of hardware, equipment and other resources for the APK by many times. The basis for this is our party's consistent course toward relaxation of the international situation and a sharp reduction in expenditures for military products.

Just what are kolkhozes and sovkhoses receiving from the defense industry today? It is tractors, wide-coverage sprinklers, mineral fertilizer spreaders, surface plows, trailers, and other machinery and equipment.

I would also like to note the following detail. Specialists of defense enterprises now are paying more attention to the problem of improving the quality, reliability, economy, and operating convenience of equipment for the village. This work goes on in close touch with those using the machinery and mechanisms in kolkhozes, sovkhoses and processing enterprises. Here is just one example. In order to use irrigation units most effectively, to install them, carry out start-up and production work, turn them over for operation, and conduct subsequent servicing in many regions of the country, 29 regional production and installation facilities of the Fregat Production Association were set up especially in the USSR Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry] system. Another 15 facilities will be added in the next few years. For now, however, this is just the beginning of a big job. The creative alliance of "defense personnel" with agricultural machine operators must continue to be strengthened.

"Defense personnel" also consider the interests of those rural dwellers who have their own farmstead as well as numerous gardeners whose contribution to augmenting

food resources will grow appreciably. For example, enterprises of USSR Minaviaprom [Ministry of the Aviation Industry] developed the output of tillers for working the soil, micromowers, water pumps and other small-scale mechanization equipment. The output of these scarce products must be increased considerably, and necessary steps are being taken in this direction.

Today, with the party sharply raising the question of a larger-scale inclusion of all the production and scientific-technical potential accumulated in the country in resolving the food problem, defense sectors can and must make their substantial contribution to this matter. It is quite natural that the renovation and retooling of the processing industry has been assigned specifically to enterprises in this sphere.

What is the technical status of enterprises of processing sectors now? Only 13 percent of equipment corresponds to the world level, 42 percent is subject to modernization, and 26 percent is subject to being written off and replaced. Almost a third of industrial equipment is imported.

During the period 1988-1995 the output volume of modern equipment for processing sectors of the APK, including deliveries from CEMA countries, will be over R37 billion, including R17.5 billion supplied by defense sectors. Growth rates are impressive.

While in 1987 enterprises of the now abolished Minlegpishchemash [Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances] and of ministries in defense sectors of industry produced R865 million of industrial equipment for the APK, last year the defense complex manufactured R1,029 million of such equipment. Equipment worth R3.8 billion is to be produced in 1995, or 4.4 times more than in 1987.

What has been done already? In 1988 345 of the primary defense industry plants were used to produce industrial equipment which was the specialty of the former Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances. The relative share of equipment they produced for APK processing sectors within the overall production volume of such equipment by defense sectors in 1989 will be 25 percent, and subsequently it will grow. Some military plants being constructed are being reoriented to peaceful production while still on the drawing board. Two hundred five of the leading research institutes and design bureaus engaged in creating military equipment were assigned to design equipment for the agricultural industry.

In just eight years it will be necessary to create 4,500 kinds of new equipment for the processing sphere, of which over 3,000 will be produced by defense sectors of industry. In 1995 at least 90 percent of the equipment must conform to the world level. An important direction such as the creation of small-capacity equipment and shops also merits attention. A creative approach is required to solve the



problems. Here I would like to take note of the initiative of the USSR Minsredmash [Ministry of Medium Machine Building] in taking a comprehensive approach to retooling milk industry enterprises (creation of equipment, design, and turnkey construction).

But it must be said frankly that matters still have not been properly arranged everywhere and not everything is being done by the planned dates. For example, there is a delay in making macaroni production lines operational in the Ministry of the Aviation Industry and in creating jam preparation lines in the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry. For a long time the Mir NPO of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building together with Rostprod mash PO of Minobshchemash [Ministry of General Machine Building] and the Membrany MNTK [Interbranch Scientific-Technical Complex] of Minkhimprom [Ministry of the Chemical Industry] have been engaged in creating and mastering production of flat-membrane ultrafiltration units for processing secondary dairy products (buttermilk, whey), but they have not been brought to a working condition even today.

Or take the question of creating equipment for low-capacity processing enterprises. For example, a number of ministries have been enlisted for manufacturing small bakeries: the Ministry of General Machine Building as the primary ministry as well as the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, Minkhim mash [Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building], Minelektrotekhprom [Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry], Minpribor [Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment, and Control Systems] and Minavtoselkhoz mash [Ministry of Automotive, Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building] of the USSR. It was planned to manufacture 30 sets of this equipment last year, 600 in 1989 and 1,400 in 1990. Meanwhile, only two prototypes have been produced. Unfortunately such instances are not yet isolated ones. All this requires a more responsible attitude toward creating new equipment and making it operational.

Modernization and creation of equipment for processing enterprises is picking up the pace. In 1989 over 150 descriptions of industrial equipment must be placed in series production [one or more phrases missing].

First of all, attention is being given to producing equipment which is especially scarce today. For example, the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry will begin manufacturing lines for the aseptic canning of liquid and puree semimanufactures. This will permit reducing the storage losses of raw materials by 15-20 percent and provide for year-around operation of canneries. The USSR Minoboronprom [Ministry of the Defense Industry] will master sugar cube equipment production under license and will begin producing lines for bottling and packaging nonalcoholic beverages, mineral water and beer with a capacity of 24,000 bottles per hour, and a mechanized flowline for producing canning containers from lamister [transliteration]; the Ministry of General

Machine Building will begin producing extruders for producing dry breakfast food; and the Ministry of Medium Machine Building will begin production of automatic lines for producing cream butter (by the churning method), as well as units for manufacturing fruit and vegetable powders and sets of equipment for producing food concentrates and groats.

In 1989 the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry, Ministry of the Defense Industry, Min mash [Ministry of Machine Building], and the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment, and Control Systems will manufacture a number of pieces of high-capacity automatic equipment for bagging and packaging biscuits, rice sticks, souffle sweetmeats, pastila [sweet made of fruit or berries], potato chips, syrup-filled bonbons, gelatin, fruits and vegetables, and a number of other food products. By the end of the 12th Five-Year Plan it is planned to double the production of bagging and bottling equipment. In short, a very big job lies ahead and it is fully understandable that the accomplishment of tasks set for a cardinal retooling of APK processing sectors demands the cohesive work of labor collectives, an imaginative and responsible attitude toward the assigned job on the part of workers and engineer-technical personnel of the defense complex, and an active search for nonstandard solutions.

Today the important thing has been done—a foundation has been created for developing the production of industrial equipment for processing agricultural products. The work of modernizing this sector has begun, and this should appreciably affect the build-up of food resources in the country.

#### Minister of Medium Machine Building, Others Comment

18010519 Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK  
in Russian No 4, Feb 89 p 2

[Commentary by V. G. Chirskov, minister of construction of petroleum and gas industry enterprises USSR; Ye. A. Varnachev, minister of construction, road and municipal machine building USSR; and L. D. Ryabev, minister of medium machine building USSR: "Industry's Contribution"]

[Text]

[Chirskov] Nonspecialized directions, if it can be thus expressed, have appeared lately for Minneftegazstroy [Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises].

One of them is the creation of low-capacity modular meat processing enterprises. Why did we do this? It is common knowledge that a poor production base for meat processing, backward designs, an unjustified mania for gigantic things, and long construction periods lead to enormous meat losses. There is one solution to this situation: to have a far-flung network of low-capacity

meat processing enterprises that are inexpensive, mobile, rapidly installed, based on domestic equipment, and not inferior to the best foreign analogs.

Our Modular Product Design Institute developed a design for a plant capable of processing two tons of meat and producing a ton of sausage products per shift.

The collective of the Sibkomplektmontazh Association in Tyumen was assigned to produce a prototype. The system had been manufactured, delivered to the suburban Moscow area, and set up in just two months. The first test of operating the miniplant showed the promise of this design.

Just what are its advantages? Thorough plant readiness, mobility and compactness permit organizing large-scale production. One such plant is capable of providing meat products to a settlement with a population of up to 20,000. Every kolkhoz, sovkhos or large subsidiary farm can have one.

This year it is planned to build 50 such complexes in 21 regions of the country. Their output will be increased to 200 in 1990. It is planned to place a total of 1,750 modular processing enterprises in operation by the end of the present five-year plan.

[Varnachev] Much now has to be built in the village, which means construction materials, and bricks above all, are needed in large quantities. The raw materials are at hand, for many areas of the country have enormous reserves of clay, and agricultural enterprises could organize the production of this time-tested construction material. It is all a question of where to purchase the necessary equipment.

Our ministry's enterprises set about to solve the problem and help the village organize series production of equipment for low-capacity brickyards for producing ceramic brick. For example, specialists of the Krasnyy Oktyabr Association already are completing development of such a brickyard with a capacity of 10-15 million bricks per year. A test batch will be manufactured this year and it is planned to organize series production of complete lines beginning in 1990.

Several versions of brickyards with a capacity of five million bricks per year are being created at the Mogilev Stromavtoliniya Production Association in collaboration with specialists of other sectors of the national economy.

What are the characteristics of the brickyard? It is a rather compact production with an estimated cost of R1.5 million, i.e., purchasing it is within the capability of any medium kolkhoz or sovkhos. There will be 8-12 persons manning the brickyard. The estimated production cost of a thousand bricks is not over R50.

Collectives of USSR Minstroydormash [Ministry of Construction, Road and Municipal Machine Building] enterprises gave their word to manufacture 22 sets of brickyards in 1989. Annual deliveries subsequently will grow to 100 sets.

[Ryabev] Milk products make up around 40 percent of our diet. Appropriate industrial equipment is needed to obtain them. Unfortunately, this is just what is lacking; existing equipment is fairly worn or obsolete. Now, with priority importance attached to developing the processing sphere, the production of equipment for the milk industry has become one of the principal tasks of the USSR Ministry of Medium Building.

The most important task is to create low-capacity shops in a modular unit design. This means cheese dairies with a capacity of 50 and 300 kg of cheese per shift, and milk processing plants and milk receiving points with a capacity of 10 tons of milk per shift. It is necessary to develop the design of a city milk plant with a capacity of 50 tons per shift.

The concept of creating a comprehensive retooling of the milk industry was defined. The beginning of its implementation showed that expected results can be achieved only with a precise interrelationship of scientific subunits of the USSR Gosagroprom [State Committee for the APK] and organizations of our ministry. We believe that the time has come to transfer the technological institutes of USSR Gosagroprom or some of their subunits to the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building.

Last year sector enterprises successfully fulfilled the plan for producing equipment that was new for us. Equipment worth R188 million was delivered to the national economy. The current year's program is R235 million. It is envisaged preserving the very same rates next year, but in this connection it is necessary to resolve one matter. Ministry enterprises now are putting out equipment not only for the milk industry, but also for the meat, food, and milling-elevator industry. Would it not have been better to transfer production of this equipment to other sectors of the defense complex responsible for specializing in the particular equipment? Our enterprises are ready to take the manufacture of all industrial equipment for the milk industry from other departments.

**Changes in DOSAAF Regulations Detailed**  
*18010489a Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA*  
*in Russian No 3, Mar 89 pp 21-24*

[Unattributed article: "USSR DOSAAF Regulation"]

[Text] *In the material being published, chief attention is given to the main changes made to the USSR DOSAAF Regulations at the 10th All-Union Congress of the Defense Society.*

**The Law of Life of the Society**

The DOSAAF is a mass defense-patriotic organization of the working people of our country. Like any other social organization of like-minded persons, it structures its work on the basis of a regulation. The regulation, in accordance with the requirements of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, clearly formulates the tasks of the society, the principle's of its organizational structure, the duties and rights of its members, and other provisions governing the activities of all DOSAAF links.

The Military-Scientific Society, the Society for Assistance to Defense, the Society of Friends of the Air Fleet, the Society of Friends of Chemical Defense and the Chemical Industry, and the Society for Assistance to the Aviation and Chemical Construction of the USSR had their own regulations that determined their organizational structure. The Society of Friends of Defense and Aviation and Chemical Construction of the USSR (Osoaviakhim) created in January 1927 also operated in accordance with regulations.

Over its more than 60-year history, changes were made to the society's regulations as its tasks became more precise and its forms of work developed. There was practically no all-union congress where one or another question about the Defense Society's regulations were not revised.

During the period of preparation for the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, changes to the regulations were drawn up and submitted for general discussion based on proposals of committees, organizations, and members of the society. All the mail received at the DOSAAF Central Committee, press organs, and verbal statements by members of the society during the all-union pre-congress discussion on questions of restructuring defense work among the masses were analyzed by a specially created commission. The results of its work were examined by the DOSAAF Central Committee Buro and Presidium.

Suggestions on changes to the regulation were also stated at the congress itself. They have all been specified in its new wording. The fundamental purpose of the changes, on the one hand, is to further expand inner-union democracy, develop the initiative and activeness of society members and all defense collectives, and increase their responsibility for carrying out set tasks.

The DOSAAF Regulations consists of 9 sections combining 35 articles (somewhat fewer than in the previous version).

The main task of the USSR DOSAAF, the introduction emphasizes, is active assistance in strengthening the country's defense capability and preparing workers to defend the socialist fatherland. The purpose of the practical activities is to implement the Leninist ideas and provisions of the CPSU Program on the nationwide nature of protecting the socialist fatherland, comprehensively improving the defense capability of the Soviet state, and implementing the principle of the unity of military-patriotic, international education of workers and young people and practical instruction in the fundamentals of military affairs.

In its work, the DOSAAF is guided by the directives of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government on strengthening the defense capability of the USSR and its armed forces and strictly observes Soviet laws and the rights and interests of USSR citizens and state and social organizations. The practical activities of the Defense Society's organizations are closely linked to the corresponding state, trade union, Komsomol, sports, and other social organizations and labor collectives.

The basic tasks of the DOSAAF's international activities are to expand and strengthen cooperation with defense and sports organizations of fraternal socialist countries and to establish ties with sports organizations of capitalist and developing states.

**On Membership in the Society**

The first section of the DOSAAF Regulation is devoted to membership in the society. It points out that any citizen of the Soviet Union who has reached the age of 14, recognizes the DOSAAF Regulation, works in one of the organizations, and pays membership dues can be a member of the society.

Certain duties of DOSAAF members are clarified. In particular, it is emphasized that they must expand their political and cultural outlook, temper themselves physically, strictly observe the standards of communist morality, be an example in labor and studies, and display a high level of consciousness. Members of the society have the right to discuss freely and submit their proposals, defend them until the organization makes a decision, and use all the material and technical and sports base in the prescribed manner. The procedure for admission as a DOSAAF member has been simplified. Now one needs only to state verbally his desire to join the society.

The regulation points out that the society structures and organizes its activities on the basis of democratic centralism, combining centralized leadership and high discipline with broad democracy within the society and development of the activeness and creative initiative of organizations and all their members. The provision on



the collective nature in the work of all organizations and supervisory bodies of the DOSAAF and the personal responsibility of every society member for carrying out his duties and assignments is important.

### The Main Directions of Activities

The regulation defines the directions of the Defense Society's activities. They include: military-patriotic education of workers and young students; preparing lads for actual military service in the USSR Armed Forces; training cadres of mass technical occupations having military-related importance for the national economy; assisting in civil defense measures; developing technical and applied military sports in the country; strengthening the material and technical base. It also points out how important it is to use new forms in military-patriotic propaganda and to help in organizing the work of defense sports camps for pre-draft-age and draft-age youths. It provides for the right to open independently (and, if necessary, also to eliminate in the prescribed manner) amateur associations and clubs for interests that have gained general recognition in recent years.

### The DOSAAF Structure

The DOSAAF is structured on the territorial-production basis. It combines in its composition the 14 DOSAAF central committees of union republics, 159 kray and oblast committees, 4,488 district, city and rayon DOSAAF committees, and over 300,000 primary organizations that are the basis of the Defense Society.

The primary organizations are created according to the place of work or study of DOSAAF members—at plants and factories, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, institutions and educational institutions, and also among workers and employees of military units and military educational institutions, at arsenals, bases, plants, communication centers, hospitals, and other institutions and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense (which has been instituted for the first time) if there are at least 25 members (before it was at least 10 members).

The number of DOSAAF members required for creating primary organizations was increased primarily because experience has shown that smaller organizations are impractical. The question arises: What do we do with those so-called small organizations that existed prior to the congress? This question is answered in the following provision of the DOSAAF Regulation: In individual cases, with authorization of the DOSAAF district and city committee, primary DOSAAF organizations can be created within the framework of several enterprises that make up a production association and are located, as a rule, on the territory of one rayon or several rayons of one city.

Today, this provision has fully proven its value in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, and Chelyabinsk and Perm oblasts. Take, for example, the primary organization of the ispolkom of the Podolsk City Soviet of

People's Deputies in Moscow Oblast, which has combined 39 organizations and institutions. Before combining them, the small collectives that did not have a material and technical base essentially did not carry out defense work among the masses. Now the DOSAAF Committee, using in a centralized manner deductions from membership dues and assistance from enterprises and institutions, has been able to strengthen the material and technical base: It has acquired small arms and cartridges, decorated DOSAAF corners, and arranged subscription to the Defense Society's publications for all organizations. A rifle team has been set up based on the Gazokhozyaystvo Trust, and a motor sports section has been set up at an automotive enterprise. DOSAAF members are taking tours to battle sites in the Moscow area and the city's museums and have visited many of our country's hero-cities.

But experience prompts us that we must approach the solving of this problem creatively, taking into account the specific conditions, after carefully working out all the "pros" and "cons." However, we cannot openly bide our time and not take into account the dictates of the times.

It is namely this work style that is seen in the activities of certain Defense Society committees. Take the Kaliningrad DOSAAF Obkom. Up to now, the base primary organizations and a listing of the simplest sports facilities have not been determined in a number of cities and rayons of the oblast. Circles and sections for technical and applied military sports have not yet been set up at 220 industrial enterprises. Only 27 percent of the DOSAAF primary organizations have been provided small arms.

Contrary to regulation requirements, oblast, rayon, and city committees are poorly analyzing the processes taking place in defense organizations in connection with the reorganization of enterprises and institutions. For this reason, the membership in the society has declined in 11 rayons of the oblast.

The development of the mass nature of technical and applied military sports (and this is also required by regulation) is being held back by the lack of authorized technical sports complexes in 14 rayons of the oblast. The existing sports equipment is not used effectively.

So, the changes outlined by the decisions of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress in the meantime have not affected all the committees called upon, as the regulation requires, to display creativity and initiative in their work.

The highest governing bodies are: general meetings or conferences for primary organizations; corresponding conferences for rayon, city, district, oblast, kray, and autonomous organizations; union republic DOSAAF congresses for union republic DOSAAF organizations; and the All-Union Congress for the All-Union DOSAAF. These are the broadest and most representative bodies. They express the will of the corresponding DOSAAF

organization as a whole, discuss and make decisions on the most important issues, determine tasks, and elect governing bodies—committees (chairmen and their deputies), auditing commissions (auditors). It is pointed out that the meeting, conference, and congress are competent if more than half of all members of the organization or elected delegates are present at them.

The numerical composition of governing DOSAAF bodies is established by the general meeting, conference, or congress. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the union republic central committees, and kray, oblast, district, city, and rayon committees oversee the activities of their subordinate organizations between congresses and conferences. Plenums of committees at all levels are convened at least once a year.

Presidiums, made up of chairmen, their deputies, and members of the presidium in a number determined by the committees, are elected to supervise the work between plenums. The presidiums of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the union republic DOSAAF central committees, and kray, oblast, and city (with population over 300,000) DOSAAF committees are elected from their bureau staff for current work, monitoring, and checking on fulfillment of adopted decisions.

Primary DOSAAF organizations numbering 50 or more members (previously it was 25 or more) elect committees and auditing commissions at meetings (conferences); organizations numbering less than 50 members elect chairmen, their deputies, treasurers, and auditors. As a rule, part-time workers work in the defense organizations on a voluntary basis. An exception to this is primary organizations combining more than 5,000 members of the society; they may be granted the rights of raykoms and full-time positions.

Changes have been made to the periods for conducting conferences and meetings. Thus, regular kray, oblast, district, city, and rayon conferences are convened at least once every 5 years; reports and elections meetings and conferences in primary organizations are convened once every 2-3 years. The decision on convening a congress or conference, on the representation norms at them, and on conducting a meeting is made by the appropriate committees.

#### **Elections Based on Democracy**

In connection with the expiration of the terms of office of the committees and auditing commissions (auditors) of the Defense Society primary organizations, the Third USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum, held on 11 April 1989, decreed to hold reports and elections meetings (conferences) in September-November of this year in the primary organizations of the Defense Society. In accordance with the regulation, at enterprises, kolkhozes, and

educational institutions combining more than 300 members of the society, the reports and elections conferences should be preceded by meetings in the DOSAAF organizations operating with rights of primary organizations.

Reports and elections time is the most critical in the work of our organizations. It demands our closest attention. Without wasting time, the union republic DOSAAF central committees and kray, oblast, district, city, and rayon committees of the society should ensure planned preparation and conduct of reports and elections in primary DOSAAF organizations on a high organizational and ideological level in an environment of broad democracy and glasnost and a self-critical approach to assessing the activities of the committees and auditing commissions (auditors).

Many things in connection with the reports and elections campaign fall to the lot of primary defense collectives. During the course of the campaign, they should thoroughly discuss and work out measures to deepen perestroika in light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the requirements of welcoming the CPSU Central Committee to the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, and the guidelines of the congress on the basic directions of the Defense Society's activities. Without wasting a single day, develop in good time and in coordination with local party bodies approve preparation plans for the reports and elections and schedules for conducting them.

Of course, if this is done only by the committee chairman and his deputies, they may not handle all the concerns and leave out quite a bit. Therefore, everywhere it is necessary to enlist the help of the staff workers of committees, educational and sports organizations, and public activists in the reports and elections campaign, and to instruct them in advance.

The decree of the Third USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum on conducting reports and elections in primary organizations of the Defense Society contains the following requirement: In July-August 1989, conduct 1-2 day seminars with chairmen of committees and auditing commissions (auditors) of primary DOSAAF organizations, at which it is necessary to discuss thoroughly questions concerning the upcoming reports and elections.

The Soviet society is experiencing a period of renewal and of reaching new heights of development. This is associated with the intensification of democracy and glasnost in the country and in the activities of all our social organizations. The nomination and elections of people's deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet demonstrated that the people enjoying the greatest support of the population are those who worry about the job and who are concerned with the fate of the country and the course of perestroika. From this flows the following indisputable conclusion for all committees of the society: It is necessary to use the reports and elections campaign in every possible way to strengthen the elective aktiv of

the primary DOSAAF organizations with the most capable and authoritative cadres who enjoy the trust of the masses. The surest way to achieve this goal is to conduct the elections for chairmen of the committees and auditing commissions by a multi-candidate system. In doing this, of course, it is necessary to take into account the local conditions and under no circumstances act in a stereotyped way.

Special attention must be given to the selection of committee chairmen of primary DOSAAF organizations that are granted the rights of a rayon committee of the society. These must be people who possess the appropriate knowledge and, most importantly, are ideologically steadfast, have high moral principles, and are enthused about restructuring and renewing our society.

Of course, during the course of the reports and elections, decisions will be made aimed at improving the activities of the society's organizations and at carrying out the tasks set forth by the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress. It is the duty of committees at all levels to take effective steps to implement the planned measures, as well as the critical remarks and proposals made by members of the primary defense collectives.

This is one task. A second, equally important task is to sum up the results after the conclusion of the reports and elections and organize training of the newly elected chairmen and members of the committees and auditing commissions (auditors) of the DOSAAF organizations.

We should talk separately about the auditing commissions (auditors) of the society's primary organizations. During the period of preparing for the reports and elections, they should check most carefully the financial and administrative activities of the committees. The reports presented to the meeting (conference) should reflect the committees' fulfillment of the financial plans, the correctness of receipts and expenditures of material resources, and the state of monitoring observation of financial discipline. The main principle is not to hide shortcomings, but to bring them up for general discussion and censure. This will make it possible to outline effective measures to eliminate them.

The primary DOSAAF organizations are an integral part of the labor collectives. They make their weighty contribution to fulfilling national economic plans and resolving social problems. Their activities help workers to participate actively in all measures aimed at strengthening the country's defense capability. That is why it is very important during the course of the reports and elections campaign to expand work to popularize the activities of the Defense Society. To this end, in many places they make wide use of the press, television, radio, visual agitation, diverse forms of oral propaganda, and military-patriotic, sports, and other mass measures.

The elections of committees (chairmen and their deputies) and auditing commissions (auditors) of primary, rayon, city, district, oblast, kray, and republic DOSAAF organizations, the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission of the USSR DOSAAF, and also the elections of delegates to higher conferences can be conducted by the union republic DOSAAF congresses and the All-Union DOSAAF Congress by both open and closed (secret) ballot by decision of the majority of participants of the meeting, conference, or congress. The same voting procedure is provided for when electing leaders and their deputies at the corresponding committee plenums and at auditing commission sessions.

The elections must be organized so as to ensure free discussion of the candidates, the right to unlimited nomination of candidates, and opportunities for their rejection and criticism. Already in the course of the previous reports and elections campaign in Moscow, Turkmen and Kazakh SSR, and Omsk, Murmansk, Kuybyshev, and Moscow oblasts, the chairmen of some committees were elected under the multi-candidate system.

It is recorded in the regulation that elections of governing DOSAAF bodies should observe the principle of systematic renewal of their composition and continuity of leadership. This is precisely what makes it possible to involve a wide range of the aktiv, new forces, and capable and initiative-filled workers in the activities of elective bodies. At the same time, it will help get rid of inactive people who do not see the future and are not handling the duties entrusted to them.

The governing DOSAAF bodies were substantially renewed, for example, in the process of the reports and elections campaign that took place on the eve of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress. Thus, 32 percent of the chairmen of primary organizations were replaced; 26 percent of the staff of district, city, and rayon committees were replaced; and 43 percent of the corresponding auditing commissions were replaced.

The new version of the USSR DOSAAF Regulation also clarifies certain duties of elective bodies. In particular, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee is granted the right to make the decision on converting DOSAAF committees, enterprises, and organizations to full cost accounting, cost recovery, and self-financing. Local DOSAAF committees, in accordance with standard structures and staffs, can themselves within identified limits approve manning tables and estimates of expenditures for maintaining the administrative apparatus, financial plans, and labor plans of its committee and organizations on its balance sheet.

#### Work of the Apparatus

On 20 October 1988, the Second USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum examined the question of the practical work of DOSAAF organizations to carry out the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference



and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. It outlined specific measures for further democratization of the life of the society under conditions of the new stage of perestroika. This concerns both the approaches to the development of true collective leadership in the work of elective bodies and their formation, as well as monitoring of their activities on the part of members of the Defense Society.

In order to regulate the interaction of elective bodies and workers of the staff apparatus of the committees, the USSR DOSAAF Regulation points out: In the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the union republic DOSAAF central committees, and the kray, oblast, district, city, and rayon DOSAAF committees, an apparatus is set up whose tasks include current work on organizing and verifying the execution of decisions, assisting lower organizations, and supporting the activities of the elective body. The structure and staffs of the apparatus are determined according to the procedure established by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

Elective bodies supervise the activities of the corresponding apparatus and its workers and certify them. Workers of the apparatus regularly report on their activities in organizations of the society.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum, having approved measures for improving the structure and reducing the apparatus, considered it necessary to continue this work. In doing so, it was recommended that the rayon (city) link of the society be strengthened, combining into a single staff all jurisdictional organizations, including technical sports complexes, pneumatic firing ranges, and others.

The question of maintaining or reducing the staff positions of committee chairmen of primary organizations numbering more than 5,000 members is to be resolved taking into account the local conditions. In place where these positions are abolished, volunteer workers are elected committee chairmen, with payment of their combined office from DOSAAF funds.

The regulation clarifies certain provisions on increasing the role of the voluntary basis in all links of the society. It is emphasized that to develop democratic principles, the appropriate DOSAAF committees create non-staff sections, instructor groups, commissions on the basic directions of practical activities of the Defense Society, and federations for technical and applied military sports, which work under the supervision of the appropriate DOSAAF committees. Permanent commissions can be created in committees of primary DOSAAF organizations for military-patriotic and defense work among the masses.

The appropriate commissions are being created in order to step up the activities of the DOSAAF committees and create conditions for providing practical assistance to organizations of the society. In particular, the USSR

DOSA AF Central Committee Plenum made the decision to form the following commissions of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee:

- for restructuring defense work among the masses, military-patriotic education, and democratization of the life of the Defense Society;
- for restructuring the preparation of young people for service in the USSR Armed Forces and personnel for the national economy;
- for fulfilling the demands of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress on increasing the mass nature of technical and military applied sports.

The section on auditing commissions calls attention to the fact that the commission (auditor) is now obligated to report on the results of audits to the higher DOSAAF body, and the committee being audited is to make the appropriate decision within a month based on the conclusions of the audit.

#### Society Funds

The society gets its funds not only from the dues of members of DOSAAF and sports clubs, income from publishing and economic activities and from DOSAAF lotteries, but also from sports events requiring payment, other revenue from state and social organizations specified by legislation of the USSR and union republics, and from voluntary contributions from citizens concerned with developing defense work among the masses.

The procedure for distributing membership dues has been changed: Primary DOSAAF organizations of general-education schools, secondary educational institutions, and vocational and technical schools keep the entire amount; the rest keep 50 percent. Introductory membership dues are also spent in the primary DOSAAF organizations. The remaining 50 percent of membership dues go to rayon and city DOSAAF committees. The amounts of the introductory and membership dues of DOSAAF clubs are determined at general meetings and remain at their disposal. The regulation also authorizes spending the society's funds on needs such as improving the conditions of daily life and giving bonuses to DOSAAF workers.

In accordance with these changes, the Central Committee Presidium approved in the new version an instruction "On the Procedure for Issuing Membership Cards, Receiving, Storing, and Using Membership Dues in DOSAAF Organizations," which was coordinated with the boards of the USSR Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development (Zhilsotsbank) and the USSR State Workers' Savings and Credit Bank.

Thus, the USSR DOSAAF Regulation consolidates legislatively those changes that have taken place in the activities of the Defense Society's organizations and have been made by life itself and daily practice.

An analysis of the activities of the leading organization shows that they firmly observe the requirements of regulation provisions and struggle decisively against any attempts to violate them. Staff workers of committees, directors of educational and sports organizations, and activists of these organizations, as a rule, have a good knowledge of the requirements of the USSR DOSAAF Regulation.

The Novozybkov DOSAAF Gorkom of Bryansk Oblast also acted correctly: Changes to the regulation were passed on to all workers and activists in a timely manner. In addition, appropriate tests were taken from staff workers. Regulation questions are constantly studied during inspections and explained to members of the society.

On the other hand, there are quite a few other examples. During work in the DOSAAF organizations of Vologda Oblast, it was revealed that the obkom and rayon and city committees were not paying proper attention to promulgating regulation requirements. As a result, many staff workers themselves do not know the regulation requirements and do not strive to fulfill them precisely in practice. As before, the deadlines for holding presidium sessions and meetings are being missed, there are many shortcomings in getting the public involved in the work, and little attention is given to organizational strengthening of the society's primary organizations.

It is important to remember constantly that the regulation is the law for the Defense Society, and its requirements should be carried out steadfastly by all DOSAAF members and all organizations.

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### **Pros, Cons of Removing Pre-Draft Training from Schools**

18010489b Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA  
in Russian No 3, Mar 1989 p 16

[Letters to the Editor: "Following the VUZ Pattern?"]

[Text] In issue No 9, 1988, of VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, military instructor A. Gaybullayev suggested eliminating pre-draft training at schools, agricultural vocational and technical schools [SPTU], and tekhnikums and conducting pre-draft training for students at rayon and city training centers. The responses received by the editorial board contained various opinions.

### **Pro:**

After reading military instructor A. Gaybullayev's letter, I have taken heart. I am not the only one with the idea of creating a pre-draft training center. I, too, have not been on the job very long—3 years. Therefore, I was beset with doubts about whether I was right. I think that creating a pre-draft training center, given the insignificant shortcomings that will emerge if pre-draft training is removed from the schools, will nonetheless produce incomparably greater benefit.

I can add from my own experience that the first class at SPTU No 34, where I work as a military instructor, gained more skills in pre-draft training during the 2-week training assembly than during the entire year of instruction. This is the opinion of the students, and I agree. Making the training assemblies as close as possible to army conditions creates a special atmosphere. The result is apparent: many of the students, who throughout the year barely made a "three" in pre-draft training, passed the test sessions at the assemblies with a "good" rating.

A center on which the regulations of the USSR Armed Forces are in effect should provide this. Saluting, addressing superiors, and standing daily detail duty will no longer be an episode in school lessons, but will become the usual standard of behavior. The uniform for going through the training camps will not gather dust on shelves; it will prove useful at the training center. A single order of dress will also instill discipline.

In addition, now each rayon must have a defense sports camp which will operate 19 days a year, but then what is done with it? How should it be built—as a permanent camp or as a tent camp? Many are thinking about this. The center eliminates this problem—it will operate all year long, and all training assemblies will be held at its facilities.

There is one detail which, in my view, is significant. Very often, complaints are made of military instructors for poor physical training of youths. But there is no physical training in the pre-draft training curriculum (other than the training camp curriculum). Physical training must be transferred to the training center, especially since the official salaries of military instructors force them to teach other subjects as well, including physical education lessons.

I will analyze, using the example of training assemblies, another problem that is close to SPTU and tekhnikum military instructors. In our rayon, there were two companies at the training assemblies: one made up of students from schools and the other of students from SPTU's, each with about 100 students. Military instructors commanded the platoons of school students; masters of production instruction commanded the platoons in my company. Can they give the lads the same knowledge as the military instructors? It is doubtful. Each year,

a considerable portion of the draftees are SPTU students, and how can we compare the work of a military instructor in a school where only 9th and 10th grade students undergo pre-draft training and the work of a military instructor of an SPTU or tekhnikum where everyone studies this subject.

I have not mentioned that enlisting the help of soldiers-internationalists, reservists, and veterans in military-patriotic work in one place, at the pre-draft training center, will not only be easier but also more effective than spreading their efforts over many educational institutions.

#### **A. Maparov, City of Suvorov, Tula Oblast**

##### **Con:**

After discussing this proposal, we, military instructors in the city of Dneprodzerzhinsk, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, consider it unacceptable. I will state our arguments.

First of all, pre-draft training in each educational institution has great educational importance and helps to strengthen discipline and organization of students. With the help of pre-draft training, they are more actively involved in military-patriotic and military-sports work, and it becomes possible to bring the students of lower classes in contact with the fundamentals of military affairs. Finally, it increases the responsibility of the sub-collective in general and the military instructors in particular for the level of military-patriotic education of the students, the preparation of youths for military service, and the selection of candidates for entrance into military schools.

Secondly, as experience has shown, occupational education of students at training production combines "has not worked." Many resources have been spent on creating them, but there are virtually no specialists for the national economy. It appears that the training of youth for actual military service under assembly-line conditions, as is proposed, will be of very low quality.

**On behalf of the military instructors of Dneprodzerzhinsk, V. Fragin, Supervisor of the City Committee on Methods for Pre-Draft Training**

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Comrade Gaybullayev's proposal is tempting. This would be a big step forward in instruction, but an even bigger step backward in military-patriotic education. If you take the military instructor from the school, military-patriotic education will be kept down, since our teachers have already forgotten how to do it.

When you look at a ninth-grade student who comes from an 8-year school, you notice right away the difference between him and his classmates who have many times visited the military-science room and small-arms range

back when they were first-year students. And how all the seventh- and eighth-grade students are longing to go to a defense sports camp or on a march with the military instructor!

In my opinion, we need to leave the military instructor in the school, but he must be made subordinate only to the military commissariat. Now he is subordinate both to the director of the school and to the director of studies, is a member of the school party organization, and bears all sorts of other social responsibilities.

Often, demands are made of him that are contrary to official instructions. For example, to have the small-arms range operate during recesses. The director of studies believes that this will keep some of the lads from running about in the halls, but he does not think about equipment safety (there will certainly be crowding).

Or, I took Ivanov, Petrov, and Sidorov on a tour to battle sites... But the director of studies was dissatisfied: they have "two's." My argument was that both the strong and weak students will be drafted into the Army, that they should all be patriots, and so forth was no argument for her. I gave a good female student an "unsatisfactory," and was threatened: "You will get hauled on the carpet! Because of your pre-draft training, the overall results are lowered!" They use my hours to fill "holes" in the schedule.

In short, there are many examples. If I were not subordinate to the school administration, I could demand the proper attitude from class leaders and the director of studies toward the subject and toward military-patriotic extra-curricular work. You see, sometimes to straighten out the military instructor, the cry is heard: "Who pays your wages?" How many duplicating papers, plans, instructions, and various courses! This is the work of two "bosses" who often ignore one another: the Ministry of Education (now already the former ministry) and the Ministry of Defense.

**T. Khayrulin, Military Instructor at the Pytalovo Secondary School, Pskov Oblast**

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In my opinion, A. Gaybullayev came out with a proposal that deserves not only attention but also implementation in those places where there are conditions for this. But the author clearly did not take into account the geography of our country, which has tens of thousands of rural schools, that are impossible in the foreseeable future to be included in the zone of operation of the proposed centers for a number of serious and objective reasons. Taking into account what has been said, I consider the proposals outlined in the article "Following the VUZ Pattern" to be unacceptable for the absolute majority of schools.



**A. Selivanov, Military Instructor at Secondary School No 4, Kochubeyevskoye, Stavropol Kray**

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I work as a military instructor at a secondary school in a remote taiga village. It will now become clear why I am calling attention to this.

The proposal of military instructor A. Gaybullayev merits attention, of course. But even if it is acceptable, it is only for the cities and those rayons that have easy access to the center. For our secondary school, and for a number of other schools of the rayon, the "VUZ pattern" is not suitable because it is very difficult to resolve the transportation problem. Just recently I accompanied senior students to the rayon military commissariat to meet a medical board—as a result, 3 training days were lost. The difficulty is in how to get to the rayon center and back.

In my opinion, it is not feasible to separate pre-draft training from the schools. You see, pre-draft training is inseparably linked to military-patriotic education. If we take the pre-draft training facilities from the school, with what will the students be left?

**Yu. Ratushnyy, Military Instructor at Kezhenskaya Secondary School, Krasnoyarsk Kray**

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**Articles 77-82 of Decree on Pre-Draft Training**  
*18010489a Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA*  
*in Russian No 3, p 17*

[Articles 77-82 of Statute on Pre-Draft Training: "Evaluation Criteria"]

[Text] *As the editorial mail shows, it is the evaluation criteria that are causing a mass of questions, resentment, and even indignation among many military training officers whose work was checked by various commissions. That is why we decided to publish for discussion the paragraphs from the draft Statute on Pre-Draft Military Training that define the parameters for evaluating pre-draft training in educational institutions.*

77. An overall rating is drawn for an educational institution or training center from the ratings given for students' mastery of the curriculum, the state of the training facilities, and the state of military-patriotic work, and at training centers—also for the state of physical training of youths. Fulfillment of the curriculum, methods training of the military training officer (instructor), his conduct of classes, and also leadership on the part of the director of the educational institution are evaluated in the form of conclusions.

78. The quality of students' mastery of the curriculum (knowledge, abilities, skills) is checked at classes, with individual ratings given. As a rule, youths from upper classes (groups) are used in the check at secondary educational institutions.

Based on the individual ratings received by the students, the educational institution is given a rating for the quality of mastery of the curriculum:

- “excellent” if at least 80 percent of the students checked received favorable ratings, with at least 50 percent receiving “excellent;”
- “good” if at least 70 percent received favorable ratings, with at least 50 percent receiving “excellent” and “good;”
- “satisfactory” if at least 60 percent received favorable ratings;
- “unsatisfactory” if more than 40 percent received unsatisfactory ratings.

The following are checked to come up with a rating for an educational institution or training center for quality of curriculum mastery by students: at an educational institution—students in a number comprising two platoons; at training centers—one to two groups. The testing of students' knowledge, abilities, and skills is conducted on all material previously covered.

79. The state of the training facilities at an educational institution or training center is rated:

- “excellent” if it has an equipped military-science study room, a room for storing training weapons and small-caliber rifles, a small-arms range<sup>1</sup>, and a drill-training area; places for practical study of orderly duties and instruction on cleaning and lubricating weapons; authorized training weapons and equipment<sup>2</sup>, and accounting and storage is organized strictly in accordance with established requirements; a set of removable portable training equipment and personal gear<sup>3</sup> making it possible for the educational institution to practice, in the amount of the curriculum, practical actions for tactical training and shooting practice for weapons training; in addition, for training centers, a place for physical training classes;
- “good” if it has all the above items for an “excellent” rating, but training positions are not fully equipped for practical study of orderly duties and instruction on cleaning and lubricating weapons, or there is a shortage of certain components in the set of removable portable equipment;

—"satisfactory" if it has an equipped military-science study room, a weapon storage room, a small-arms range, and a drill-training area; authorized training weapons and equipment which are stored and accounted for in accordance with established requirements;

—"unsatisfactory" if one of the above-listed components of the training facilities is missing, or if storage and accounting of authorized weapons and equipment do not correspond to established requirements<sup>4</sup>.

82. The overall state of pre-draft training of young people at an educational institution or training center is rated:

—"excellent" if the quality of students' mastery of the curriculum is rated "excellent," the state of the training facilities is not below "good," and the state of military-patriotic work is rated "satisfactory." In addition, for training centers, the state of physical training of youths must be rated at least "good."

—"good" if the quality of curriculum mastery and physical training of youths at the training centers is rated "good," and the state of the training facilities and military-patriotic work is not below "satisfactory;"

—"satisfactory" if the quality students mastery of the curriculum, the state of the training facilities and military-patriotic work, and, in addition, for training centers, the physical training of youths are rated at least "satisfactory;"

—"unsatisfactory" if the quality of curriculum mastery and, at training centers, the physical training of youths are rated "unsatisfactory" or two other groups of indicators are rated "unsatisfactory."

When checking particular problems, the educational institution or training center is not given an overall rating for pre-draft training. A critique is held upon completion of the inspection of the educational institution or training center.

#### Footnotes

1. The existence of a small-arms range is also counted at educational institutions if these institutions have a common firing range and its location makes it possible to ensure a timely start of classes and work of shooting circles called for by the schedule and training plan; if the location of an educational institution does not permit having a small-arms range, but by order of the national education body this education institution is attached to another educational institution (organization) having a small-arms range for conducting firing with students.

2. The lack of authorized training weapons and equipment at an educational institution does not affect the rating if they have not been issued by the military commissariat or have been removed by Internal Affairs agencies, but the storage room for them conforms to established requirements.

3. The training equipment and gear for conducting classes on tactical and weapons training include: target set; models of terrain features; markers; training hand grenades; signal flags for cocking weapons; set of rests and groundsheets; screens for uniformity in sighting; aiming rest secured to a base; commander's chest; and sets of personal equipment for the squad (slings, grenade and magazine pouches, shovel cases).

4. Instructions on the procedure for acquiring, transporting, storing, accounting for, and using firearms and ammunition for them; making bladed weapons; opening small-arms ranges, firing ranges, skeet and hunting ranges, and weapons repair shops; and trade in firearms, ammunition for them, and hunting knives. Approved by order of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, No 246, 1987.

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#### Leaders of Moscow Commissariat Detail State of Pre-Draft Training

18010625a Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL* in Russian No 5, Mar 89 pp 39-46

[Report by Lt Col G. Petrenko, *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* correspondent, under the rubric "For the Training and education— Good Quality": "The Military Commissariat: New Approaches and Old Problems"]

[Text] The restructuring underway in the nation and in the Armed Forces has produced numerous changes. One of them is a need to ensure the effective development of our defense based primarily on quality. Naturally, the military commissariats cannot remain on the sideline with respect to the accomplishment of this task. What is the situation in the capital's GVK [City Military Commissariat]. The search for an answer to this question led me first to the City Assembly Point (GSP), where an open-door day was held one Sunday in December of last year....

#### The "Calling Card" of the Army and Navy

Many Muscovites came that day to see how the send-off of draftees into the forces and fleets is organized today. It was there that I became acquainted with Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General (retired) G. Samoylovich, chairman of the Committee for Cooperation With the City Military Commissariat.

"The present undertaking," the veteran said, "is a real reflection of the restructuring in the work of the military commissariat. Today no one can reproach the leadership, the political section or the party organization of the MGVK [Moscow City Military Commissariat] for drawing an impenetrable curtain around Moscow's City Assembly Point or for failing to provide even the basic conveniences for the draftees. Everyone who visited the City Assembly Point today could see that the opposite was true.

Considerable concern is indeed shown for the future soldiers and seamen there. The leadership, the political section and the party organization of the military commissariat and those who assist them try to see that the draftees, torn from their familiar family surroundings, do not feel abandoned to fate but leave for the units or the ships in a good frame of mind. Wherever one went, there was cleanliness, order and friendliness.

"There are more than 700 draftees at our assembly point today," said Major General V. Bepalov, Moscow City Military Commissar. "A far greater number of people have come to see how it operates. What does this indicate? On the one hand, a vital interest on the part of the Muscovites, particularly those whose sons are being drafted or will soon be drafted into the service, in their first steps in the military. On the other, it shows that the stir raised by certain journalists around alleged 'carefully concealed outrages,' 'inhumane treatment' of the youth and 'oppressive conditions' at the City Assembly Point had an effect. I believe everyone has been convinced that such statements are groundless, however."

What was the purpose of the leadership, the political section and the party organization of the Moscow City Military Commissariat in holding the open-door day? They had one purpose: to acquaint people with the entire "chain" through which the youth pass from the time they cross the threshold of the traffic control post at the assembly point right up until they are sent as a group to their unit. This required considerable effort on the part of the organizers of the undertaking, since the departure of the draftees proceeded according to the usual rigid schedule. And I want to particularly stress the fact that "festive atmosphere" frequently created in the past was deliberately omitted. It was decided not to try to fool anyone but to let everyone see the real situation. And the people came, looked and were pleasantly surprised at the cleanliness and pleasantness of the assembly point, combined with organization and friendliness. This is to some degree no doubt responsible for making the draftee's transition from home to the military painless.

#### **Draftees: About Themselves and the Service Just Before They Join the Forces**

**Aleksandr Usanov:** I was sent to a DOSAAF motor vehicle school following a 10-year school. I completed it and obtained my license. I also made parachute jumps. I earned a 3rd-class rating. I believe it will be easier for me

in the beginning than for others. At least that is what my father, a serviceman, told me. And mama shared this opinion. My parents see nothing shameful in the fact that I will be a soldier. My older brother Igor has already served out his term. I thank him for opening my eyes to many things. We know that certain newspapers today write dismally about the military: the "old ways" still exist there, they say, and things like that. Igor confirmed the fact that there are cases of this. But why write only about that? Why try to scare us? They should write about what to do to eliminate the evil of these "old ways." I am in good spirits. I want to enter the military; I need to test myself.

**Albert Polichayev:** I completed 8 grades and not 10. I then went for training and worked as a watchmaker. I liked that. My father and older brother served in the military. It is now my turn. I am concerned, of course, but I expect things to go well in the service.

**Excerpt from a conversation at the assembly point with Gennadiy Alekseyevich Galakhov, a draftee's father and a scientific associate at a sanitary engineering institute**

[Correspondent]What are your impressions?

[Galakhov]When I joined the army we did not have these conditions. Now we are seeing off my son, and I decided to see everything with my own eyes. I am very satisfied. I am less concerned after what I have seen. Good conditions have been created for the young fellows at the assembly point. Everything is available so that the work can proceed and everyone can rest and make good use of his time until departing for his assignment.

[Correspondent]What are your son's feelings as he enters the service?

[Galakhov]He is somewhat nervous. But that is only natural; there is a lot of unknown ahead. I expect everything to go well, however. He attended a vocational and technical school and worked at a Moscow plant as a fitter/assembler. So he has already learned how to interact on a team. This will help him, of course. Besides that, my Denis is fairly easy to get along with. And a great deal depends upon one's character. He also completed a DOSAAF radioelectronic school through the military commissariat. In short, he already has some initial training. He was happy when he learned that he was being drafted in his field, of course, and is looking forward to the service.

**Opinion of Irina Borisovna Nazymova, mother of a draftee:** My son Ilya is somewhere around. I have two different feelings. On the one hand, there is a lot of fear. We had Afghanistan, after all.... So that there are grounds for my alarm. On the other hand, I have a sense of pride that my son is grown-up and independent, in short, a man. I hope very much that things go well for him in the service.



**Opinion of Yelena Komrakova, draftee Ilya Nazymov's fiancée and a nurse at Polyclinic No. 3 in the city of Moscow:** It is sad to be parting, of course: we have grown accustomed to one another. Perhaps it is better, though. We can test ourselves and our feelings. But Ilya is a reliable young man. He worked as an assistant mechanic on the railway. He liked the work. He is entering the Railway Troops. I shall wait. The atmosphere here at the assembly point feels good, the kind in which I hope Ilya continues to serve.

These are good, sincere, heartfelt words, you will agree. And I would point out that I heard many such words at the assembly point that day. One could not help feeling good about this, of course. Other things were disappointing, however, even somewhat confusing. Judge for yourselves. Unfortunately, there was not a single representative of the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom, the DOSAAF organization or the city education department at the City Assembly Point on open-door day. Can it be that they are actually not interested in how the induction of the capital's youth into the army and navy is organized today, in the problems which still exist and are frequently outside the jurisdiction of military commissariat workers? What needs to be done to break down the interdepartmental barriers preventing improvement of the preparation of future soldiers and seamen and military cadets? The Communists with the Moscow City Military Commissariat are highly concerned about the tardy reporting of many youth to the induction commissions, for example. Think about it: up to 1,000 a year. And this trend is not changing. It indicates major flaws in the education of the upcoming generation, in its preparation for service in the Armed Forces.

M. Tarusin and A. Kotlyarov, two draftees, ran away from Domodedovo Airport that Sunday when they learned that they would be serving in the Transbaykal Military District. They are both Komsomol members. The police had to be enlisted to find the runaways. Once again, no one except the Communists with the military commissariat were actually upset about this. And that is understandable: the Communists bear direct responsibility for the draftees.

At that time the judge advocate's office of the Moscow Military District had 25 cases for prosecution against malicious draft "evaders." So what, some readers will say. As Col M. Klimov, chief of the political section of the city military commissariat, said when he commented on this fact, these cases will probably be returned—allegedly because the documents are not properly filled out. But just who in the military commissariat is to draw up the cases, when the position of legal expert is not included in the T/O? Only a specialist can do it competently. What is more, there is no unified opinion in agencies of the procurator's office as to the moment liability for evading military service sets in. Those who evade reporting to the draft commissions are ordinarily not brought to accountability, since, they say, they have not gone through the induction commission. Is that not a paradox?

Or take the process of sending off the youth into the service. The military commissariat has even worked out an entire ceremony devoted to this important event in the life of each. What actually happens, though? There were seven draftees from the Karacharovskiy Machinery Plant at the City Assembly Point on open-door day. The young men stated as one that no one at the enterprise had given any thought to seeing them off, to bidding them farewell in a humane manner. What were the enterprise leadership, party committee, Komsomol and trade-union activists thinking about, one asks. Is this really a normal situation?

**In short, I accumulated quite a few questions at the city assembly point. It was clear, however, I repeat, that good conditions have been created for the draftees there, and the real kind of order for beginning the military service is maintained. To find answers to my questions I then set out for the military commissariat....**

#### **Insurmountable Barriers?**

**Excerpt from a talk with Major General Vladimir Aleksandrovich Bespalov, Moscow City Military Commissar, Colonel Mikhail Nikolayevich Klimov, chief of the political section of the Moscow City Military Commissariat, and Colonel Nikolay Ilich Yermilov, section chief and deputy Moscow city military commissar for induction and external-military training**

[Correspondent] The restructuring is becoming more and more firmly established in real life. This process is far from painless, however. As in the past, words are frequently not followed up with action; one thing is stated, but an inspection shows that there is no movement and no change. I could see that the city assembly point had gone from words to action. One senses, however, that many things are still preventing it from working productively. Particularly with respect to raising the caliber of the draftees.

[Bespalov] Life itself and the growing demands made of the training and the moral-political and psychological conditioning of the draftees have forced us to critically review our previous work. The lessons which we have derived from the past, from the period of stagnation, and the conclusions which we have drawn for ourselves from the analysis have become the basis for our restructuring. What do I mean by this? First of all, we decided to make our interaction more effective and to increase demand- ingness of all organizations participating in the preparation of the youth for the military service. They include agencies of public health, education, the procurator's office and internal affairs, Komsomol and DOSAAF committees, as well as sports committees. Let me explain at the outset that we have not yet achieved the desired result. What is hampering us? The inertia of the not-so-distant past and the burden of old habits are still with us.

Speaking specifically of the Komsomol rayon committees, for example, it has to be said that, unfortunately, there is still a great deal of the formal and bureaucratic style in our contacts with them. The Komsomol's participation in the screening of draftees for DOSAAF training organizations, in the work of the induction commissions, in the military-occupational orientation of the youth and in the military-patriotic work continues frequently to remain only in writing. Is this not why, during the 1988 fall induction alone, more than 300 young men arrived at the city assembly point for departure into the forces and fleets without Komsomol documents, and more than 20% of the total number evading military service were Komsomol members?! Unfortunately, however, the Komsomol committees are not taking the proper steps locally.

Now, about the DOSAAF organizations. Their representatives should have as much interest as we in participating in the military-patriotic education of the young generation, the pre-draft training and the selection of candidates for training at their—I stress, their!—schools. In fact, however, their participation frequently amounts merely to a nominal presence. This is due in great part to a lack of material incentives for the work of DOSAAF instructors, whose wages are still in no way linked to the end result. What should the situation be? If this or that instructor achieves a high quality of training, let us say, he should receive more. If his work is deficient, "unhitch him," as they say, from the vital work. The problem we are discussing would then disappear by itself, and people would develop interest. Even this is not the most serious problem, however; the most important thing is to ensure attendance at DOSAAF schools. There are subjective reasons along with objective ones. Many school directors, instructors and masters do not always try to work one-on-one with each student or to develop in the young people an interest in acquiring a technical military specialty. Up to half of the students are sometimes absent from the classes as a result. How can they master the program well, one asks, with this attitude?

**Facts to think about:** pre-draft training is performed at 1,374 educational institutions in the city and at 24 specialized centers. The NVP [pre-draft training] system encompasses more than 230,000 people. Approximately half of them will soon be going into the service. What kind of materials and equipment base does this system have, and does it provide for the quality mastery of the program by the trainees? Unfortunately, there are only 156 complete facilities in Moscow today, which is only 15.7% of the required number.

The matter of organizing sports and defense health camps for youth undergoing pre-draft training is being carried out extremely slowly. In the 1987-88 academic year, for example, only four such camps were set up in the city: in Babushkinskiy, Moskvoretskiy, Sokolnicheskiy and Oktyabrskiy rayons. In the others the field training assemblies are conducted at... permanent facilities of educational institutions. And the city military commissariate has already proposed a perfectly realistic way of

resolving the OSOL [defense sports health camps] problem, which is to use the Pioneer camps. This is all the more important when one considers the fact that up to 10% of the youth are classified as medically unfit for military service when they register with the induction sections. Furthermore, a study of the health of draftees has shown that the objective indicators have been deteriorating over the past few years. And the following fact gives pause for serious thought: of 43 new schools built and schools released after undergoing major repairs in the city in 1988, only three have swimming pools and not one has a completely equipped facility for pre-draft training classes and physical education.

[Correspondent] What can and should be done today to make progress in improving the health of draftees specifically and the condition of the draft-age youth in general? Are there reserves which should be activated immediately? I know that the military commissariate, together with the city health department, has already taken certain steps in this direction, for example.

[Klimov] Yes, that is true. Specifically, doctors designated for medical certification of draftees in 21 of the capital's rayons have begun participating directly in the transfer of adolescents from children's health clinics to adult clinics. The clinical monitoring of youth from the age of 16 has been started in 17. This makes it possible to detect illnesses in them 2-3 years before registration and to treat them in good time. So that a certain improvement in the health of the draftees can be anticipated as early as by 1990 as a result of what might appear to be insignificant measure.

But can we be satisfied with this? Of course not. The leadership of the military commissariate is trying to get pre-draft training and physical conditioning in the schools and SPTUs [special vocational and technical schools] raised from a secondary to a main training subject. This would give both the teachers and the trainees an interest in the end result. We just need a corresponding decision on the part of the State Committee for Education.

[Correspondent] I also want to mention certain figures. As you know, the training of specialists for the Armed Forces is performed by 12 educational organizations in the city. They include seven motor vehicle, one radio-electronic and one naval school, the 3rd City DOSAAF Air Club and two vocational and technical schools. The 1988 target for the preparation of specialists for the spring induction was only 96.4% met, however, the fall induction target by 94.3%. Why the shortfall? What is the cause?

[Yermilov] There are several causes. Take the 3rd City DOSAAF Air Club, for example. It has two fields of training: parachute and airborne. And we meet our targets each year in both. Why? Because the kids consider these fields prestigious, ordinarily leading to service in the VSV.

Then there is the radioelectronic school. It has three fields of training. The school prepares radiotelegraphists/direction finders, telegraphists and radar operators. While it has not been difficult to find students who want to study the first two subjects, there have recently been difficulties with the third. We got to the bottom of the matter. It turned out that the young people consider this to be a fairly boring, monotonous specialty, and they therefore do not like it. We found a solution. We opened a hand-to-hand combat section in the radar training division. The young people developed an interest and started coming. After all, everyone wants to be strong.

We have still not resolved a problem pertaining to the training of drivers at DOSAAF motor vehicle schools from among the students at the city's SPTUs and tekhnikums, however. The program for those schools calls for conducting part of the classes in the daytime, which disrupts the training process at the SPTUs and tekhnikums. Unfortunately, it is impossible to put together special groups at the vocational and technical schools to take direct charge of preparing specialists in their fields for the Armed Forces, because they have neither the proper facilities, nor the instructors nor the necessary programs. It would seem to be a simple thing to use the DOSAAF training materials and equipment base to provide the youth with a technical military specialty along with their main civilian specialty while they attend SPTUs. With a common goal, the partners would have to achieve mutual understanding for the good of the cause. Unfortunately, however, one can only dream of this right now. Once again, departmental interests run counter to the state's.

[Correspondent] How well the future soldiers and seamen are trained depends directly upon who actually performs the work. Unfortunately, the prestige of being an officer has dropped markedly today. There were many causes. In the first place, there are unquestionably major flaws in the education of the upcoming generation. But other factors have played and continue to play an important role. Among other things, shortcomings in the financial and general support of the officers. And it is to some degree not surprising that some of our youth have been drawn to the easy money of the cooperative, into the arena of individual entrepreneurial activity, while a number of military schools have a shortage....

[Bespalov] Yes, unfortunately, interest in becoming an officer has indeed decreased today in a significant part of the youth. This leads one to some distressing thoughts pertaining primarily to major errors both in the financial support for the officers and in the area of education of the upcoming generation. The position taken by a large portion of the mass information and propaganda media is also unquestionably having a large influence. It disarms the youth morally, develops a spirit of passiveness among them and gives the youth a negative attitude toward the service and toward the officer's profession. Even with the warming of the international climate,

however, we continue to need a strong army and navy capable of reliably protecting the nation from its foes. Imperialism's aggressive nature is still a reality with which we have to reckon.

[Klimov] It would not be practical today, of course, to attempt to surround the Armed Forces with an impenetrable curtain of secrecy as in the past. Things interfering with the restructuring in the forces and holding up the process of democratizing army and navy life absolutely must be rooted out relentlessly. This includes such a detrimental thing as "the old ways." We do not need to savor the negative elements, however, and not use them merely as established facts. It needs to be demonstrated that "the old ways" will inevitably lead those who want to base their relations with colleagues on it into court. The youth will then once again enter the service without misgivings and will want to become officers.

[Correspondent] If we are going to discuss the end results of the work performed to select candidates for military educational institutions, we cannot avoid the fact that for all of the reasons cited above the Moscow Military Commissariat has not once met the targets set for it during the past 8 years....

[Yermilov] Unfortunately, that is so. There were a great many factors involved. The fact that these targets have constantly increased, the fact that Moscow is a unique city—more precisely, a city with over 60 VUZs providing young people with broad opportunities for selecting a profession. What is not understandable is what considerations made it necessary to make changes in the decree on the procedure for registering reserve officers in the capital. Did you read Colonel (reserve) Krasovskiy's article "About 'My Corner'" in PRAVDA in October of last year? It seems that only officers and... recidivists do not have the right to return home to Moscow. I am certain that this prospect squelched the desire of more than one young man to enter a military school. And then many parents are against it today. I consider the decision to be fundamentally incorrect, and it should be revised as soon as possible.

[Bespalov] I agree with Nikolay Ilich. It should also be mentioned, however, that despite everything, there are still those who want to devote their lives to the officer's profession. And the work of revealing them at the schools begins as soon as the youth complete the 8th grade. Then, all of them go through a selection process when they are registered with the induction sections. Along with out associates, representatives of the military schools always take part in it. A precise orientation toward a specific troop arm or branch of the Armed Forces is developed in the youth.

The children of servicemen account for around 70% of those we select for military educational institutions, 15% are the children of intelligentsia, and the same percentage are the children of workers. The vast majority of the candidates are graduates of secondary schools. Less than



half of the candidates successfully pass the professional-psychological screening at the military schools themselves, however. Because of the large targets, we therefore fill out documents on practically every individual expressing a desire to become an officer. This sometimes results in rejects. Last year alone more than 30 Muscovites were returned from various schools because of a disinclination to study or a lack of discipline.

And so, with a consistent increase in and failure to meet the targets for selecting candidates for the nation's military educational institutions, the professional-psychological orientation loses all meaning, since the rayon military commissariats are forced to register all those who want it and not just the more worthy. This runs counter to the contemporary demands for improved training of the officer corps for the Armed Forces.

**Our information:** Each year, during the registration at induction sections, many city youths are classified as unsuitable for military schools for reasons of health, particularly the military educational institutions which train pilots. At the same time, the targets "sent down" to the military commissariat for the selection of candidates have constantly grown: by almost 10% in 1986 over the 1985 figure, approximately 13% in 1987, and almost 20% in 1988. The target for selection of candidates for military schools was met by 81% in 1987; by only 57% in 1988. Of the youth selected from Moscow last year 24% were not permitted to take the entrance exams for various reasons.

[Correspondent] And how are things with the induction for active first-term service? We know that it is easier for those who find in it a conformity to their interests, aspirations and calling. The readers of our magazine are interested in just how the Moscow City Military Commissariat conducts the professional-psychological selection of future fightingmen.

[Yermilov] This is a very important problem. To be perfectly frank, however, we are still merely at the start of its scientific resolution. Although specially equipped offices have been set up for the professional-psychological selection at the city assembly point and in certain rayon military commissariats, unfortunately they do not yet exist everywhere. Corresponding methods based on a testing system have also been worked out.

We do indeed attempt to take into maximum consideration in the selection process the civilian specialty of the draftees, their interests and inclinations. The crucial factor is still each individual's state of health, however. And so, the selection process takes into account primarily the draftee's health, the specialty he has acquired, his interests and inclinations, and, naturally, our possibilities with respect to the target we have been assigned. One has to consider also the fact that the Armed Forces have dozens of specialties with no counterparts in the national economy. Gunner, machine-gunner, grenade launcher, gun-layer and others, for example. On the other hand, we cannot send all of the student draftees from the Moscow

Motor Vehicle and Highway Institute and the Moscow Institute of Automotive Mechanics into the Motor Vehicle Troops, for example, all of those from the Moscow Civil Engineering Institute into construction, or all those from the Moscow Institute of RR Transportation Engineering into the Rail-road Troops. We try to do so, however, I repeat. Unfortunately, circumstances still sometimes overwhelm us.

It is clear, however, that an enormous amount of information must be acquired and processed in order to use the skills acquired by the youth in civilian life and thoroughly consider their interests and inclinations in the military situation. Like many other city military commissariats, ours simply must have electronic computers for accomplishing this. Unfortunately, however, we do not have them, and it is difficult to say whether we will have them in the near future.

[Correspondent] Some of the young people today have approximately this attitude: Why prepare to defend the homeland when we are reducing the Armed Forces? This is particularly true for the members of various kinds of "unsanctioned associations." One naturally wonders what kind of work you perform with the "unsanctioned association" members and in contact with whom.

[Klimov] If I am not mistaken, Moscow has around 2,000 various unsanctioned associations. Unfortunately, far from all of these associations have been properly studied, and we do not have any kind of methodological or other information for conducting specific educational work with their members in the area of focused preparation for the military service. For now only the Komsomol gorkom and raykoms are working with the "unsanctioned," and not very successfully at that. To tell the truth, our military commissariat has not even initiated this kind of work. We do not have the personnel for that. It would be more than we could handle. We, the rayon military commissariats, need specialists in the field. Otherwise, it would not be working with the "unsanctioned," but a profanation. And this would not help to improve the caliber of the draftees. We will unquestionably think about it, though, and will do something. A start has to be made.

**A small depiction pertaining to this problem:** The young fellow was looking for his group. With the crowd which had arrived at Moscow's assembly point on open-door day it was not difficult to become lost. There was a sort of indifferent look on his face as he looked, though. Something told me that life had rolled over the youth. We began to talk. His name was Roman Pavlov, an unemployed graduate of Construction Vocational and Technical School No. 195. This is what he told me about himself:

"To tell the truth, it is not clear what my father does. To be precise, he 'skips' from one cooperative to another, doing this and that. Mama is sick. I also have a brother.

He is older than I. He has already served in the military. I don't remember the branch. He returned 2 years ago from Chita. He spoke poorly of the army.

"At one time I was active in sports, in free-style wrestling. I injured my neck, though, four vertebrae at once. I had to give up wrestling, even though I still like sports. I lift weights and play soccer with the fellows every Sunday. At one time I drank a lot. I stopped, though. I woke up with a hangover once and said to myself: 'Stop! Enough!' I became a heavy metal fan, but not for long. It lasted only a year. I then became a 'punk' for around 6 months. This"—he indicated the typical haircut, high behind the ears—"is all that is left of that time. I do not want to serve, but I know I have to." Do you have a girlfriend? "I have a lot of them. One of them is Natalya. I won't tell you her last name. She works at an automatic telephone exchange. She came to see me off."

[Correspondent] How do you detect among the draftees individuals inclined to use alcohol, drugs and other toxic substances, those who have police records or have served time? You have to admit, after all, that this is the group which creates the most problems for commanders and political workers in the army and navy and who commit the lion's share of infractions of discipline, crimes and accidents.

[Yermilov] These individuals are detected mainly through the internal affairs agencies and the drug-treatment and psychoneurological clinics, when the draftees are screened by officers and warrant officers with the military commissariats. In 1988, for example, 7% of those called up were registered with the minors' sections at police stations. More than 1,000 were on the records at drug-treatment clinics. More than 1% of those sent into the army had been in court. Another 400 were under investigation during the induction period. I would add that these figures, unfortunately, are growing.

Just a few years ago these figures were simply concealed. People did write and talk about the alcoholics, to be sure. But there was total silence, as they say, with respect to the drug addicts and abusers of toxic substances. And what was the result? We are now reaping the harvest of self-deceit, because we were not prepared to resolve the problem. And we express surprise at what is going on in the army and navy. We send reports on these draftees to their future stations.

[Correspondent] And now this question: Where do you find your workers? Let us frankly admit that the military commissariat was previously considered to be a "back-water" or an assignment for... failures. Many were assigned there as a last resort. Everything depended upon the kind of military commissariat it was, where it was located and in what city. Has the situation changed today, or is it the same? That is very important, after all, because the caliber of the draftees depends in great part upon those primarily charged with seeing to it, the workers in the military commissariats.

[Bespalov] A large number of officers have been assigned to the rayon military commissariats from among the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. As a rule, these are people who have received wounds or contusions in battle or have been disabled, people who have combat experience but who for reasons of health cannot serve in the forces. We have 45 of them. But there are cases in which officers who have compromised themselves, who have been brought to disciplinary or party accountability, are assigned to the military commissariats. These individuals are frequently subsequently discharged into the reserve for service incompatibility or by decision of comradely courts of honor. This was the case, for example, with Captain V. Zuyev, who had 28 disciplinary penalties and had been tried three times by a court of honor, and Captain V. Lugovkin, who was repeatedly punished for abusing alcohol. So that this is also an open question. The military commissariat should have officers who are well trained, responsible and capable of accomplishing the mission of improving the caliber of the draftees.

From the editors: This article has touched upon many important issues having to do with improving the system of education of the draftees, their pre-draft training and the training of specialists for the Armed Forces, and the selection of candidates for military educational institutions. They all demand immediate resolution, because they directly affect the situation with respect to improving the caliber of the draftees and consequently, the combat readiness and discipline of personnel of the army units and navy ships. The editors await answers to these questions, await responses to the article and sensible suggestions for eliminating the interdepartmental barriers which still exist.

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#### Pre-Draft Training Slighted at Education Conference

18010625b Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHEN-NYKH SIL* in Russian No 5, Mar 89 pp 47-50

[Letters to the editors and commentary by Lt Col V. Lutovinov, post-graduate student in the philosophy department of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, and Lt Col V. Loskutov, instructor at the Red Banner Military Institute: "How the Pre-Draft Youth Are Prepared"]

[Text] Respected editors: We read the article "Who Will Enter the Army Formation Tomorrow?" in issue No. 23 of the magazine *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* last year. It discussed the urgent need to enhance the role of the general education school in the preparation of students for military service. We know how urgent the problem is from our own experience in working with draftees. We had hoped that this would be discussed at the congress of public education workers held in December of 1988. Unfortunately, however, the resolution adopted at the congress said practically nothing about preparing the

student youth to defend the socialist homeland. Are the teachers actually not concerned about this? And not just the teachers, but all those who are responsible for educating the future fightingmen? Do the editors intend to return to this important subject?—Major N. Taltanov and Major I. Skopylatov, political workers

Young replacements arrived in our subunit in the fall of last year. How difficult it was for those who were prepared neither morally nor physically to serve in the army. It is still difficult. We shall teach them everything which a real soldier must know and be able to do, of course. How much more rapidly the development of the young fightingmen would have proceeded, however, if the schools, vocational and technical schools and tekhnikums had been more serious about preparing the youth to serve in the Armed Forces.—Senior Warrent Officer I. Garmash, Company Sergeant Major, and Junior Sergeant V. Kayzer, deputy platoon commander

The editors have received other letters like these. The editors asked Lieutenant Colonel V. Lutovinov, postgraduate student in the department of philosophy at the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, and Lieutenant Colonel V. Loskutov, instructor at the Red Banner Military Institute, who attended the congress, to respond to them and to talk about the place assigned to the preparation of students to defend the socialist homeland in the plan being worked out for developing the general education school.

The alarm perceived in the letters from readers about the inadequate moral-political, psychological and physical preparation of some of the pre-draft youth to serve in the army is near and understandable to many of those who are connected in one way or another with the training and education of personnel. There is no question that Senior Warrent Officer I. Garmash and Junior Sergeant V. Kayzer are right. The young soldiers would settle in far more rapidly in the army formation if they were better prepared to fulfill their constitutional duty prior to their induction into the army. This is an important problem. A general state problem. And the general education school, which is now at a turning point in its development, has far from the least important role in its resolution.

Let us go back several months. At that time, on the eve of the congress of public education workers, the country's public was discussing the draft of two plans for developing the general education school. Strange as it sounds, however, both of these documents and the debate which developed around them in the periodic press said practically nothing about preparing the youth for the military service and for defending the socialist homeland. It was believed that the congress would make up this omission. One cannot seriously discuss improving the educational and educational process, after all, while completely ignoring the problem of improving the

military-patriotic education and the entire system of preparing the youth for the military service which developed at the school a long time ago. Unfortunately, this did not occur.

The congress was underway. It was the first day. The problem of preparing the youth for service in the Armed Forces was not touched upon until the end of one of the sections in the report by G. Yagodin, chairman of the State Committee of the USSR for Education. Just that, touched upon. This large and complex job was constricted to a minimum and limited to a solitary training subject, the initial military training. Furthermore, maximum promotion of the physical development of the youth was declared to be almost its main purpose. Is that really the main purpose of pre-draft training. Then why was not a single word said about the restructuring? Instead of that, the well known difficulties keeping this training from being performed at a high level were listed.

It was the second day, and the delegates and guests were working in sections. There was every reason to assume that at least one out of the 15 could have been named "The Development of a Readiness to Defend the Homeland in School Children," for example. This was not just a noble desire; it was a real need, because many teachers consider this to be one of the most important areas of their teaching work. Let us take a look just at the results of a survey recently conducted by UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA, (the 17 December 1988 issue). To the question "What should the school turn out above all else?" more than 40% answered: a reliable defender of the homeland, a patriot and internationalist.

Unfortunately, the congress did not attach any importance to this problem, so important to a significant number of teachers. And to representatives of the students as well, incidentally. An organizing group for preparations for the first All-Union Rally of the Young Army Movement presented a statement to the congress which frankly stated that they "are concerned about statements presented in the press and speeches by certain public figures which demonstrate a lack of understanding and sometimes a rejection of the importance of preparing students to defend the homeland and to perform their international duty". They, the upper-class students, can see something to which the public education officials attach no importance: that the moral-psychological and physical preparation of many draftees do not measure up to current demands, that this is one of the causes of the "old ways" in the army, that military-patriotic education should be conducted during the school years and be started as early as possible. They asked all of the teachers to devote attention to it, regardless of the subject they teach. And what was the response? Participants in the section "The Humanizing of Public Education and the Balanced Development of the Individual" tried to accuse the Young Soldiers who submitted the appeal of formalism and to cast doubt upon the sincerity of what they had said from the speaker's platform.



Is it surprising that the resolution passed by the congress does not even mention such concepts as "preparation to defend the homeland," "military-patriotic education" or equivalent concepts. There was only some extremely one-sided discussion of patriotic education. First critically—to the effect that like international education, it "is conducted without taking into account the specific national traditions and culture of each republic—then pretentiously: "the education of citizens in a spirit of patriotism and socialist internationalism is the lofty duty of the Soviet school." You will agree that, not being specifically addressed, these statements do not bind very many people to anything.

One of the points did state that the State Committee intends to submit to the USSR Council of Ministers suggestions for improving the work of the departments of the military disciplines and civil defense and on the teaching of pre-draft training. But why was not a word said about how this "improvement" was to be achieved and who specifically would handle it? And why was the discussion once again only about the programs of the departments and the initial military training course at the schools, which make up only a small part of that which must be done toward educating future defenders of the homeland.

Nor was the situation any better with respect to the main document discussed at the congress and then generally approved by the delegates. It was a draft plan for general secondary education. Only the section which describes the goals of the general education school notes in passing that the stress on development of the individual helps to produce in the young generation a readiness to defend the socialist homeland. Does such a statement of fact say a great deal? Why not put it more precisely: The preparation of students to defend the homeland is one of the most important conditions for the all-around development of the individual. If the problem had been defined in precisely this way, then there is no way it could have been avoided also in other sections of the plan which discuss the makeup of the contemporary teacher and the restructuring of training forms and methods and the education system.

And so, the congress actually did little to make a task of state importance, the preparation of the upcoming generation to defend the homeland, one of the main areas of work of public education agencies in their restructuring situation. One had the impression that by ignoring the problem, workers with the USSR State Committee for Education were attempting to simplify to the maximum the long existing system of military-patriotic education of the student youth, reducing it to pre-draft training alone. But there is yet another question: Why did this indifference not evoke concern and a proper response in those agencies and organizations—and there are more than 30 of them—which are charged with preparing the upcoming generation to defend the homeland? It is perfectly apparent that this problem will not be resolved

well without close interaction between the USSR Ministry of Defense, party and soviet organs and such public organizations as the Komsomol and DOSAAF, and the public education agencies. Consolidation of efforts is needed. Mutual concern is needed. For the sake of fairness, it should be stated that the school is still not getting a fervent effort to cooperate closely in this area from its potential assistants.

Specifically, long before the congress the State Committee for Education sent an official request to the USSR Ministry of Defense for suggestions for the plan for general secondary education being worked out at that time. It received them literally only a few days before the congress opened, however. As a result, many possibilities were missed. It must also be pointed out that the military press has practically remained on the sideline from the debate which developed in the mass media on the eve of the congress. This provided cause to believe that the army is little concerned about the problems presented at the forum. Is it surprising that no military people found it possible to speak at the congress? They therefore did not exert any sort of influence on the attitude of the delegates toward the problem of preparing the student youth to defend the homeland.

But there is still time. The plan for general secondary education adopted at the congress is being refined. Only then will it be considered and approved by the All-Union Council for Education. The authors of the article would like to present for the readers' assessment a number of provisions which we feel should be reflected in the final version of the plan.

First of all, the fact should be established that preparation of the student youth to defend the socialist homeland is an inseparable component of all the preparation of the upcoming generation for an independent life and work and an important area of the training and educational process at the school and the vocational and technical school. In the development of a balanced individual the teaching collective should proceed from the constitutional tenet that defense of the socialist homeland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. In short, the plan should establish the statute on the school as on the central element in the development of a readiness in the youth to apply every effort to ensure the security of their homeland.

It is also essential, in our opinion, to state specifically that physical and labor education have a special role in the preparation of future defenders of the socialist homeland along with the pre-draft training. In the process of teaching these subjects, there needs to be a more focused effort on developing in the school children the specific skills and abilities needed by the youth for the successful performance of their military service.

Large possibilities are provided also by such extracurricular activities as defense-sports health camps, field training assemblies, military-sports games and Young Army-men's schools and clubs, conducted from the school

together with local agencies and organizations and coordinated by the ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies.

It would be useful to stress the fact that the development of patriotism and internationalism and responsibility for the nation's security in each of them is an extremely important component of the preparation of the students to defend the homeland. The practical focus of the training is oriented toward the mastery of basic military affairs by the students. They are differentiated by time into three main stages corresponding to the three school levels.

It would also be a good thing to introduce this provision. In preparing future defenders of the homeland, the public education councils rely actively on the help of party, soviet, Komsomol and economic agencies, DOSAAF, the military commissariats, military units and establishments of the USSR Ministry of Defense, conducting it comprehensively—in the moral-political, psychological, technical military and physical respects.

Finally, based on what we have said, we feel that it would be expedient to reorganize the Administration for Physical Culture and Initial Military Training of the State Committee for Education as the Administration of Training to Protect the Socialist Homeland.

These suggestions are not indisputable, of course. They demand collective discussion, refinement and additions. They also have to be closely coordinated with the corresponding sections in the draft plan. It is not even a matter of specific definitions, however, but of the idea itself. It is impossible to develop a worthy citizen of the USSR without forming in him a readiness to defend the homeland. This is why we consider it essential to stress once again that it would be incorrect to regard all of these suggestions as an attempt to impose the army's narrowly departmental interests upon the public education system. And some people have developed precisely this attitude toward them. It will be a pity if that attitude prevails. Everyone would be the loser: the students themselves, the school, the public education system as a whole and the Armed Forces, which still have a great deal to do to fill in gaps in the school education. And defending the socialist homeland is the most important cause.

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#### **Roundtable of DOSAAF Candidates for People's Deputies**

18010434 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
12 Mar 89 First Edition pp 1-2

[Discussion moderated by Lt Col S. Pashayev and Maj V. Kazakov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents, under the rubric "Candidates for Deputies at the Round Table": DOSAAF: How to Realize the Potential"]

[Text] The following candidates for people's deputies of the USSR from DOSAAF took part in the roundtable discussion arranged by the editors: A. Bragin, chairman of

a DOSAAF primary organization; M. Zokirov, chief of the technical sports club in the city of Kasansay, Uzbek SSR; Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk, twice Hero of the Soviet Union and Pilot/Cosmonaut of the USSR; Mar Avn I. Kozhedub, twice Hero of the Soviet Union; A. Kozik, chief of a model DOSAAF technical school in the city of Brest; Col Gen N. Kotlovtssev, chairman of the DOSAAF CC; Honored Sports Master L. Nemkova, absolute champion of the world, Europe and the Soviet Union; M. Simonov, holder of the Lenin Prize, chief designer at the Experimental Design Office imeni P.O. Sukhoy; V. Fesenko, chairman of the Krivoy Rog DOSAAF city committee; Col Gen N. Chekov, deputy USSR minister of defense for construction and billeting of troops; former soldier/internationalist N. Shamin, director of the Tomsk Military-Patriotic Club.

#### **Information for the Discussion:**

Today DOSAAF has 348,000 primary organizations and more than 100 million members. The society's technical assets include more than 39,000 motor vehicles and motorcycles, 20,000 carts, 52,000 amateur radio sets and around 7,000 aircraft. The society trains every third draftee, more than one half of the drivers and around 2.5 million technical specialists for the national economy.

[Moderator] The preelection platform of the candidates for people's deputies of the USSR state that DOSAAF's role and importance are increasing significantly in the situation of the restructuring taking place in the nation and in the Soviet Armed Forces. What are the priority tasks which have been moved to the fore by DOSAAF with respect to improving the military-patriotic, internationalist and physical education of the youth?

[N. Kotlovtssev] One of the main tasks, in my opinion, is that of dynamically restructuring the organization itself. Doing everything possible to achieve a situation in which initiative, energy, enterprise and even thrift determine the strategy and tactics for the society's work from now on. Substituting all of this right now for the ostentation, stagnation and adherence to hackneyed procedures, high-sounding statements and inflated figures. Unfortunately, the blight of bureaucracy and the style based on decrees and orders are still a reality in the DOSAAF work. We need to strive resolutely to eliminate all of this. And in those organizations of ours in which the restructuring has been accepted not as another propaganda campaign but as our own vital cause, changes have taken shape and results are in evidence.

[N. Chekov] I have to say that in meetings with DOSAAF activists in Simferopol, Zaporozhye and Kiev, Moscow and Kalinin oblasts I have perceived a complete understanding of the responsibility which lies with DOSAAF. People frankly say that the defense society must not only improve the preparation of the youth for the service, but must also bear direct responsibility for it. And not just with respect to developing technical and special skills in tomorrow's defenders of the homeland,

but primarily for developing in them civic-mindedness, the ability to assess events and developments in political and social life from the standpoint of the restructuring, and a willingness to defend the ideals and spiritual values of socialism.

[I. Kozhedub] In this respect, it seems to me, we have somehow dropped the prewar traditions of the nation's defense societies to some degree. And no one has relieved us of the job of developing real patriots, strong, honorable and responsible people capable of self-sacrifice; it has been and remains the priority task. I know from experience that it is not enough merely to gain an understanding of the equipment, but that it has to be mastered and that the future soldier must be able to use it in combat and have an inner conviction that the cause which we defend and for which we fight is right. This is a very important time. A paradoxical situation is developing today, however, in which we have the materials and equipment base, thoroughly conceived programs and an entire army of skilled specialists, but some of our students' hearts are filled with emptiness and ideological confusion. Now we have a group of youth committing an outrage over the graves of those who died, now a flag with the swastika, hated by the Soviet people, profaning a monument to heroes of the Patriotic War, now an outburst of "nonregulation behavior" of savage, inexplicable cruelty in an army or navy collective. Where does this come from? We certainly cannot write it all off to infantilism or the evil influence of the street. This is a facet of a large social problem. Our deputy group, I feel, must therefore vigorously engage in drawing up an objective and effective Law on the Youth. We have both a position on this matter, a set of specific recommendations....

[N. Shamin] We need such a law, of course. It should be universal and take into account not just the rights and interests of the youth, but also their duties. Right now, today, however, I think that it would be inexcusable to sit idly and wait for such a document to be passed. We need to attempt, at least within the framework of our defense society, to resolve some of the youth problems which have accumulated. And there are many. They include the difficulties which the fightingmen/internationalists encounter every day and the material situation of those who, motivated almost solely by enthusiasm, work with the kids— instructors, trainers and leaders of technical sports clubs. The housing problem is one of the most acute. And the cooperatives are beginning to take advantage of the situation to lure our best cadres away from us.

[Moderator] It is apparent today, is it not, that we cannot avoid revising even certain documents defining the status of the defense society itself and its tasks?

[N. Kotlovitsev] The defense society's tasks are defined, of course, in a decree passed by the party and the government long ago, during the years of stagnation, one might say. Many of the provisions therefore no longer conform to today's realities and need to be changed,

supplemented and revised. I repeat: we must alter not just the tactics, but also the very strategy, of the DOSAAF work. We pin great hopes on our deputies in this regard.

[V. Fesenko] They are the ones, as representatives of the highest state authority, who are in a position to eliminate the duplicate machinery in the functioning of party, soviet, Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations, public education agencies and military commissariats. They should be linked and coordinated. Otherwise, we constantly talk about concern for the youth, but when it comes right down to it we cannot jointly resolve even the most elementary question. Here is an example. We decided to build ourselves parachute towers; they once existed in every city park. We worked out a plan and compiled the estimate, but we were unable to build them in Krivoy Rog because of departmental leapfrogging and disunity. No metal was available. And this, in a city of metallurgists!

[L. Nemkova] Speaking of improving the preparation of the youth for the service, one could not fail to mention their physical conditioning, their preparedness and their ability to withstand the moral and physical pressures. In meetings with electors I have more than once heard reproaches leveled at us on this account. They were justified, by the way. Time and again they try to push physical culture into the background at school, and our sports and technical sports sections are gradually turning into quasi-professional clubs for the development of masters. It is painful and offensive for me, a representative of a technical sport, to hear this. There is no way to oppose it, however. The situation has been exacerbated by the fact that the publicizing—the advertising, if you like—of the technical sports is way back at the cave-man level.

[Moderator] That reproach is leveled primarily at the press. And it is justified in part. But do the society's capabilities measure up to the current tasks?

[P. Klimuk] Problems pertaining to the materials and equipment base need serious discussion. It depends upon what we compare the current base with. If it is with what we had in the '60s, the difference is like night and day, but then we cannot prepare the youth for the service by looking back; we need to look ahead. We are restructuring the development of the defense society, converting its development from the extensive, price-is-no-object approach to the intensive, economical path and orienting the army and navy toward quality parameters in the combat training, the service and mastery of the equipment. We cannot do this without the proper base.

[A. Kozik] I have to agree. In many cases our technical training base is outmoded, extremely so when it comes to the equipment present in the forces today. Not to speak of the fact that in Belorussia, for example, we have many DOSAAF technical schools, but only three dormitories for housing the students. The youth are forced to rent a



place in private homes. What kind of indoctrination can we achieve if they are outside the control and care of teachers and instructors most of the time?

[P. Klimuk] The trouble is, however, that DOSAAF cannot get out of the situation by itself. Not in its present condition, at any rate.

[M. Simonov] Up to now we have discussed only one aspect of the problem. There is another, however. Just who should, who is obligated to provide DOSAAF with the modern equipment? Take air sports, for example. I will not be revealing any big secret when I say that both the designing and the construction of planes and gliders are carried out here practically on a volunteer basis. There is not a plant or even a more or less decent workshop engaged in the mass production of flight equipment for sports. The aircraft enterprises which receive orders from DOSAAF are quite simply not interested in producing it.

[N. Kotlovtssev] We need a production base if we do not want to lose our prestige. After all, our aviation has aircraft measuring up to world standards....

[M. Simonov] Which, incidentally, are in fairly big demand in the world market. They are prepared to pay us for it with currency. Air clubs of Italy, Switzerland, France, the USA and certain other nations are prepared to put out \$200,000 or more for the SU-26 aircraft, for example. We do nothing, however. Are we waiting for the price to fall, or something? We are brushing aside real money. On the other hand, we are eager to sell Soviet passenger cars for next to nothing on the foreign market, and DOSAAF cannot even acquire them for itself. I am convinced that the specialists now working on plans for converting military manufacturing have something to think about in this respect.

[A. Bragin] We do not understand commercial matters nor know how to make good use of funds. And how they would come in handy for modernizing the motorcycle industry, let us say. The sports models produced by Soviet industry do not satisfy our needs. You will not set even an oblast record with them, let alone a world record.

[Moderator] We have to some degree touched upon the problem of establishing closer relations and interaction between the army and the volunteer society. We have not exhausted the subject, however. The *Krasnaya Zvezda* editors receive letters complaining, as an example, about the poor training of your graduates, particularly the drivers, about the fact that they are frequently used not

in their field. Millions of the people's rubles are wasted as a result. How do you candidates for people's deputies of the USSR view these problems?

[N. Kotlovtssev] Unfortunately, the level of training of drivers for the army, especially at a number of schools in Central Asia, does in fact not stand up to criticism. I want to say, however, that we are even now taking steps to rectify this situation. Serious steps. The teaching staff has been beefed up, and the school motor vehicle pools are being augmented with modern equipment and technical training facilities. The monitoring of final exams has been made more stringent. With respect to the use of our specialists, this question is presently being resolved in close cooperation with pertinent agencies of the USSR Ministry of Defense. We have clarifications and direct instructions on the matter from the Minister of Defense, but let us be frank and say that we have also committed blunders and that there are unutilized channels for communicating with the military commissariats. Moreover, a scarcity of information is making itself felt.

[Moderator] There are presently more than 100 million people in the DOSAAF ranks. Does this magnitude ultimately affect how well the draftees are prepared for the military service? Has the number not become the goal in and of itself?

[M. Zorikov] I would say that the time when DOSAAF tried to embrace the entire population is receding into the past. It is receding, I want to stress, but has not disappeared. There is another danger, however: that we might in fact restrict our focus to the champions to the detriment of those for whom our clubs and sections can and must be a school for acquiring technical knowledge and job orientation and simply a place for communicating with peers. The right conditions are needed for this too, however. The youth today are not interested in merely hearing about the equipment; there must be an adequate quantity of equipment in each primary organization. We have no rights either financially or legally, however. Our requisitions to industry are not filled for years on end. I would cite the following example. For several years talks have been underway about mass-producing the PVSh (school air rifle). Incidentally, KRA-SNAYA ZVEZDA has written about this. There has still been no intelligible response from the Ministry of the Defense Industry, however.

[N. Kotlovtssev] All that we have discussed is only part of the restructuring which has begun in DOSAAF, of course. We are revising our organizational structure and reducing the administrative apparatus. A number of steps are directed toward the introduction of economic incentives. The deputy group will make every effort, of course, to bolster the process of restructuring in DOSAAF and return its prestige to its former popularity.

**Rules for Acceptance to Officers' Schools,  
Aviation Schools Noted**  
18010498 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 30 Mar 89 p 4

[Unsigned Article: "Rules for Acceptance to Military Educational Institutions"]

[Text] Warrant officers on active military service in the USSR Armed Forces, compulsory and extended service personnel, military construction workers, civilian youth, reservists from among compulsory service personnel discharged into the reserves, graduates of the Suvorov military schools, the Nakhimov Naval School, the Moscow Military Musical School, and specialized boarding schools with extensive Russian language study and intensified military-physical training, who have completed secondary (secondary specialized) education, and whose state of health is suitable, are accepted into military educational institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Warrant officers are accepted at the end of two years of service in positions of warrant officers, or officers' positions; extended service personnel are accepted after two years of extended service; compulsory service personnel and military construction personnel are accepted regardless of their military specialty and time in service. All of these categories of military personnel, as well as military reservists from among those compulsory service personnel discharged in the reserves, are accepted up to age 23. Civilian youth are accepted at ages 17 to 21. The age of those entering military educational institutions is determined as of 1 September of the year they begin study.

Compulsory service military personnel, and youth from among komsomol activists, public minded individuals or those having work experience, who are CPSU members, CPSU candidate members, or komsomol members, at the recommendation of Soviet Army and Navy political organs, or CPSU raykoms (gorkoms) and komsomol raykoms (gorkoms) respectively, are accepted into higher military-political schools. Compulsory service military personnel, military reservists from among compulsory service personnel discharged into the reserves, civilian youth from among komsomol activists, and public minded individuals who are CPSU members or candidate members, or komsomol members, on the recommendations of garrison (formation) military prosecutors, are accepted into the military law faculty of the Military Institute.

Compulsory service military personnel and civilian youth who have honorary sports titles, or no lower than skill category 2 in one of the types of sports, and warrant officers and extended service personnel in no lower than skill category 1, are accepted into the Military Institute for Physical Culture. Warrant officers and compulsory and extended service personnel submit a request through command channels to the military unit commander before 1 April of the year of entry; persons from among

civilian youth, and military reservists, submit a request to the rayon (city) military commissariat at their place of residence before 1 May of the year of entry.

The report of a military person indicates: military rank, last name, first name, middle name, position occupied, year and month of birth, education (general and military), and name of military educational institution (faculty) that the individual desires to enter. To the request are attached: copies of documents on education, party recommendation (for CPSU members and candidate members) or komsomol recommendation (for komsomol members), three authenticated photographs (without head cover, 4.5 x 6 cm), recommendation (for compulsory service personnel) autobiography, and service card. Originals of education documents are presented to the VUZ reception commission upon arrival.

Statements of civilian youth indicate: last name, first name and middle name, year and month of birth, address of place of residence, and name of military educational institution (faculty) that the individual desires to enter. To this statement are attached: an autobiography, recommendations from the place of work or study, in the form of the Rules of Acceptance, party recommendation (for CPSU members and candidate members) or komsomol recommendation, copy of the document on secondary education (students in secondary schools present a certificate about their ongoing success), three photographs (without head cover, 4.5 x 6 cm).

Passport, military service card or draft registration certificate, and the original document on secondary education, are given to the acceptance commission of the military educational institution upon arrival.

Compulsory service personnel of all USSR Armed Services and branches of arms, selected as candidates for attendance at military educational institutions, are sent to 25-day training assemblies, held in the military districts and groups of forces, from 5 through 30 June of the year of admittance for study. At the assemblies the candidates are prepared to enter the military educational institutions, and there is a preliminary professional selection, in the course of which the commission selects candidates for study on the basis of the results of a second medical examination, they are tested in drills, physical training and regulations, a discussion is held on subjects submitted to for the entrance exams, and there is a test of knowledge of Russian language (writing a dictation).

Preliminary professional selection to military educational institutions of candidates from among civilian youth is conducted by rayon (city) draft boards before 15 May of the year of entry for study.

Compulsory and extended service personnel, and warrant officers, are sent to the military educational institutions for professional selection and to take the entrance

exams, to arrive no later than 5 July of the year of admittance for study, directly from the places where the preliminary professional selection was held.

The chiefs of military educational institutions report to the candidates before 30 June of the year of admittance for study, through the military commissariats, about the time and place that candidates from among civilian youth are to arrive for professional selection.

Candidates who have arrived at the military educational institutions undergo professional selection, which includes an assessment of social and political activeness and moral qualities, state of health (taking into account psychological data), physical readiness, and general educational preparation.

General educational preparation is assessed at profile (competitive) exams, which are evaluated according to a "five," "four," "three," "two" grading system, as well as at exams with a two grade evaluation of "satisfactory" and "unsatisfactory," in the following disciplines:

- at engineering faculties of some military academies in groups made up of compulsory service personnel, military reservists who have served their active duty, and civilian youth: in Russian language and literature (written), mathematics (written), physics, USSR history, and foreign language;
- at higher command, command-engineering, and engineering schools, schools for pilots and navigators, naval schools, and the majority of other higher military schools, and at the Military Engineering Institute imeni A. F. Mozhayskiy: in Russian language and literature (written), mathematics (written), physics, and USSR history. At the Yaroslavl Higher Military Finance School imeni Arm Gen A. V. Khrulev, instead of the physics exam candidates take a mathematics exam (oral).
- at higher military political schools: in Russian language and literature (written), mathematics, geography, and USSR history. Persons entering the Lvov Higher Military Political School, instead of a mathematics exam, take an oral exam in Russian language and literature, and are interviewed on their selected specialty;
- at higher military chemical defense schools, rear services schools, and the Ulyanov Higher Military Technical School imeni Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy: in Russian language and literature (written), mathematics (written), chemistry, and USSR history;
- at secondary military schools: in Russian language and literature (written), and mathematics.

Candidates entering the Military Institute are tested in Russian language and literature (written and oral), USSR history, and a foreign language; those entering the Military Institute for Physical Culture are tested in Russian language and literature (written), USSR history, biology, physical culture and sport (practical); those entering the Military Conductors' Faculty at the Moscow State Conservatory imeni P. I. Chaykovskiy take an exam in Russian language and literature (written) harmony and scales, USSR history, instrument of the military orchestra, and conducting (practical).

Exams that are evaluated according to a two grade system include: USSR history (except for higher military political schools), mathematics (in higher military political schools), oral exam in Russian language and literature at the Lvov Higher Military Political School, and foreign language (in the engineering faculties of certain military academies).

Heroes of the Soviet Union and heroes of socialist labor are enrolled in all military educational institutions without having general educational knowledge tested, if all the other requirements of professional selection are met. Graduates of the Suvorov military schools, and the Nakhimov Naval School, are enrolled in military schools and institutes (except for the Military Institute). Graduates of special boarding schools with extensive Russian language study and intensive military-physical culture training of the pupils are sent by military commissariats for enrollment in military schools; graduates of the Moscow Military Musical School are enrolled in the Military Conductors' Faculty at the Moscow State Conservatory imeni P. I. Chaykovskiy;

—Persons who have completed secondary school with a gold or silver medal, or secondary special educational institutions, or secondary vocational-technical schools, with a diploma "with distinction," are enrolled in secondary military schools.

Persons who have completed the first or subsequent courses of civilian VUZes, in specialties that correspond to the profile of the given military educational institution, and who meet the other requirements of professional selection, may be enrolled in the first course in higher and secondary military schools, and military institutes, without a test of knowledge in general educational disciplines, after an appropriate interview. If the profile does not correspond, the candidates take the exams in the usual way. The chairman of the acceptance (republic acceptance) commission decides whether an interview will be held or exams taken.

Admittances of this category of persons for professional selection and enrollment as candidates for study are carried out in the basis of a copy of, or excerpt from, the order on the civilian VUZ, about the granting of academic leave.



Warrant officers, compulsory and extended service personnel, and persons from among civilian youth, awarded a gold or silver medal upon completion of secondary school, or who completed secondary specialized educational institutions, or secondary vocational-technical schools, with a diploma "with distinction," and who satisfy all the other requirements for entry into military educational institutions, take one exam, determined by the chief of the military educational institution, on the profile discipline. If these persons receive a mark of "five" in the profile discipline, they are excused from further exams and are enrolled in the VUZ on a non-competitive basis; if they receive marks of "four" or "three" they also take exams in all other disciplines.

Persons from among the indigenous nationalities of the union republics, by direction of the republic commissions, are admitted into military educational institutions on a non-competitive basis, based on the results of professional selection, if favorable assessments are obtained in general educational disciplines; candidates from among orphan youth or those left without the guardianship of parents are admitted in this way into military schools.

Candidates are enrolled on a competitive basis into places remaining after enrollment of those persons who have the right to enter without entrance exams and on a non-competitive basis. In conducting the competition, social and political activeness, moral qualities, and state of health (taking psychological data into account), level of physical preparedness, and general educational preparation are considered.

Preference in the competition is enjoyed by:

- persons awarded orders and medals of the USSR: "For Valor," "Ushakov," "For Military Services," and "Nakhimov," as well as military personnel who have displayed high morale and fighting qualities in defending the USSR, and in fulfilling their international duty;
- candidates from among civilian youth who have practical work experience of no less than one year, and compulsory service personnel who have served no less than one year.

The competition of candidates from among civilian youth, and that of military personnel, is held separately.

The acceptance commissions of military educational institutions conduct the work of professional selection with warrant officers, compulsory and extended service personnel, and civilian youth, from 10 through 30 July. Republic acceptance commissions will be at work from 5 through 25 July.

All candidates who have arrived at military educational institutions are provided a free residence (barracks), training aids and literature, and candidates from among compulsory service military personnel and civilian youth, in addition, are given free meals, according to the established norm.

Detailed information about military educational institutions and the rules of acceptance can be obtained at military unit headquarters, or in military commissariats.

**TYUMEN HIGHER MILITARY ENGINEER COMMAND SCHOOL** imeni Mar Eng Trps A. I. Proshlyakov (625028, Tyumen-28). Term of study—4 years.

**ARMAVIR HIGHER MILITARY AVIATION RED BANNER SCHOOL FOR PILOTS** imeni Chief Mar Avn P. S. Kutakhov (352918, Armavir, Krasnodar Kray). Term of study—4 years.

**KAMYSHIN HIGHER MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COMMAND SCHOOL** (403850, Kamyshin-10, Volgograd Oblast).

**VASILKOV MILITARY AVIATION TECHNICAL SCHOOL** imeni 50th Anniversary of Lenin's Komsomol of the Ukraine (255130, Vasilkov-S, Kiev Oblast). Term of study—3 years.

**KRASNODAR HIGHER MILITARY COMMAND ENGINEERING ROCKET FORCES SCHOOL** (350090, Krasnodar, 267 Severnaya Street). Term of study—5 years.

**STAVROPOL HIGHER MILITARY ENGINEERING COMMUNICATIONS SCHOOL** imeni 60th Anniversary of Great October (355028, Stavropol, 2 Artema Street). Term of study—5 years.

**Lobov on Development of Strategy in 20's, 30's**  
00010008z Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY  
ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 89 (signed to press  
25 Jan 89) pp 41-50

[Article, published under the heading "Military Science: People and Problems," by Col Gen V.N. Lobov: "Timely Questions in the Development of the Theory of Soviet Military Strategy in the 1920's to the mid-1930's"]

[Text] The Soviet theory of strategy, in being founded on Marxist-Leninist teachings and in drawing on the rich military experience of the past, developed with unusual strength in the 1920's. The period of the 1920's and the start of the 1930's represented the establishing of the Soviet theory of strategy. At this time the foundation was laid for the development of Soviet strategic thought and the areas were designated for its subsequent development and advance.

The 20's and the beginning of the 30's are of particular significance in the history of the development of our military theory. Precisely during these years, its methodological bases were established, content was defined and the first Soviet military scientific personnel was created. This period was marked by a diversity of military strategic research, by a boldness of conclusions and generalizations, by high professionalism and content on the part of the authors of the military scientific works. A characteristic trait of those times was the stormy military theoretical debates the predominant theme of which was the questions of the development of strategy. This was, as the documents of those times show, a free exchange of opinions marked by a depth of judgments, by freedom of thought, and by a reticence to claim absolute truth and this, as was pointed out by the former participants of these debates, "was no longer to be found in any stage of the subsequent development of Soviet military theory."<sup>1</sup>

The period of the 1920's up to the mid-1930's provides a vivid picture of extensive research work, broad creative thinking and important principled decisions on elaborating the questions of the development of the theory of strategy. Without this period, it would be impossible to imagine the further development of Soviet military theory.

The history of Soviet military thought, unfortunately, has still not been given a complete treatment in our military science. At the same time, precisely the study of the history of military thought helps us seek out and find answers to the most crucial questions of military theory. Without a knowledge of the historical roots and without knowing that situation in which one or another theoretical concept was formed, it is hard at times to foresee its correct further development. It is generally recognized that the basis for the elaboration of major military theoretical problems the importance of which is extremely significant now was established in the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's. All of this applies fully to the Soviet theory of strategy.

History was to develop in such a manner that many strategic views on the part of Soviet military theorists have reclaimed a right to existence only after scores of years. In this context, it is extremely important to refer as often as possible to the sources of the development of our military science.

Since research on the strategic views of the prominent military leaders and military theorists in the 20's and 30's is a separate independent subject, within the context of the given article I would like to take up a review of certain publications and manuscripts which up to the present have been little known or unknown for the reader.

Of great interest is the previously unpublished work of B.M. Shaposhnikov "Abris sovremennoy strategii" [Outline of Modern Strategy]. Written in 1923, it is a critical analysis of the then known lectures on strategy by A.M. Zayonchkovskiy. The basic provisions of this work make it possible more clearly to understand the content of the debates over strategy and where B.M. Shaposhnikov was an active participant.

The author of the "Abris," having posed the question of on what material one should construct a strategy of the future, said: "...We have considered it a profound error to base conclusions on a future strategy on 'the times of Ochakov and the conquest of the Crimea,' in avoiding the harsh judgments of Clausewitz who felt such excursions into the area of ancient history to be 'patterned patches superimposed on scandalous tears' and the absence 'in a majority of an honest desire to persuade and instruct'."

This methodological provision proposed by B.M. Shaposhnikov is extremely pertinent as it shows that the initial historical material which forms strategy ultimately is constantly in development and changing and that it will lead unconditionally to changes in strategic views.

A particular subject of the "Abris" was the problem of the relationship between policy and strategy. The polemical nature of the work and the broad scope of the subject as proposed by A.M. Zayonchkovskiy in his lectures made it possible to B.M. Shaposhnikov to examine the relationship of policy and strategy from different, at times unexpected, aspects. In correcting Zayonchkovskiy who did not always consistently carry out the notion of the primacy of policy in relation to strategy, B.M. Shaposhnikov reaches extensive conclusions and generalizations.

Like A.M. Zayonchkovskiy, the author of the "Abris" considers it valid to divide the process of "preparation" for a war into the "strategy of the state" and the "strategy of the command," and the latter, undoubtedly, is subordinate to the former. He emphasizes that in the period of preparing for a war, the relationship of policy and strategy "must be spoken of first of all."

In the opinion of B.M. Shaposhnikov, the basis of everything should be the "war plan" understood in the broad sense as the state's preparations for a war in all regards. "The essence of a modern war plan," he said, "consists precisely in drawing up the views on the conduct of the war as a whole and a portion of which comprises the indispensable work of the High Command."

Here it is wise to emphasize that B.M. Shaposhnikov was against dividing the political and military aspects of a war plan. He felt that work on such a plan was a task for both the politicians and the military. The integration of political and military vision into unified strategic views—this is what B.M. Shaposhnikov demanded from the military, in emphasizing that "a military leader should be a state figure and not merely an adviser on military affairs." At the same time, he did not see any particular advantages of the strategist over the politician and pointed out that "the best conclusion is a harmony of work and not the passing from hand to hand of one or another question of the war."

Shaposhnikov was an active supporter of the notion that "preparation for a war is a concern of the entire state." Here a particular role is assigned to the strategist. "It seems to us," he emphasized, "that the activities of a strategist should be aimed at daily intervention into the work of the remaining state bodies, being concerned with one high goal of ensuring readiness for the war."

One of the most important tasks for the strategist, in the opinion of B.M. Shaposhnikov, is involvement in establishing the optimum sizes of a state's armed forces in peacetime. Shaposhnikov felt that the basis of such a choice and justification should be "goals of an international nature" and the international situation. In developing his views on this question, the author favored a militia type army, feeling that "in our days militia armies should be considered by us as a permanent factor in a future conflict and should not be an exception and an indication of the state's weakness."

In relying on an analysis of historical patterns, Shaposhnikov critically assessed the views of A.M. Zayonchkovskiy concerning the relationship of a "offensive strategy" and a "defensive strategy." The author of the "Abris" pointed out that "policy should unconditionally influence the nature of a war, making it either offensive or defensive." This viewpoint by Shaposhnikov is fundamental to the harsh criticism which B.M. Shaposhnikov subjected to the views of A.M. Zayonchkovskiy concerning the primacy of the offensive over the defensive as Zayonchkovskiy felt that "an offensive strategy is a natural type of military art as it corresponds to the nature of war."

In contradistinction to A.M. Zayonchkovskiy, the author of the "Abris" did not absolutize the offensive, seeing not only its positive aspects but also the negative ones. B.M. Shaposhnikov felt that there could be neither a pure offensive or a pure defensive. He emphasized that

"in a war, the offensive and defensive are intertwined and it is impossible to recommend only an offensive and may even be harmful." Here the critics shared the viewpoint of A.A. Svechin that "a defensive is a very strong form of waging war." B.M. Shaposhnikov advised the author "to gain a good feeling for this and with the light touch of a Suvorov not to label in our days the defensive as 'false' and 'eradicate the spirit of the defensive' from the Red Army."

Judging from the examined work, B.M. Shaposhnikov in the debate on the offensive and defensive held a centrist position, rejecting equally extreme viewpoints, although he was inclined in favor of the defensive. As a whole, his view on this problem is clearly illustrated by his own words that he considers "one strategy essential and that is the 'strategy of common sense' which is of 'two types,' a military-political offensive and a military-political defensive."

It is very indicative that B.M. Shaposhnikov was against any strategic routines or "systems" of strategy. He emphasized that "there are not different 'systems' of strategy which could be recommended for the conduct of a war, but each military leader, in studying the essence of a war and in comprehending its development in his contemporary age, works out his own 'beat' as a result of his practical and scientific work."

An examination of the strategic views of B.M. Shaposhnikov can be continued from the example of a critical analysis made by him of the report of A.A. Svechin "Budushchaya voyna" [Future War]. Addressed to the people's commissar of defense, the report by the professor of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Military Academy raised very important theoretical and practical questions of strategy: concerning the nature of a future war, concerning the make-up of the coalition opposing the USSR and concerning the tasks of the Red Army in the first operations of the war. In our view, from these and other questions raised by A.A. Svechin and B.M. Shaposhnikov, it is wise to point out the most pertinent ones.

First of all, A.A. Svechin raised the question of the underestimation of a strategic defensive which was indispensable for the Red Army given the coalition war against the USSR. The view of Prof Svechin came down to the fact that a strategic offensive on one sector of the front should be supported by a defensive on the remainder. "The disdain for the defensive noted in the Red Army," writes A.A. Svechin, "is based upon a miscomprehension of the dialectical link between them: the one who is unable to defend itself will also be unable to advance."

B.M. Shaposhnikov recognizes the valid criticism of A.A. Svechin, emphasizing: "It must not be concealed that in recognizing the defensive as an equal type of action with the offensive, we are moving along a slow evolutionary path. The defensive is more difficult than the offensive and our units do not do well on the defensive." At the same time, the chief of the RKKA



Staff felt that "revolutionary armies in the course of history have always advanced better than defending themselves" and for this reason "it is essential to consider the essence of the Red Army and not deprive it of its spirit."

The political subtext of the ideas of B.M. Shaposhnikov concerning strategy is even more vividly, in our view, reflected in that portion of his critical review where he accuses A.A. Svechin of adhering to a "strategy of attrition, a strategy with limited goals, a strategy of major paths to the goal." Soviet authors on the problems of strategy have repeatedly turned to the debates of the 20's and 30's on the strategy of attrition and the strategy of active defeat. Nevertheless, we feel that the form of this debate did not always make it possible to examine its content completely and thoroughly.

In agreeing that a future war would be a coalition one, A.A. Svechin and B.M. Shaposhnikov, regardless of the fact that they were adherents of different strategic views, felt that the USSR could sustain a victory in such a war only by an offensive. However, they conceived of the goal of the offensive differently. Thus, A.A. Svechin felt that "the task of Red strategy in the initial period of a war consists in picking out the weakest point in the system of the configuration of enemy fronts, to achieve a dependable and major success and quickly regain the freedom of maneuver of the main forces." Here the enemy's main forces must be tied down by a defensive and, having ground them down and bled them white and having seized the initiative, to go over to the offensive and bring about the final rout.

Conversely, B.M. Shaposhnikov proved that "a war must commence with the defeat of the strongest and most dangerous enemy and not be diverted by successes over a weak one leaving the stronger to hang over one's neck." In the line of argument of B.M. Shaposhnikov, in addition to the strictly military considerations, political ones are also present. He wrote: "It must not be forgotten that for the resolution of a war, it is important to have not only military successes but also obtain a political success, that is, win a victory over a politically important enemy.... Otherwise, only after an extended period accompanied even by military successes, we will be forced to return to the same fight against the main enemy against which we initially were only on the defensive."

As is seen from the given viewpoints, the essence of the debate over a strategy of attrition and a strategy of active defeat was somewhat more complicated than is usually felt. It is also understandable that this debate had not so much a speculative as a practical nature.

The views voiced by A.A. Svechin about strategy in the report also concerned the qualitative aspect of military organizational development. "Under our conditions," said Svechin turning to the people's commissar of defense, "we must give a significant advantage to a reliance on quality over quantity; a reliance on quantity

is a reliance on a positional and not a maneuvering war.... This is the best method of devastating a state." Svechin's definition of the qualitative parameters is extremely timely now, when a search is underway for new approaches to the problems of defense organizational development.

The constructiveness of the strategic views of the prominent military scientist A.A. Svechin has not lost its importance and many of them have been confirmed by practice. In this regard, we must particularly emphasize his support of the idea of a pluralism of opinions on the questions of military art; he was categorically against "sealing the lips of any critic."

Clearly, B.M. Shaposhnikov shared the same approach of A.A. Svechin. He felt that regardless of the insufficiency of information available to military thinkers and the thus inevitable errors, "all the same, it is not only interesting but even essential to listen to their arguments as the expression of the opinion of 'fresh' persons, that is, sitting in a permanent job and more quickly noting various errors."

As a whole, an analysis of the unique material found in the unpublished works of B.M. Shaposhnikov and A.A. Svechin makes it possible to bring out new features in the strategic views of these military leaders and to properly assess the breadth of view and the depth of their judgments on a number of problems which have not lost their timeliness even now.

Of course, it would be erroneous to feel that a judgment on strategic questions was a privilege of only the prominent figures; on the contrary, without a broad exchange of opinions among the professionals there judgments could not have been crystallized so vividly and clearly.

Many works on strategy by researchers in the 1920's and up to the mid-1930's, it is to be greatly regretted, continue to remain unknown to the readers. The given article will examine only certain of these. Certainly this question requires a separate study and in the given instance one can only outline broadly that contribution which the authors of these military scientific works made to studying the theory of strategy.

The well-known Soviet military theorist A.A. Neznamov repeatedly turned to the problems of strategy. Among such works is his article in which the strategic importance of modern equipment is examined.

In researching the question of the impact of new combat equipment on the nature of conducting combat, the author emphasizes that each appearance of a "innovation" plays a definite role "but in combination with others may require serious reforms, sometimes in areas not directly related to it."

In speaking about the strategic importance of equipment, Neznamov particularly stressed that "equipment is capable to an enormous degree of increasing the combat energy of the live element but by itself without this element cannot be of benefit." In this regard, for achieving a strategic success, in the author's opinion, there must be the strictly advisable involvement of equipment and the limits of this involvement "can be determined only by a true military man."

The author offered his own definition of strategic surprise, "that is, surprise against which there is no means for establishing a sufficient counteraction in a short period of time. Much time will pass until such counteraction can be organized (built) and during this time initiative to a certain degree will shift to the enemy side."

The secret of the art which provides serious advantages to the process of creating strategic surprise consists, in Neznamov's opinion, "in the prompt recognition and prompt 'adaptation' to technical 'innovations'."

The article by N. Lyamin "Defeat and Attrition" published in the journal *ARMIYA I REVOLYUTSIYA* (No 1, 1926) provides a detailed analysis of the views of military authorities of the 16th-19th Centuries on the forms and methods of waging war. The author distinguishes the two leading trends: "a war of defeat" and "a war of exhaustion (attrition)."

In tracing the history of wars, the author notes the consistent change in the methods of waging war: either the method of defeat or the method of wearing down the enemy forces. "The strategy of a modern war," the author concludes, "is becoming evermore flexible, more dialectical and variable. The method of waging war does not remain unchanged over the entire war but rather undergoes a number of changes which are felt in the scale of the individual campaigns and even in the process of conducting individual operations. The method of how to wage a war—by the method of defeat or by the method of wearing down the enemy—is of profound practical importance. A correct solution to this question before the start of a war will determine the carrying out of measures in the area of organizing the armed forces, developing industry and the railroads, education and training of the army. All strategy, tactics and their calculations with these two completely different methods of waging war also differ. It would be absurd for the just voiced reasons to view the conduct of an entire war as a whole following one of these two methods. Clearly, the most farsighted politician and strategist will be unable to anticipate the entire course of a war. He can make his plans only for the first period in relying on the methods of conducting operations which get underway directly after the start of the war."

N. Lyamin particularly emphasized that there is confusion in the definition and content invested in the notion of attrition. In the author's opinion, the notion of attrition must not be identified with the concept of the

defensive. It is all the most unacceptable to confuse the concept of a strategic offensive or defensive with the concept of the defensive and offensive in the historical political sense. Characteristic is a statement by Zinovyev which the author gives in his article: "We should precisely distinguish between an offensive and defensive war in the historical, concrete sense and a defensive and offensive war in the diplomatic and strategic sense. A parallelism between either is in no way obligatory. There are possible instances when a war which is defensive in the historical sense is offensive in the strategic sense and vice versa...."

"A state wages an offensive war when by this war it defends a policy impeding historical progress. A state conducts a defensive war when in the arrangement of things it defends or protects historical progress.... In the age of imperialist wars, in the age of wars conducted at the higher stage, with maximum maturity of capitalism, a defensive war can be waged only by a victorious socialist state against a capitalist, imperialist state."<sup>2</sup>

N. Lyamin arrives at a conclusion on the probability of "future wars, and particularly their first part in a style of attrition." "If we are forced to fight in the near future," he pointed out, "then the first period of the war, up until the completion of economic mobilization and the full deployment of the Red Army, until the increase in the revolutionary movement in the enemy and the exhaustion of its moral and physical forces, we will be forced to conduct following the method of attrition."

The article of A. Zayonchkovskiy "The Democratization of Strategy"<sup>3</sup> is devoted to the noble task of popularizing the study of strategy. The essence of a modern war demands from the commanders, in the authors opinion, strategic knowledge. Questions of a strategic nature more and more are part of the daily work "not only of wartime but also peacetime, if strategy is given a broader interpretation in the sense of preparing the military might of a people."

"The sphere or radius of activity of a general and a commander of a middle-level troop formation are very different," Zayonchkovskiy emphasized, "but they should both be to greater or lesser degree strategists. In modern armies strategic art should move down from the superior staffs to the small cells of the line units, it is to be democratized and without fail should be among those books with which the line commanders are familiar."

In briefly setting out the main provisions of the strategic views among the prominent military figures of the past, A. Zayonchkovskiy pointed out that "a majority of writers give strategy a vital, practical character and consequently for this reason is within the reach of all the commanders who have obtained at least the military theoretical and practical training which provides them with an understanding of the individual elements of military affairs and the possibility of consciously investigating their aggregate employment in a war."

A. Zayonchkovskiy was against the blind following of the prescribed standards and routine in military art. "Grief will befall that army," the author of the article pointed out, "in which the command in all its mass does not abandon this alpha and omega of their predecessors. Command personnel educated solely in employing a prescribed standard in tactics, the letter of the order in training and routine and cramming in education should not have a place in the wars of the near future. At present, each tactician should be to a greater or lesser degree a strategist, so complex have our military affairs become and so greatly the intertwined conglomerate of all elements of a war has grown and without being limited to just the top of the troop mass, this has now permeated the entire body in all the diversity of combat life."

A most important feature, in the opinion of Zayonchkovskiy was the fact that the showing of independence and initiative as an essential component confronted the commanders. All of this "involves the entire mass of commanders in the strategic art." By independence Zayonchkovskiy understood the independent choice of the means for carrying out the set task. By initiative the manifesting of independent creativity by subordinates in a spirit of the better execution of the main idea of a senior chief.

In the view of Zayonchkovskiy, the senior chiefs should turn over a portion of their authority to the junior ones while the juniors should be included in the circle of thinking of the senior. The democratization of strategic art at the current stage consists in the fact, the author emphasizes, that life itself dictates the necessity for each commander "to become utterly absorbed in the strategic area." "A regimental commander and all the more a commander of a division and higher," Zayonchkovskiy feels, "works in such an expanse that the sphere of activity involuntarily departs from the narrow battlefield and moves into the sphere of strategic combinations.... On the one hand, the area of work of each troop organism and, consequently, its commander has been broadened; on the other hand, its work is narrowed by the necessity of being a small part in a very large troop mechanism extending over a great distance but at the same time carrying out one common main idea which in addition requires constant mutual aid and unity in work. The entire difficulty in a modern situation is that the parts of the complex machine of a modern army are put into motion not mechanically but rather with the aid of great knowledge and ability which drive them and which, moreover, should be created by a uniformity of approach to one's work and to the methods of thinking."

All of this is achieved solely due to the extensive knowledge of command personnel in the area of strategy. For precisely this reason, the article's author recognizes the "democratization of strategic art" as an urgent necessity.

Important questions linked with a definition of the concept of strategy and its particular features in coalition-type wars were raised in the article "Strategic Reserves" by

A.D. Shimanskiy. In analyzing the experience of World War I, he arrives at the notion that the strategic concepts of future wars inevitably will take into account the multinational, international nature of the opposing sides. In the notion of A.D. Shimanskiy, strategy in a modern war represents for the state and its armed forces a combination of a strategy for fighting as part of a coalition grouping or the "strategy of internal operational lines" and a strategy of fighting against coalition groups or the "strategy of external operational lines."

Of interest is the notion of A.D. Shimanskiy of the need to mobilize all the state's forces in a war even against a weak enemy. Strategy, as the author feels, must immediately alert "forces readied by policy" and deploy them in the theater of war. Otherwise, Shimanskiy feels, "they (the forces) must be strengthened by waves of reinforcements."

The author gives a great deal of attention to the question of strategic reserves which in the 1920's had been little worked on. A.D. Shimanskiy assumed that strategy should "divide its forces not evenly along the fronts and their operations but rather proportionately to the relative importance of them." Here he pointed to the necessity of creating strategic reserves or "a reserve common to all the fronts" and which, in using the words of the author, "would not delay, would not dawdle in idleness, and wander aimlessly." The ideas of A.D. Shimanskiy on the need for a strategic reserve of several fronts completely justified themselves in the course of the Great Patriotic War when a strategic reserve of the fronts was established (for example, the Steppe Military District formed in the course of preparing for the Kursk Battle in 1943).

In his work, A.D. Shimanskiy also devoted significant attention to the question of the battle task of the strategic reserve, to the forms of its maneuvering in strategic offensive and defensive operations and so forth. In speaking about the composition of strategic reserves, the author isolated two elements which form them. He considered in these, in the first place, "all the combat reserves of the state which had not yet been alerted or still not deployed in the theater of war but capable within a stipulated time (or times) of taking their place as strategic reserves" and, secondly, the portion of forces which strategy leaves for itself from among those forces deployed in the theater of war.... The composition of the strategic reserve is determined "by the aim, axis and urgency of the same operation."

The new aspects in developing the idea of strategic reserves in a modern war underwent severe testing in the course of the Great Patriotic War and showed their viability.

In briefly summing up the review of certain problems in the development of the theory of strategy as touched upon by authors of military scientific works in the 1920's and 1930's, we must first of all mention their timeliness and the original judgments on the proposed ways of solving. The innovative nature of many of them reflected



not only the indefatigable scientific search of the military theorists and practical workers and not only synthesized previous experience, but for many years to come defined the ways for the development of Soviet military affairs.

Along with the interesting scientific views among the military theorists of those times, from the standpoint of today there is also particular pertinence in that level of democracy, scientific competitiveness and pluralism of opinions which was characteristic of the situation of those times and which, undoubtedly, contributed to the flight of military strategic thought and was a manifestation of the authentic democracy in the development of Soviet military science.

In the second half of the 1930's, the development of Soviet military theory and particularly the theory of strategy went on in an extremely difficult situation. On the one hand, there was the growing threat of a new world war as well as military conflicts in various parts of the world and, on the other, the harsh testings which befell the Red Army under the influence of the consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality.

In the second half of the 1930's, the attitude toward studying the theory of strategy became worse and worse. Thus, in 1935, at the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, the curriculum of the military history faculty provided a 32-hour series of lectures on the theory of strategy, however during the year that the faculty existed, not a single lecture was given. With the establishing of the General Staff Academy in 1936, a course on strategy was not even part of its program. Representatives of the superior command, as G.S. Isserson has recalled, avoided giving lectures on strategic questions (with the exception of Tukhachevskiy who gave one at the start of 1937 on general problems of modern warfare).<sup>4</sup> More and more the questions of strategy were considered the prerogative of the superior leadership in the person of I.V. Stalin. Even the slightest hint of the need to investigate the questions of the theory of strategy collided with a blank wall. The unjustified repressions to which the already small group of military leaders and theorists working on the theory of strategy was subjected to halted the development of strategic theory. Many interesting concepts and ideas voiced in the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's were declared to be alien and wrecking.

The consequences of such an attitude toward the development of the theory of strategy, as is known, were fatal for the start of the war in 1941. The certain confusion and the inability to encompass the complex situation as a whole, to take an effective large-scale decision and subordinate to it the entire course of events to a significant degree were the result of the lack of strategic orientation and the unpreparedness to think in large categories of strategic significance...." recalled G. Isserson. "The rapid change of mind on the part of the military command which had already entered a mortal engagement with the attacking enemy was not backed up by the instilling of flexible thinking which was not

subordinate to any declarations and was free in taking quick decisions, as was considered essential under the arising conditions. This was precisely the reason that the command of the hither formations at the outset of the war did not gain from our progressive military theory that benefit which it could have provided."<sup>5</sup>

According to the information of G. Isserson, the decline in debates on the questions of the theory of military strategy in a definite sense told negatively on the development of a new area of military affairs, operational art, and here Soviet military theory had primacy in its development. As G. Isserson has written, "our operational art to a certain degree was contained in its own limits while the strategic sphere of the war remained, unfortunately, basically outside the research of military theory."

It can be said with a certain degree of confidence that the essence of the gap between the theories of operational art and strategy was that the latter dictated the initial premises to operational art, demanding from it completely definite conclusions; the reverse effect was minimal. "We were bound by definite concepts of a declarative nature concerning the offensive conduct of a war," confided G. Isserson, "that our army would be the most aggressive army; that we would shift military operations into enemy territory and so forth and so forth. These ideas were handed down from above as unquestionable guiding directives for our military policy and formed the basis of all the military thinking of the command personnel. During the period of Stalin's cult of personality, they assumed the importance of a law and could not be discussed in theory."

Thus, the studies by the General Staff Academy on the question "The Army on the Defensive" remained completely unnoticed. Done in 1938 for the first time "in all the history of the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and the General Staff Academy," this work did not gain appropriate recognition. Unfortunately, the opinion imposed from above on the superiority of the offensive over the defensive was an insurmountable obstacle for analyzing the results of the academy's work. The dialectics of the relationship between the defensive and offensive as recognized in words was not considered in practice, although this dialectic rests on the surface. "It is possible to adhere to an offensive doctrine," wrote G. Isserson, "and have a theoretically well elaborated defensive. On the contrary, it is possible to actually adhere to a defensive doctrine and neglect the careful elaboration of the questions of the defensive on an operational scale."

The wagering on a maneuvering war in no way contradicted the possibility of waging it both in the form of an offensive and a defensive. Here the defensive can assume not only a positional nature but also a maneuvering one. S.S. Kamenev on this question wrote: "Maneuvering warfare requires from the troops the ability to maneuver not only with the successful course of an operation but

also with setbacks." The profundity of this idea was beyond the reach of a majority of his contemporaries and for this we had to pay in 1941.

The conscious underestimation of the objective trends in military affairs, the violent instilling of strategic views and the elimination of broad strata of military theorists and practical workers from the elaboration of a theory of strategy—all of this naturally became established in the growing system at the end of the 1930's of command-administrative leadership over military science and could not but help cause the most negative consequences in the first encounter with combat reality. "The orientation of military theoretical thought and on which our command was educated over the years, out of inertia continued to influence the military mind, although it had long been in contradiction with the real facts of strategic reality..." concluded G. Isserson. "For this reason, the situation in which the Great Patriotic War commenced in June 1941 was unexpected for the entire subjective strategic and military theoretical orientation of our superior command and this gave rise to definite confusion and an inability to understand events, to subordinate them to one's will and seize initiative."

In summing up what has been stated, let us emphasize that the 1920's until the mid-1930's were a flourishing in the elaboration of the Soviet theory of military strategy. The objective needs of elaborating a military theory on a new methodological Marxist-Leninist basis, the necessity of analyzing the very rich combat experience of World War I and the Civil War and the demands of ensuring the defense capability of the world's first worker and peasant state—all of this was an impetus for the awakening of military thought. The catalyst of creative activity was also the atmosphere of debate and a critical approach to any, even

the most authoritative opinions. The accomplishments of the theory of strategy of those times were a vivid reflection of the progressive nature of Soviet military science and its very rich potential.

All the finest that was elaborated by Soviet military thought in those years was employed with honor by Soviet military science as the starting point in terms of those new conditions which arose during the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War. Undoubtedly a large portion of the Soviet military leaders who headed the Armed Forces during the years of fiery testing was raised in the finest traditions of the military theoretical school of the 1920's and the mid-1930's. As the very rich experience of the operations and engagements indicates, during the war years there was a succession of advanced strategic views of that period.

At present, in analyzing the historic distance covered by our society, it becomes clear that much that had been forgotten or had been suppressed requires an objective evaluation. This applies completely to the questions of the development of the Soviet theory of strategy in the 1920's and until the mid-1930's. And not only this!

#### Footnotes

1. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1965.
2. Zinovyev, "Voyna i krizis sotsializma" [War and the Crisis of Socialism], Petrograd, 1920, p 150.
3. VOYENNAYA MYSL I REVOLYUTSIYA, No 2, 1923, pp 78-89.
4. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1965, p 50.
5. Ibid., p 51.

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**U.S. Air Force Medical Delegation Visit**

18010364 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 Feb 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Brigadier General R. De Hart, U.S. Air Force delegation head, by Colonel V. Pogrebenkov and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Ye. Agapova, in the column: "We Saw Everything We Wanted to See"; on the occasion of the delegation's visit to the USSR; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] "At one time I was being trained in identifying the silhouette of a Soviet fighter plane in 1/25th of a second. At that time I had no idea that in several years' time I would visit Russia on a mission of friendship." That admission by 52-year old Brigadier General Rufus De Hart of the U.S. Air Force started off our talk. R. De Hart, chief of an Air Force department dealing with professional training of physicians and quality assurance of pilot medical care, headed a U.S. military delegation on a one-week visit to our country.

He was a fighter pilot for five years before he took up the specialty of aerospace medicine. He graduated from a medical school, which is the equivalent of our medical institutes. He has three children, all of whom are serving in the U.S. Air Force. The general likes to fly, travel, fish, and take pictures. He is very energetic, possessing a marked sense of humor and love of life.

[De Hart] It seems that your newspaper has already reported that last year Admiral W. Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Marshall S. Akhromeyev put their signatures on a plan of contacts between the armed forces of the USA and USSR. Our delegation's visit is the result of that plan. Our great powers possess the most powerful armed forces and large-scale space programs. We should resolve problems in a safer world. We may not become bosom friends, but we are obligated to learn how to maintain normal relations. Nuclear war is madness. From the medical point of view, the number of human casualties would be incalculable. There is also the impossibility of rendering aid to anyone who may survive by some miracle. Medical people are in agreement with sober-minded politicians: A nuclear war cannot be won.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] As a military man, you must have been given instructions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before departing for the USSR.

[De Hart] Admiral W. Crowe himself did not speak with me. However, one of his deputies, in a conversation he and I had, did stress that we must continue to maintain official relations between military leaders of our countries. "Let this visit be useful and productive. Set up as many friendly contacts as you can," he told me.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Could you name, say, three outstanding features of American military medicine?

[De Hart] Only three? In that case I would point out three aspects. First, selection of healthy people for the Armed Forces and maintaining their health at a good level for the duration of their service. Second, medical care for servicemen's families. Finally, concern for the health of retirees and their families.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What illnesses are the most prevalent among American servicemen?

[De Hart] Mostly acute respiratory disorders.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It is about the same for us. What can you say regarding the AIDS threat? According to WHO data, at the end of last year there were more than 70,000 cases in your country.

[De Hart] That is not the most serious problem for the Armed Forces. We test all applicants for presence of the human immune deficiency virus. If the test results are positive, the individual is rejected. In the event a serviceman tests positive, he is sent to our hospitals. He is immediately denied the possibility of overseas assignment. AIDS patients are subject to discharge from the Armed Forces.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Physicians of all countries have much to say about the consequences of lack of physical exercise. In our opinion, Americans cannot be thought guilty of lack of interest in physical culture and sports. However, excess poundage is something that can afflict anyone. What does your Army do if an officer is overweight?

[De Hart] In that case a pilot may simply be discharged, especially if he refuses to stay on a diet.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Your surgery is famous for its progress, especially in the area of organ transplants. Could you tell us the salary paid the military surgeon?

[De Hart] That depends on his rank, of course, but \$60,000 to \$65,000 a year would be about average. As far as I know, Congress is willing to vote an increase.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Would you like to collaborate with our military doctors in particular areas?

[De Hart] We could work jointly to combat infectious diseases—including AIDS of which we spoke and tick-borne encephalitis.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What impressions are you taking home with you? Is there a wish you would like to extend to Soviet military doctors?

[De Hart] For us this was a pleasant and useful opportunity to visit the Soviet Union and get to know our Soviet colleagues. We realize that we are just starting our acquaintanceship. What impressed us? You have the remarkable Military Medical Academy, which is rich in



history. I liked the way medical care is organized in the Kantemirov Division. And, of course, the hospital ship "Yenisey" is outstanding. Its size is optimum and the medical personnel are well-qualified. The ship's doctors are capable of rendering effective medical care to your Navy.

Unfortunately, I could not become better acquainted with your aerospace medicine, I do believe, however, that you are on the right track, especially in medical care for flight personnel and centrifuge training. I would probably be right by saying that you are ahead of us in some areas, while we lead in others. Our delegation has discovered that we have much in common. Mainly in quality medical care for servicemen and their families. The visit itself was more successful than we had anticipated. We saw everything we wanted to see. Such contacts should continue. We wish all our colleagues in the USSR good health and success.

#### **U.S. Said to Use Weapon Systems Mock-Ups for Deception**

18010419 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
3 March 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Trofimov under the "Military Technical Survey" rubric: "The Pentagon's Trojan Horses"]

[Text] Military history has recorded a large number of stratagems used by commanders. An example is the siege of Troy by the Greeks and the use of the famous "Trojan Horse" for hiding warriors. Experience gained in fabricating deceptive devices has been employed often since that time. The right of use of stratagems by a belligerent was even specified in the Statute on the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, which was signed in The Hague in 1907 and is still in effect.

An example of deceiving an enemy was the Normandy operation of World War II. Upon arriving in the British Isles, General G. Patton ordered that several hundred tank mock-ups be built. They played a major role in confusing the Fascist intelligence. The Abwehr forces, after determining the location of columns of decoy tanks, were led to believe in the existence of the U.S. 1st Army Group, which was supposed to establish a beachhead in the Pas de Calais area. Sixteen divisions pulled from the 15th German Army were thrown there. However, we all know now that the Allies landed in an entirely different place.

Pentagon strategists are presently striving to employ camouflage deception in addition to political deception in their aggressive actions against many countries. They include the operation with the code name "Urgent Fury" that took the island of Grenada in October of 1983 and the bandit action called "Eldorado Canyon" carried out in April of 1986 against Libya, in which the Pentagon managed to achieve a tactical surprise.

In 1979 the U.S. Department of Defense issued a special directive announcing a new concept of troop security. It is based on the principle of "integrating the use of the entire arsenal of means and methods to conceal friendly forces and deceive an enemy."

Research on the role and position of military deception in U.S. defense activities was made public in 1983. Results of this research were compiled in a special report which was submitted to C. Weinberger, who at that time was in charge of the Pentagon.

In 1985 a special land warfare department dealing with the development of techniques for deceiving an enemy was organized in Fort Belvoir (state of Virginia). In September of 1988 fundamentally new means known as "decoys" within the military were adopted for use. Thus, more than three years have passed since these practices were incorporated into combat readiness courses for troops.

Robert Ackerman, co-publisher of SIGNAL, the American military journal, recently wrote the article "The Art of Deceiving the Enemy", in which he describes an example of one of the Pentagon's latest ideas—a mock-up of the Abrams M1A, the latest American tank. The mock-up is a flat, life-size photographic image of the tank in the form of flat pieces that can be taken apart and put together. This false tank (weighing 23 kg) easily fits into a portable pack that can be carried by a single soldier. Deployment time is less than five minutes. The new device is provided with a portable 1 kw generator for powering a thermocouple to produce a heat field simulating a combat vehicle.

Each Abrams M1A1 tank costs the Pentagon 2.6 million dollars, while the flat photographic image is much less expensive. This relationship makes it possible to manufacture 800 "decoys" for the cost of one actual tank. A contract placed with Teledyne Brown calls for supplying 1,100 of these mock-ups; a large number has already been delivered. The U.S. expects to accept delivery of a second generation of "decoys" and other types of the latest deception devices in 1991.

Is there a need to ascertain the enemy that will be deceived by this "decoy"? Foreign propaganda spares no effort to convince the public that it is Soviet tanks that will assault Western Europe. The newfound "panacea" for combatting them, in the opinion of the American publisher, facilitates the resolution of a number of problems. The idea is that a Soviet tank will fire at a "decoy", thus losing some of its ammunition supply. While the Russian gunner wastes precious seconds identifying the target, the Abrams will fire the first shot in this brief time period.

The Pentagon does not limit itself to the innovations discussed above. The Land Warfare Communications and Electronics Command, located in Fort Monmouth (state of New Jersey) is developing means and methods

of confusing an enemy by virtue of electronic deception. It awarded an 8 million dollar contract with Motorola Incorporated for dummy radio sets and radars. A similar department was created on the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (state of Ohio) by the Air Force. Experts there are not satisfied with the flat Army "decoys", since they are easily recognized by aerial reconnaissance. Air bases located in Western Europe will be provided with three-dimensional mock-ups of standard F-15 "Eagle" and F-16 "Fighting Falcon" aircraft, each to cost about 20,000 dollars.

Development costs of aircraft mock-ups amount to 3.4 million dollars in 1987 alone. Recent successful tests of these mock-ups carried out at the Eglin Air Force Base (state of Florida) led to letting an order for thousands of these mock-ups for the Air Force and the adoption of a program for creating means to deceive an enemy.

Initiated in 1989, this program is targeted against aircraft belonging to Warsaw Pact member countries. Carroll Scheidel, its leader, considers that this program is cost-effective, even if only one American aircraft will be saved at the expense of a decoy.

The U.S. Air Force is committed to creating a new generation of camouflage networks, corner reflectors, smoke and aerosol generators, camouflage shelters, false command posts, missile sites, etc. The new ideas have also influenced naval aviation. The time is long gone when naval pilots flying over Vietnam dropped silver foil used to wrap sandwiches to throw off air defense systems. All naval aircraft are loaded with automatic devices that drop cassettes containing chaff and decoy flares to confuse air defense missiles. Undergoing testing is a new wide-spectrum decoy which remains in operation throughout an aircraft's flight.

The U.S. Marine Corps is actively working on mock-ups of combat materiel. "Analogues" of the AV-8 "Harrier" fire support aircraft have been delivered.

To justify research in this area, Robert Ackerman insists that the Russians will soon move away from the defensive nature of their doctrine. It would appear that the Americans would require all these clever devices to repel the invasion.

#### **Defensive Character of U.S. Deterrence Challenged**

18010435 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Mar 89 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Lt Col V. Rodachin, candidate of philosophical sciences, under the rubric "Prisoners to Obsolete Approaches": "Defense Based on Force?"]

[Text] Continuity is a wise word. It connotes the possibility of learning past experience for advancing toward a better future. It can sometimes also be alarming, however. When one encounters attempts to immortalize

obsolete, outmoded concepts and approaches, for example. Particularly in such a sensitive area to all mankind as the military. Specifically, this feeling of alarm is cast by statements coming out of Washington on its readiness to continue pursuing the same course in the area of national defense.

In order to understand the causes of this alarm, one needs to turn to the basis and the principles underlying that course, particularly since the G. Bush Administration is just beginning to explain its attitudes on the matter to the public. It is important also because the U.S. military doctrine which is presently the basis for ensuring national security is persistently publicized by its authors as thoroughly defensive. A report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) "The Military Status of the United States for Fiscal Year 1989," for example, openly states: "U.S. military strategy is designed to prevent war with deterrence [i.e. intimidation], while at the same time contributing to the establishment of a situation of security and democracy in which the USA and its allies and friends can secure their lawful interests. This strategy of deterrence is based on our devotion to peace and liberty."

Can one speak of the defensive nature of a military doctrine which achieves its objective with intimidation? Does it conform to the realities of a world saturated with weapons? Let us try to provide the answer by focusing on the three main "leviathans" of U.S. military doctrine.

Its first "leviathan" is its anticommunist orientation, which harbors a concealed inclination toward aggression. In all the phases of development of the U.S. national security doctrine it has been oriented mainly toward combatting so-called "world communism" headed by the Soviet Union. At first it had the objective of "throwing back" and "destroying" communism. Justification was given for the need for "realistic restraint" of communism following the elimination of the USA's nuclear monopoly and the development of a Soviet missile capability. The stress was then shifted to "effective," in the words of former U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger, restraint of the Soviet Union and its allies, expressed in a clearly confrontational, aggressive spirit. "We are striving," a document entitled "U.S. National Security Strategy," signed by the President in 1987, stated, "to restrain further Soviet direct and indirect aggression.... We shall continue to resist Soviet expansionism throughout the world.... The most important fact is that American-Soviet relations are essentially **relations of rivals** (emphasis mine—V.R.) and will continue to be such in the foreseeable future."

This is followed by a stipulation that it is essential to ensure "that these relations remain peaceful," to be sure. It does not essentially change things, however. It is difficult to consider as defensive a doctrine based on active "restraint" of nations belonging to a different social system, with the stress primarily on offensive nuclear weapons. This approach is clearly in conflict with both the interests of protecting peace and the new

realities in the development of human society. A confrontation of social and political interests, national hostility and ideological incompatibility have led to devastating wars in the past. Today, they harbor the danger of catastrophe.

An emphasis on strength and on the achievement of superiority over the Soviet Union in all the components of military strength constitute the second "leviathan" of the doctrine, which contradicts the defensive nature attributed to it. "U.S. National Defense Strategy" states that "a powerful American capability is extremely important for preserving a stable and safe world." This principle is most closely combined with the mission "of achieving and maintaining long-term military superiority of the USA over the Soviet Union" by "pitting long-term U.S. advantages in certain areas against long-term Soviet weaknesses in others."

It is clear that U.S. politicians and military strategists have still not recognized the fact that the nature of modern weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, sets absolute bounds for the employment of military force. There are many dangers inherent in preserving and building up such devastating weapons as nuclear weapons. It increases the likelihood of the unauthorized unleashing of a war as a result of a computer failure, a false alarm, emergency situations and other accidental circumstances. Nor can we ignore a temptation by the superhawks to put nuclear weapons into play in a crisis. We recall that in 1948, in the heat of the Berlin crisis, H. Truman considered using the atom bomb against our nation. In May of 1953 D. Eisenhower considered the possibility of using nuclear weapons against China. In April of 1954 he offered France two atom bombs for breaking the blockade at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. The world was on the brink of nuclear war during the Caribbean crisis. R. Nixon considered a plan for escalating the Vietnam War by employing nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear forces was considered during the Arab-Israeli war in October of 1973 and during the Iran crisis in January of 1980. Nations have no guarantee that such situations will not be repeated.

For analyzing the nature of U.S. doctrine, one should bear in mind the fact that strivings for military superiority are alien to defense objectives. They are contrary to the very logic of defense.

Stress on a nuclear first strike is the third "leviathan" of the strategy of deterrence, which evokes the greatest alarm in peace-loving forces and thoroughly refutes its allegedly defensive nature. The U.S. now prefers not to overemphasize and not to direct particular attention to this stress, to be sure, as a result of negative attitudes toward it in the international community. The parts mentioning a "first," or "preventive," strike have been deleted from recent Pentagon documents, including those we have mentioned, and they refer only to a "retaliatory" strike. Nonetheless, there are real grounds for believing that this "leviathan" still exists. At any rate, no formal statements have been made so far to the effect that the USA will not be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

These are the facts. They demonstrate that despite all the talk about a desire to protect peace and statements that all actions of the U.S. in the area of national security are "exclusively defensive," those across the ocean are hesitant to abandon their reliance on force—and on the most dangerous version for the future of mankind, nuclear intimidation. They still refuse to acknowledge the fact that real security can be guaranteed today not so much by military as by political means.

The modern world is experiencing drastic changes. And these changes dictate with increasing urgency the need for fundamental changes also in strategic/military thinking, which must resolutely reject the obsolete stereotypes and transparent illusions. The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states are setting an example in this area.

We are encouraged by indications of growing realism in views on problems of war and peace which can be seen in the U.S. leadership. We are pleased with all the new signs of improvement in American-Soviet relations. We are prepared to participate in joint discussion of the fundamental principles of our military doctrines. This is important in order for that "extended hand" which President G. Bush spoke of in his acceptance speech not to "tighten into a fist," and particularly for it not to become the embodiment of a force "which can be used to great advantage." Advantage?



**Efforts to Improve Benefits for Afghan Vets in BSSR**

18010544 Minsk SELSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 1 Mar 89 p 3

[Interview with the CC Secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia, V. A. Pechennikov by A. Alekseychik: "Looking at the Needs of the Soldier-Internationalists"]

[Text]

[Alekseychik] Valeriy Andreyevich, we are all glad that Soviet forces have been withdrawn from Afghanistan. You see, that country may have been far away, but the war was not remote from us. The obelisks placed on the graves of our boys will be an eternal reminder of it. The weapons have been put away, but arguments about that war have not died down. In these arguments one can even hear voices speaking of a lost generation...

[Pechennikov] At present there are more than 16 thousand men living in Belorussia who did their international duty as part of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. For bravery and heroism, for exemplary execution of the tasks of the command, 3,605 of them were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, and four Belorussian soldiers were granted the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, no war is without victims. In battles on Afghan soil, 760 of our countrymen perished. Another 433 became disabled, including 24 category-one disabled, and 175 category-two. Indisputably this is a bitter statistic, for a person's life and health is his greatest value on earth.

As for the doubts and talk of a lost generation, on this subject one can only say this: Soviet soldiers entered Afghan territory with noble goals. And it is not their fault that foreign logs were thrown on the Afghan fire. They did their duty honorably, and in extreme situations they showed that they are fully worthy of the glory of their fathers. This is a good answer to those who see only infantile behavior and social and political passivity in today's young people.

Soldier-internationalists did not earn their rebukes, and they do not need consolation. They need understanding and fair treatment. It is no secret that the return to a peaceful life is by no means always without pain. Especially since not everything depends on the "Afghans" themselves.

[Alekseychik] At a meeting with the soldier-internationalists in the CC, CPB, Central Committee First Secretary Ye. Ye. Sokolov stressed that the party counts on their active participation in the processes of perestroika.

[Pechennikov] I also want to stress that people tempered in hard trials, possessing a keen sense of fairness and an implacable attitude toward deficiencies, are very necessary to perestroika. Those who went through the "school of Afghanistan" are precisely such militant people, even in civilian life. The press has already reported of Petr Petrashkevich and Gennadiy Brovko, who continue to work as tractor drivers even after losing their legs. There are collectives where whole detachments of former soldier-internationalists are working. For example, in the Minsk automotive plant, 141, and in the tractor plant, 150 men.

Combining their efforts, they perform active social work. "Kaskad", a student construction brigade of the Belorussian Institute of Economics, made up of reserve soldiers, every year includes adolescents with police records in its membership. There can be no doubt that the "difficult" ones come under a good influence.

In the republic, 190 councils and clubs of reserve soldiers have been created, and 100 youth military-patriotic clubs in which the internationalists are active. More than thirty of these veterans were put forward for vacant komsomol positions. In Gomel'shechin alone around 300 "Afghans" help to maintain order as part of the people's militia and operational komsomol detachments. The reservists help the disabled and families of the fallen, and at their initiative memorials are raised to the soldier-internationalists.

[Alekseychik] Nevertheless, let's go back to your words about attention and fairness. After all, they were not used accidentally.

[Pechennikov] The treatment of internationalists is not always or everywhere as they deserve. Of course this does not mean that nothing is being done in this context. The disabled and the families of the fallen have been allotted more than a thousand apartments on a priority basis. Around 2,500 persons have been put on the benefit rolls. Travel passes are issued to those requiring sanatorium care, and increased stipends are paid. And still, there are incidents of an inattentive, simply callous approach to the needs of the disabled and to the families of fallen soldiers. It has happened that "Afghans" have had to knock many times at different offices, and even listen to undeserved rebukes and accusations against them, as occurred in Novopolotsk. Letters began to come to us in the CC and other party committees relating such outrages. A mass check conducted in December of last year confirmed the complaints. The decision was made to meet with soldier-internationalists in the CC, CPB and talk over all problems with them. Such a meeting was held on 3 February. Questions asked at it were carefully studied, and on 22 February, a special decree of the CC Bureau was adopted.

The Bureau deemed it correct that the question of creating a republic military patriotic association had been raised. The CC, LKSMB, the Military Commissariat, and the CC, DOSAAF BSSR are already at work to

make it operational in a short time. The technical equipment level of each military-patriotic club will be checked. Executive committees of local soviets will examine the results. This is done in order that all clubs be provided with premises, equipment, and tools.

In the CC, LKSMB plans were also made to create a republic cost-accountable training methods and cultural center for military-patriotic education of youth. It will also be used for the organization of the leisure and physical training of young people.

The decree contains many specific assignments to party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms aimed at helping reservists participate actively in public life, and at educating pre-conscript young people.

At the publishing house of the Belorussian Soviet Encyclopedia, they have begun assembling materials on all the soldier-internationalists who died in Afghanistan. A special book will be dedicated to them.

[Alekseychik] And what will be the solution to the housing and everyday living problems that the soldier-internationalists must encounter?

[Pechennikov] In the executive committees of local Soviets of People's Deputies, they are forming commissions to study over a two month period the living conditions of each former soldier-internationalist and the families of those who died in Afghanistan. Specific decisions will be made from the results of the study. But if any problem proves to be too much for local authorities, it is suggested that materials be sent to the specially-formed commission in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the BSSR.

The CC, CPB Bureau has thus raised the question of providing a separate apartment or home to all the disabled and the families of soldiers who died in Afghanistan by the end of this five year plan. It has been recommended to trade union committees and councils of labor collectives that they provide for benefits in their collective contracts facilitating placement of soldier-internationalists on the apartment lists. It is proposed that they be included in commissions for the monitoring of distribution of housing in the enterprises and in the executive committees of the Soviets of People's Deputies.

[Alekseychik] But there is the following, not-unimportant nuance here. In accordance with the decree of the BSSR Council of Ministers and the Belsovprof [Belorussian Council of Trade Unions], the executive committees of the oblast and the Minsk Municipal Soviets of People's Deputies have established a procedure whereby a citizen may be placed on the apartment list only two years, or even five years, after his registration, differing in each oblast. Does this not postpone implementation of your plan?

[Pechennikov] It does not. The Council of Ministers has been asked not to apply the requirements on registration deadlines to the veterans of Afghanistan and the families of the soldiers who died there. Those who want to join an MZhK [Youth Construction Combine] or build their own house also will be given help.

I want to add that the decree provides for priority telephone installation for them, and for the families of the fallen, at a discounted rate. Sovmin [the Council of Ministers] has been asked to consider the question of a 50 percent discount from the cost of medicines for the children of fallen soldiers. They will be maintained without payment at pre-school institutions and boarding schools.

[Alekseychik] During the February meeting in the CC, the question of pensions was very urgent.

[Pechennikov] In this case I simply quote the corresponding clause of the decree of the CC, CPB Bureau: "Based on the requests made at the meeting, consider it correct to grant personal republic pensions to individuals who were disabled due to performance of their international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan, as well as to members of families of service members who were killed or died due to wounds, concussions, or illness acquired in Afghanistan".

[Alekseychik] And when does the republic Sovmin adopt this decision?

[Pechennikov] The government has taken quick action. The decision has already been adopted.

The BSSR Sovmin will petition the USSR Council of Ministers for the introduction of a 50 percent discount on income tax for former soldier-internationalists. It has been proposed that the decree of the BSSR Sovmin dated 13 February 1989 "On benefits for participants of the Great Patriotic War for travel on public transportation" be applied to those who fought in Afghanistan and family members of those who died.

[Alekseychik] Does the decree of the CC Bureau provide for measures aimed at improving the medical care of those wounded or taken ill in Afghanistan?

[Pechennikov] Yes, measures will be taken to improve the medical care of these persons, especially to improve orthopedic assistance to the disabled.

The Belsovprof, the Minzdrav [Ministry of Health], and the Minsobes [Ministry of Social Security] of the BSSR jointly with the Mogilev Oblispolkom [Regional Executive Committee] have undertaken the obligation to open a specialized VTEK [Medical Commission for the Determination of Disability] on the basis of the sanatorium imeni Lenin in Bobruysk. The farms located near the city will look after the sanatorium.

[Alekseychik] And a last question, on the employment of the disabled. You know, at present not all of them have an opportunity to obtain work according to their abilities.

[Pechennikov] Several home labor combines are being transferred to the Belorussian Association of the Disabled from the Ministry of Local Industry of the BSSR, along with the boarding house at Kalinin Street 7 in Minsk.

There they propose to establish a center for social rehabilitation of the disabled. Training facilities will also be created for their professional training and retraining.

In conclusion I will say that the Bureau of the CC, CPB in its decree has directed local organs of authority immediately to examine requests to improve living conditions of those families who have been entangled in red tape. And overall this document is drawn up in such a way as to maximally provide for the needs of Afghanistan veterans and satisfy them in accordance with their merits. The CC requires more thorough monitoring on the part of party committees and organizations so that the requests of veterans of Afghanistan are considered without delay, that incidents of inattention, and especially an indifferent attitude toward them, may be resolutely halted.



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